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Abstract
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) granted significant
access to fisheries resources to coastal States in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ),
including tuna. As tuna is a highly migratory species, international law requires that
States cooperate for the effective management of tuna stocks. The Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) provides
the framework by which such cooperation is to be achieved. The coastal and Island
States of the Indian Ocean including Kenya, achieve the cooperative management of
tuna through the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
As a beneficiary of the EEZ regime, Kenya has declared sovereign rights over
the fisheries resources in its EEZ. In recent years, because of the potential of the tuna
resources in its EEZ, Kenya has expressed its aspirations to develop these resources.
Kenya’s sovereign rights over the tuna resources in its EEZ are subject to relevant rules
of international law. The LOSC confers upon Kenya management and conservation
responsibilities as well as the residual duty to promote the optimum utilisation of its
tuna resources. The significance of Kenya’s regulatory regime for conserving and
managing tuna resources in its EEZ is exemplified by the LOSC and the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement.
This thesis analyses Kenya’s legal and policy framework relative to the
management and conservation of the tuna resources in Kenya’s jurisdiction, to ascertain
the consistency of this framework with the international and regional legal
requirements. This will require an examination of the relevant international and regional
legal requirements relative to the utilization of tuna and an analysis of the extent to
which Kenya has met its international and regional commitments.
Ultimately, this thesis argues that Kenya has not fully adopted measures
consistent with its international and regional obligations for the sustainable utilization of
tuna, and that Kenya’s current legal and policy framework does not adequately address
the long-term sustainability of its tuna resources. This thesis will aid in the construction
of recommendations for the review and reform of Kenya’s legal and policy framework.
These recommendations will include the formulation of a tuna management plan
v

calculated to enhance the management of, and benefits derived from Kenya’s tuna
fisheries. This thesis explores various options for the optimum utilisation of Kenya’s
tuna resources, with a view to fostering the sustainable development of Kenya’s tuna
fisheries. In developing an appropriate framework for the sustainable development of its
tuna resources, Kenya will necessarily require provisions and commitments that ensure
the effective management and conservation of the tuna resources in its EEZ.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The nature of coastal State sovereignty was dramatically changed by the
establishment of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The concept of the EEZ was
established with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC)1 in 1982.2 The EEZ concept which is considered one of the most significant
outcomes of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), has been described as “one of the most far-reaching institutional changes in the
international society of the twentieth century”.3 Ultimately, the adoption of the EEZ
changed the scope and range of human use of ocean resources. What was previously a
“vast ocean area” containing “an enormous wealth of natural resources” and forming a
part of the high seas has now been transferred to coastal States’ assets.4
The establishment of the EEZ was motivated by the socio-economic interests
that States had in the resources of this zone, particularly fish stocks.5 It is estimated that
over 90% of all presently commercially exploitable fish stocks are encompassed by the
EEZ.6 Thus, the legal regime of the EEZ is of fundamental importance. The EEZ
concept is a representation of the philosophy of the developing States,7 signifying a
departure from the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas which had prevailed in the

1
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1

customary conception of the law of the sea under traditional maritime law.8 The interest
of developing States to attain jurisdiction over the EEZ was evident from their assertion
during the negotiations that led to the adoption of the EEZ concept. The developing
coastal States of Asia, Africa and Latin America were instrumental in contributing to
this concept.9
The African States took a central position regarding the establishment of the
EEZ, and were particularly instrumental in advocating for the extension of coastal State
jurisdiction, in order to address their concerns. These States made immense
contributions to the evolution, articulation, development and concretisation of the EEZ
concept through their proposals, submissions and negotiations prior to, and during
UNCLOS III.10 The developing coastal States had two major issues of concern. First,
these States desired to have priority to the utilisation of the resources in the EEZ.11
Secondly, they claimed sovereignty over these resources and wanted to have stricter
controls over the terms and modalities of the participation of third parties in the EEZ.12
Their concerns were influenced by the fishing activities of distant water fishing States,
whose operations the African coastal States felt defied sound conservation practices.13
Other factors that influenced their concerns were; the demand for food and industrial
commodities; the impact of technology on the environment and on the coastal States;
and the threat to the environment from abusive uses of the sea.14 It was felt that the
fishing activities of distant water fishing States were damaging in the long-term. For

8
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2

these reasons, Several African States advocated that the coastal State should have an
EEZ extending 200 nautical miles, adjacent to its territorial sea.15
The concept of the EEZ was formally articulated by the Kenyan delegate, Mr.
Frank Njenga who was dubbed the architect of the concept.16 Mr. Njenga emphasised
the need for the international law of the sea to take care of the interests of developing
States and summed up the utility of the EEZ as follows:
The economic exclusive zone concept offers a good basis for resolving
the impasse between those who believe in a narrow and those who believe in a
broad belt of territorial sea. Basically, the purpose of the EEZ concept is to
safeguard the economic interests of the coastal States in the waters and seabed
adjacent to their coasts without unduly interfering with other legitimate uses of
the sea by other States.17
By advancing the concept of the EEZ, it was hoped that the competition for
resources of the EEZ between developing coastal States and distant fishing water
nations (DWFNs) would be reduced, and that developing coastal States would be able
to utilise the resources in the EEZ accordingly.18 In essence, the EEZ concept sought to
give all States equal opportunities to access the living resources of the EEZ for
economic reasons and also to protect the marine environment.19 For many States,
mainly the developing coastal States, the rights to the EEZ present an opportunity for
them to gain economically from utilising the living resources therein.20 As a strong
advocate in favour of the establishment of the EEZ, Kenya proclaimed its EEZ in
1979.21
15
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The fish stocks in the EEZ are among the most significant living resources of
economic importance to coastal States. Tuna is one of the key fisheries resources of the
EEZ. Its high economic value makes tuna significant in international fisheries trade.22
“About 65% of all tuna taken is captured within 200 miles off shore”, most of it within
the EEZ of developing coastal States.23 Like all other living resources of the EEZ, tuna
resources are subject to the rules of international law. The international instruments
governing tuna fisheries include the LOSC and the Agreement for the Implementation
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement).24 Additionally,
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct)25
supplements the provisions of these instruments.
The Indian Ocean has been impacted by the increase in the global demand for
tuna since the 1980s. With the increased demand, a significant amount of the fishing
effort shifted from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean.26 Tuna fishing operations in
the Indian Ocean increased rapidly as the purse seine fishery became more efficient.27
Fishing vessels from Spain and France targeting skipjack and yellowfin tuna expanded
their operations to the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region.28 A purse seine fishery was
started in the Seychelles in the 1980s by French seiners who had moved from the

22
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eastern Atlantic.29 The longline fishery in the region was dominated by Japan, followed
by Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia.30 By 2004, 26% of the global landings
of tuna were being taken from the Indian Ocean.31
Kenya is a coastal State of the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Kenya has
expressed its aspirations to develop its tuna fisheries, because of the potential of the
tuna resources in its EEZ.32 As tuna resources in the EEZ are subject to the rules of
international law, Kenya’s regulatory framework for governing tuna needs to articulate
Kenya’s obligations under international law. This thesis examines Kenya’s legislation,
policy and practice relating to the management and conservation of the tuna resources
within Kenya’s jurisdiction, to ascertain the consistency of this framework with the
international and regional legal requirements. The thesis proposes measures to address
the gaps and limitations in the existing legal and policy framework.
This introductory chapter provides a background to the global importance of
tuna, and highlights the sustainability concerns pertaining to its utilization. It also
provides an overview of Kenya’s tuna fishery and finally outlines the aims, structure
and significance of the thesis.

1.1 Global trends in Tuna Fisheries
The demand for tuna which has been increasing significantly since the 1940s,
has led to a change from small fleets to large-scale industrial fisheries which have
grown rapidly with the development of technology.33 Consequently, growth in demand
has resulted in increased fishing capacity and the large-scale decline of the world’s tuna
stocks.34 Today, tunas are fished commercially by eighty countries worldwide and the

29
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30
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size of the world’s tuna capacity has become a matter of concern.35 The tuna fishing
capacity is also considered to have become excessive.36 This excessive capacity has
resulted in overexploitation and in some cases depletion of tuna stocks. It is now evident
that ‘most stocks of the principal market tunas are nearly fully exploited’.37
The principal market tunas include albacore (Thunnus alalunga), skipjack
(Katsuwonus pelamis), bluefin (Thunnus thynnus, Thunnus orientalis, and Thunnus
macoyii), and yellowfin (Thunnus albacares).38 The catches of the principal market
tunas increased from less than 0.2 million metric tonnes (mt) in 1950 to 4.3 million mt
in 2003.39 The tuna catches for 2006 reached the all time maximum of more than 6.4
million mt,40 while the 2007 catches totalled approximately 4 million mt.41 The decline
in 2007 was associated with an increase in fuel prices.42 The global export value of tuna
products is US$5 billion, while the value of global tuna is 9% of total global fish
trade.43 The increasing fishing capacity and international demand for tuna puts the
sustainability of global tuna resources at risk.

1.2 Management and Conservation of Tuna
The manner in which tunas are utilised has consequences for its abundance, its
habitat, as well as for other species that are associated with or dependent on tuna.44 To
ensure future supply of tuna, it is necessary to utilize them sustainably. In modern
fisheries, the concept of sustainability seeks to ensure both human and ecosystem well-

35
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being.45 Sustainability is viewed broadly to include ecological, economic, social and
institutional aspects.46 Such a concept would thus ensure preservation of tuna resources,
and their supporting ecosystems, equitable distribution of benefits from tuna, economic
benefits and an effective governance system.47 In order to safeguard and promote the
sustainable utilization of tuna and all species associated with or dependant upon tuna, it
is necessary to implement an effective fisheries management and conservation policy
and legal framework.
The need to utilise tuna resources sustainably is evidenced by the global demand
and pressures on these resources. It is entirely important that tuna resources in coastal
States be utilised sustainably for the social, economic and ecological benefits they
confer to these States currently and in the future. By so doing, the ecological processes
of life are maintained to ensure food security and profits from tuna fisheries in the longterm. Tuna fisheries are particularly important to economies of developing coastal
States, and in particular for the Island States with limited land-based resources. For
example, the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the largest tuna
fishery in the world, with an annual catch exceeding 2 million mt.48 Tuna plays an
important role in the culture, nutrition, welfare, recreation and government revenue of
these Pacific Island Countries, as the tuna catches make up to ten times ‘all other types
of fish combined’ and the catch is ‘worth over seven times the value of all other Pacific
Island fish catches combined’.49

1.3 Tuna Fisheries of Kenya
Kenya is situated on the eastern coast of Africa (see Figure 1). Kenya has an
area of 590,000km2 and is bordered by Somalia to the north and Tanzania to the south.50
45

FAO, Indicators for Sustainable Development of Marine Capture Fisheries, FAO Technical Guidelines
for Responsible Fisheries. No. 8 (FAO, 1999) 22.

46

Jean–Jaques Maguire, ‘Is Fishery Science Helping to Achieve Sustainability in the North Atlantic’? in J
Swan and D Greboval (eds), Overcoming Factors of Sustainability and Overexploitation of Fisheries:
Selected Papers on Issues and Approaches. International Workshop on the Implementation of the
International Instruments and Factors of Unsustainability and Overexploitation in Fisheries, Siem Reap,
Cambodia, 13-16 September 2004. FAO Fisheries Report, No. 782 (FAO, 2005) 85.

47

Ibid 85.

48

This is approximately 50% of the world tuna catch. See Langley et al, ‘Slow Steps Towards
Management of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery’ (2009) 33, Marine Policy 271, 271.

49

Robert Gillet, Tuna for Tomorrow: Some of the Science Behind an Important Fishery in the Pacific
Islands, A report prepared for the Asian Development Bank, August 2005.

50

FAO, Fishery country profile, www.fao.org (accessed 31 August 2010).

7

Figure 1. Map of Kenya51

Kenya’s coastline is approximately 880 km long, with an EEZ entitlement of 230,000
km.52 The location and availability of tuna in Kenya’s EEZ is affected by two distinct
monsoon seasons. The monsoon systems are influenced by the movement of the InterTropical Convergence Zone, a low pressure zone which moves north and south of the
equator in relation to the sun.53 The location of the convergence zones are significant in
51
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determining the location and abundance of tuna because; “the convergences are the
areas of concentration of forage biomass for high trophic level species as well as
drifting debris which have an aggregative effect on tuna species”.54 The physical and
biological aspects of the Kenya coast such as the dispersal and recruitment of species
are influenced by the East African Coastal current, the South Equatorial current,
Equatorial counter current and the Somali current (see Figure 2).55
These currents greatly influence the distribution and migration patterns of
pelagic species like tuna along the coast of Kenya, creating high and low seasons of
availability. This in turn determines the activity of fishing vessels along the Kenya coast
as they pursue the tuna stocks during the different seasons. For example, large
concentrations of tuna are found along the east African coast, mainly during the season
dominated by the southeast monsoon. The tuna migration is influenced by the South
Equatorial current, compelling the tuna movement towards the west and the north, while
concentrating food resources to feed the stocks.56
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Figure 2. Kenya Coastal Currents57

Tuna are therefore mostly abundant in July and August, during which time the
fishing activities are highest (See Figure 3). This is the time for which a large
proportion of the purse seine fleets seek fishing licenses. Their catch records also reflect

57

Source: http://www.theissresearch.org/scientists/theiss/zanzibar/overview.jpg (accessed 25 July 2010).
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highest catches during these months.58 These migratory movements of tuna along the
east coast of Africa and the adjacent island States of the WIO are represented in figure
3.
The WIO is one of the relatively important fishing grounds for skipjack and a
principal fishing ground for yellowfin and bigeye tuna after Western and Central Pacific
Ocean and the Eastern Pacific Ocean respectively.59 Observations from tuna tagging
programs of the Indian Ocean have established that all three species of tuna migrate
across the entire Western Indian Ocean region,60 and that they are each represented by a
single stock in the entire Indian Ocean.61
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Figure 3. Migratory Movements of Tuna in the WIO62

Kenya’s EEZ is considered to have valuable tuna resources owing to its location
within the richest tuna belt in the Indian Ocean.63 However, Kenya’s domestic capacity
to harvest the tuna resources in its EEZ is limited, as it lacks the financial and
institutional capability, and the expertise to participate in the tuna fishery.64 Thus Kenya
is dependent on foreign fishing access to derive financial benefits from the tuna
resources in its EEZ.65 Only two longline vessels have been flagged to Kenya since
62
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2005.66 The target species for the vessel which is currently operational are swordfish
and sharks.67 The only tuna processing enterprise in Kenya is dependant upon imports
from the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) operating in its EEZ for raw
materials.68 Foreign access to Kenya’s tuna resources has been regulated through direct
licensing since 1996 to date.69
At least thirty-three purse seines and thirty to forty-five longliners have been
licensed consistently by the Department of Fisheries to fish in Kenya’s EEZ on an
annual basis.70 Most of these vessels are European and Asian, targeting skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye tuna.71 Most of the purse seines are from Spain, while the
longliners are mostly Taiwanese.72 Other States whose fishing vessels have been
consistently licensed to fish in Kenya’s EEZ include Netherlands and Belize.73 Since
2008 the numbers of foreign fishing vessels licensed to operate in Kenya’s EEZ has
dropped dramatically to only 29 (20 purse seiners and 9 longliners), while in 2009 they
dropped further to 22 (2 purse seiners and 20 longliners).74 These changes have been
attributed to the insecurity problem in the western Indian Ocean region caused by the
piracy off the coast of Somalia.75
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The annual fishing license fee for purse seiners to secure access to the Kenyan
EEZ is US$50,000 per vessel. This fee has recently been adjusted from US$ 20,000 in
2009.76 The license fee structure for longliners differs slightly from that of purse
seiners. The longline fishing license fee is reliant upon the duration of the fishing
operations of such vessels. This fee has equally been revised from the previous
US$5,000 per month to US$10,000; from US$7,000 for three months to US$20,000;
and from US$12,000 for twelve months to USD$30,000.77 Clearly, this fishing license
fee increase is an indication that Kenya has a desire to realise better financial gains from
its tuna fisheries. These license fees, which had not been previously adjusted since
1991,78 are considered very low.79 It is evident that Kenya does not derive
commensurate return from the licenses issued to foreign fishing vessels in exchange for
its tuna.80
For example, the total license fees received by Kenya in 2005 were US$840,000.
This amount ‘represents 1.4% of the value of the estimated 60,000 tonnes of tuna
obtained from Kenyan waters’ annually. This amount of tuna would fetch ‘more than
US$60 million at first sale’.81 Compared to the annual license fee of over US$ 90,000
charged by Seychelles, the Kenyan sum of US$20,000 was a very small sum.82 Foreign
fishing fleets are also required to pay royalties set as a percentage of the landed catch.
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However, very little if any royalties are recovered.83 According to a report by the UK
Department for International Development, the demand for foreign access to Kenya’s
tuna fishery is an indication that there is still a significant resource that warrants the
investment of DWFNs. Nevertheless, the UK Department emphasizes the need for
Kenya to achieve better compliance with the data reporting provisions it has put in place
in the terms and conditions for licensing.84
The review of the license fees being levied upon foreign fishing vessels in 2009
was long overdue. As foreign vessels have been fishing under license since 1991, there
is no doubt that this delay has caused economic losses to Kenya in respect of
government revenue. Furthermore, the fishing license fees still remain low even at the
current level. Kenya needs to derive commensurate return from the fishing license fee if
it is to meet its economic objectives for providing foreign access to its tuna resources.
Although the participation of DWFNs targeting tuna in Kenya’s EEZ appears to
be an opportunity for Kenya to derive economic benefits from its tuna resources, most
of the catches are landed and processed outside the region.85 The tuna resources in
Kenya’s EEZ are potentially significant, with DWFNs catching upto an estimated
60,000 tonnes annually as the seasonal migration passes through the Kenyan EEZ,86
with very minimal domestic landings. The fishing vessels rarely, if ever report their
respective catches to the designated national authorities so that information regarding
the composition of the species, the quantity of tuna caught, the sources of the catches
and the times of the catches is scarce.87 Considering Kenya’s lack of capacity to monitor
and control the fishing activities in its EEZ, illegal fishing activities and underreporting
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Hemphill, in the Standard Newspaper 09/02/2007.
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MRAG,
Control
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Fisheries,
Policy
Brief:
Kenya
(2006)
http://www.research4development.info/ (accessed 24 March 2009). The Fisheries Act makes it a
condition of the license for all fishing vessels to submit data to the Director of fisheries.
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(IUCN, 2009) 122.
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of catches further perpetuate the loss of revenue from Kenya’s tuna fisheries.88 The
effective management of the tuna resources under Kenya’s jurisdiction therefore
remains a challenge. As pointed out earlier, the management of tuna is subject to
international rules. For Kenya to develop the tuna fisheries in its EEZ and hence
increase the socio-economic benefits from these resources, it is necessary that its
international obligations and responsibilities in respect of tuna are met. Thus, there is a
need to examine the international legal requirements for managing tuna in the context of
Kenya in order to ascertain the national implementation actions of these requirements.

1.4 Objective of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to examine and analyse the implementation of the
international legal requirements for managing tuna by Kenya. The long-term
profitability of Kenya’s tuna fisheries is highly dependant on their proper management
and sustainability. It is indeed necessary for Kenya to achieve this if its tuna resources
are to contribute to its economic development.

1.5 Framework of Analysis
This research is based on a combination of a desktop study and field work. The
desktop study reviewed the international legal framework for managing tuna and
developed criteria for evaluating the consistency of Kenya’s legal and policy framework
with international requirements and best practice, and the consistent implementation of
these requirements by Kenya. The desktop study component involved a literature
review from the following sources; library research, official government reports and
documents such as development plans, economic surveys and the poverty reduction
strategy paper of Kenya. Reference was also made to relevant internet sources, journal
articles, and international instruments and European Community resolutions related to
fisheries. The field work component involved attending relevant international
symposia89 as well as interacting with the Fisheries Department and other relevant
88

MRAG, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries:
Final Report, London, UK, (2005) 55.
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The symposia attended were; Fisheries Economics Management and Tuna Management Workshop for
the Pacific Islands, The Australian National University, Canberra, 25-26 September 2006; IORG4Marine biodiversity and Fisheries in the Indian Ocean Region: Opportunities and Threats, Oman, 18-20
February 2007; First International Symposium on Climate Impacts on Oceanic Top Predators
(CLIOTOP), La Paz, Mexico, 3-7 December 2007 (The symposium was organised by GLOBEC, a
component of the international Geosphere-Biosphere research programme. CLIOTOP devotes itself to the
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government institutions in Kenya to access government documentation. Electronic mail
was used to communicate with authors of selected articles cited during the course of the
study as a means of obtaining additional relevant reference materials.
The legal and policy framework for fisheries management, and the management
practices of Kenya in respect of tuna were analysed utilising a framework. The
framework was based on the provisions of the LOSC and the UN fish Stocks
Agreement. The framework of analysis in this thesis was discussed at two levels; the
international and regional. The first part analysed the international legal requirements
for States to manage tuna. The LOSC provides the international framework for
managing and conserving all living marine resources. The LOSC also defines and
recognises coastal States’ sovereign rights and duties for the purpose of managing and
conserving living resources like tuna in their EEZs.90 Under the LOSC, tuna are
categorised as highly migratory species.91 Due to their highly migratory nature, the
LOSC provides the legal basis for the cooperative management of tuna resources.92 The
LOSC requires States to establish cooperative management arrangements and agree
upon conservation and management measures for tuna.93
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides a framework for cooperation among
States and facilitates the implementation of the provisions of the LOSC relevant for the
effective management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks like
tuna. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides the mechanisms for international
cooperation in management of such fish stocks and requires that this cooperation be
achieved through subregional or regional fisheries management organisations
(RFMOs).94 However, cooperation is still required even in the absence of such
organisations.95 Regional cooperation among the States involved in the Indian Ocean
tuna fisheries is achieved through the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). In the
study of oceanic top predators within their ecosystems and uses a worldwide comparative approach
among oceans, regions and species, requiring extensive collaborative effort); This was followed up by
Coping with Global Change in Marine Socio-ecological Systems, FAO, Rome, Italy, 8-11 July 2008;
Conference on Fisheries Dependent Information, Galway, Ireland, 23-26 August 2010.
90
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second part of the analysis, the tuna conservation and management measures established
by the IOTC were examined in order to determine the extent to which the principles of
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement pertaining to the conservation and management of tuna
have been articulated, and the relevant measures adopted by the IOTC. In addition to the
above instruments, the FAO Code of Conduct is also applicable to tuna as it establishes
“principles and standards applicable to the conservation, management and development
of all fisheries”.96
The pertinent provisions of the above international instruments have been
analysed in chapters 2 and 4. As a result of this analysis, three sets of criteria have been
formulated. It is against this framework that Kenya’s national implementation actions
are evaluated. The first set of criteria that should be met concerns the determination of
total allowable catch as a measure for catch limitation.97 Its implementation requires
Kenya to take “into account the best scientific evidence, and to ensure through proper
conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in
the EEZ is not endangered by over-exploitation”.98 The second set of criteria relates to
the submission and sharing of data. Under international law, Kenya is required to
contribute and share tuna fisheries data such as catch of target and non-target species
and fishing effort in a timely manner.99 The third set of criteria is concerned with
compliance and enforcement. The measures that may be taken by Kenya to ensure
compliance with laws and regulations adopted in respect of the EEZ include boarding,
inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings.100 Kenya’s enforcement efforts also require
the support of an adequate monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) mechanism.101
Kenya’s international and regional obligations are to be implemented in cooperation
with other Indian Ocean coastal and Island States as well as States participating in
Indian Ocean tune fisheries, through the IOTC.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis
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LOSC, Art 61 (1).
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The introductory chapter provided a background to the global importance of
tuna, and highlighted the sustainability concerns pertaining to the utilisation of tuna
resources. It also provided an overview of Kenya’s tuna fishery and pointed out the
challenges that Kenya is currently faced with in respect of the management of the tuna
resources in its jurisdiction.
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the international legal framework for
managing tuna. It reviews the consequences of the adoption of the LOSC to the regime
of freedom of fishing on the high seas in order to gain an understanding of the
development of international law with respect to the management of marine fisheries
resources. This chapter provides an analysis of the pertinent provisions of the
international instruments relative to the management of tuna. These provisions include
the general fisheries requirements for the EEZ. More importantly, this chapter analyses
the provisions that are dedicated to the management and conservation of tuna. It
underscores the importance of the international cooperative management of tuna and
acknowledges the role of RFMOs in facilitating such cooperation.
Chapter 3 examines the regional framework for the conservation and
management of tuna resources on the Indian Ocean. This chapter provides a background
to the governance of tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean and examines the role of the
IOTC, with respect to the management and conservation of the tuna resources of the
Indian Ocean. The chapter also examines the relevant provisions of the Agreement for
the Establishment of the IOTC,102 which is the basic document establishing the structure
of the Commission.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the international legal requirements for
managing tuna that are required in the IOTC. The chapter examines the conservation
and management measures that have been adopted by the IOTC in respect of tuna in
order to determine the approaches that the IOTC has taken to implement these
requirements.

This

provides

the

necessary

context

for

analysing

Kenya’s

implementation of its international and regional obligations relating to tuna.
Chapter 5 reviews national laws and policies of Kenya pertaining to the
development and management of fisheries. The chapter examines Kenya’s regulatory
framework in order to establish the arrangements it provides for the development of
tuna management strategies. This includes Kenya’s status with respect to its ratification
102

Agreement for the Establishment of the IOTC http://www.iotc.org/, hereinafter the IOTC Agreement.
(accessed 10 August 2010).
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of the relevant international and regional fisheries instruments and a review of Kenya’s
national laws and policies related to fisheries, and in particular tuna fisheries
management. In this chapter, Kenya’s national development policies and other fisheries
sector plans are also examined in order to ascertain the extent to which the fisheries
sector has been included in Kenya’s national development strategies. It will be shown
that failure to fully integrate fisheries into Kenya’s development discourse has impacted
the development of an appropriate legal and policy framework for national tuna
management.
Chapter 6 analyses Kenya’s legal and policy framework as well as the
management practices relative to the management and conservation of the tuna
resources in Kenya’s EEZ in order to ascertain the consistency of this framework with
the international and regional legal requirements. Kenya’s national framework and tuna
management practices are assessed using the findings from chapters 2 and 4 of the
thesis. It will be shown that Kenya has not fully adopted measures consistent with its
international and regional obligations for the sustainable utilization of tuna, and that
Kenya’s current legal and policy framework, and management practices do not
adequately address the long-term sustainability of its tuna resources.
Chapter 7 explores the options available to Kenya for the optimal utilisation of
its tuna resources, by reviewing the approaches that other coastal States have taken to
the development of tuna fisheries resources in areas within their national jurisdiction.
The options examined include domestic tuna industry development and fisheries access
agreements, including the European Union Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs).
The chapter provides examples drawn from the experience of other States in order to
provide lessons for Kenya. The chapter emphasises the need for Kenya to develop a
rational management regime for the tuna resources in its EEZ in order to fulfil its
international obligations.
Finally, Chapter 8 synthesises the results of the research and concludes that,
Kenya has not fully adopted measures consistent with its international and regional
obligations for the sustainable utilization of tuna, and that Kenya’s current legal and
policy framework does not adequately address the long-term sustainability of the tuna
resources under its jurisdiction. Kenya’s fisheries laws and policies are generic and are
not tuna specific. The chapter recommends that Kenya adopt measures that would
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ensure the long-term sustainability of its tuna resources, including the formulation of a
legislated tuna management plan.

1.7 Significance of the Research
The significance of this thesis is threefold. First, it makes a significant
contribution to the academic literature on Kenya’s tuna fisheries. There has been no
other study carried out to critically examine the national implementation of international
legal obligations in respect to tuna in Kenya. This thesis underscores the policy
implications of the international and regional instruments for the sustainability of
Kenya’s tuna resources.
Second, the conclusions drawn from the analyses in this thesis will be
instrumental in informing the current policy debate on how Kenya’s tuna resources
should be utilised. These results provide a basis upon which policy decisions can be
made for the long-term sustainability of Kenya’s tuna resources. The recommendations
will assist Kenya to formulate strategies for implementing its international and regional
obligations with a view to promoting the long-term sustainability of tuna resources,
particularly nationally and regionally.
Third, the thesis will help to improve Kenya’s understanding of its international
and regional commitments for conservation and management of tuna fisheries. The
findings of the research and the recommendations will help Kenya to improve the
current management practices in its tuna fisheries and could be applied to other coastal
States in the WIO region.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING TUNA
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the international legal framework
governing the conservation, management and utilization of tuna resources. This
framework responds to the biological characteristics of the tuna species. This chapter is
therefore divided into three specific parts. First, the unique biological characteristics of
tuna will be reviewed. The life cycles of the tuna species of concern to the present thesis
will also be discussed. This is essential to understanding the nature and context of the
international legal framework for governing tuna fisheries.
The second part of the chapter analyses the measures adopted pursuant to the
LOSC, and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which are required to be implemented by
contracting States for the conservation and management of tuna stocks.

A brief

summary of the rights of coastal States in the EEZ will be provided. Additionally, the
general obligations relative to the conservation and management of fisheries resources
in the EEZ, and which are also applicable to tuna are discussed. An analysis of the
obligations imposed upon States under the LOSC with respect to the conservation and
management of tuna stocks owing to their biological characteristics is provided. This
part also underscores the obligation of States to cooperate with each other in the
management of tuna stocks and highlights the inadequacies of the LOSC in providing a
framework for such cooperation and the role of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in this
respect. Additionally, the role of RFMOs in facilitating cooperation between contracting
States for the purpose of meeting their respective obligations is underscored. The
concept of the “duty to cooperate” within the meaning of the LOSC and the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement is analysed. Such analysis provides the basis upon which the
conservation and management measures for tuna are to be implemented.
Third, a set of criteria for the assessment of the adequacy of Kenya’s legal and
policy framework for the management of the tuna resources within its jurisdiction is
established and analysed. The criteria are drawn from the material analysed and
presented in the preceding two sections of this chapter.
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2.2 Biological Characteristics of Tuna
Tuna and tuna-like species belong to the sub-order Scombroidei, which is
comprised of ‘true tunas’ (albacore, yellowfin, bigeye, Atlantic, Pacific and southern
bluefin tuna), skipjack, billfish, swordfish and other tuna-like species.1 The term tunas
is often used to refer to tuna and tuna-like species.2 In this thesis these two terms are
used interchangeably. Tunas make up fifteen species in all, including the most
economically important species.3
Tunas are pelagic and occupy the upper layers of the tropical, subtropical and
temperate oceans.4 The smaller species of tuna and juveniles of the larger species are
found in the upper layers up to about 200 m, above the thermocline,5 while the larger
species occur in the deeper, cooler waters.6 However, some tunas such as skipjack,
albacore and bluefin are found in both these depth ranges.7 Although all tunas and tunalike species occupy a high trophic level as adult predators, their highly versatile and
opportunistic8 feeding behaviour and ontogenetic9 changes in their feeding habits mean

1

Jacek Majkowski, Global Fishery Resources of Tuna and Tuna-like Species, FAO Fisheries Technical
paper No. 483 (FAO, 2005) 2. For further reading and taxonomy of tunas, See Witold L Klawe, ‘What is
a Tuna?’ (1977) 39(11) Marine Fisheries Review; B B Collete and C E Nauen, FAO Species Catalogue
Vol. 2, Scombrids of the World. An Annotated and Illustrated Catalogue of Tunas, Mackerels, Bonitos
and Related Species known to date (FAO, 1983), FAO Fisheries Synopsis 125 (2); I Nakamura, FAO
Species Catalogue: Vol. 5, Billfishes of the World. An Annotated and Illustrated Catalogue of Marlins,
Sailfishes, Spearfishes and Swordfishes known to date (FAO, 1985), FAO Fisheries Synopsis 125 (5); J
Joseph, W Klawe and P Murphy, Tuna and Billfish-Fish without a Country (Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, 2nd ed, 1980).
2

Jacek Majkowski, Global Fishery Resources of Tuna and Tuna-like Species, FAO Fisheries Technical
paper No. 483 (FAO, 2005) 2.
3

FAO, Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries, Fisheries Circular No. 963 (2001) 4; Jacek Majkowski, Global Fishery Resources of Tuna and
Tuna-like Species, FAO Fisheries Technical paper No. 483 (FAO, 2005) 2.

4

Biological Characteristics of Tuna, http://www.fao.org/ (accessed 19 May 2010).

5

The thermocline is the region below the surface layer of the sea, where the temperature gradient
increases abruptly (i.e. where temperature decreases rapidly with increasing depth). It is usually an
ecological barrier and its oscillations have significant consequences on fish stocks distribution and ocean
productivity. http://www.fao.org/ (accessed on 19 May 2010).
6

Biological Characteristics of Tuna, http://www.fao.org/ (accessed 19 May 2010).

7

Ibid.

8

Tuna do not have strong preferences for certain prey at species level, but regionally and at a given time,
a few species may represent almost all the food of fish of a specific age group. See Biological
Characteristics of Tuna, http://www.fao.org/ (accessed 31 January 2011).
9

Tuna have three distinct growth stages; larvae, juveniles and adults. The Larvae live in warm surface
waters and feed mainly on zooplankton, small crustaceans, fishes molluscs and jellyfish. Juveniles prey
on epipelagic fish, crustaceans and squids. The adult tunas feed on juvenile tunas and other pelagic fish
like mackerels. See Biological Characteristics of Tuna, http://www.fao.org/ (accessed 31 January 2011).
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that over their life history, they occupy more trophic levels than any other group of
fishes.10 This is because tuna feed on a diverse range of prey across different zones of
the ocean during their different developmental stages as larvae, juveniles and adults.11
Fundamental aspects of the anatomy, biology and physiology of tunas aid them
in fast continuous swimming movements and also in adaptation to their habitat. Their
body shape and fins are streamlined to facilitate swift movement.12 Tunas also have an
extremely efficient metabolic system with a circulatory system that enables them to
thermo-regulate, therefore retaining or dissipating heat as is required. The phenomenon
of thermoregulation in tuna enables them to maintain swimming speed across the
oceans, dive to immense depths and recover rapidly after prolonged exertion.13
The migratory nature of tuna correlates with physical ocean properties such as
satisfactory temperature and oxygen, and the appropriate food supplies. To maintain
their high speeds for prolonged periods, tunas require large amounts of oxygen. By
swimming constantly with their mouths open, tunas absorb the oxygen from water
forced over their gills in order to satisfy their oxygen requirements.14 Due to their high
metabolic requirements tunas require ready access to food.15 For this reason tunas swim
constantly for feeding purposes, sometimes consuming up to “15% of their body weight
per day”.16 Such sustained cruising also enables them to migrate long distances in
search of seasonal food and to return to warm waters for spawning.17
10

FAO, Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries, Fisheries Circular No. 963 (2001) 4.

11

Tunas feed on prey found in the pelagic (open ocean), epipelagic (close to water surface) and
mesopelagic zones (180-900 meters deep). See Biological Characteristics of Tuna, http://www.fao.org/
(accessed 31 January 2011).

12

Donley, et al, ‘Convergent Evolution in Mechanical Design of Lamnid Sharks and Tunas’ (2004) 429
Nature 61, 61.
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FAO, Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries, Fisheries Circular No. 963 (2001) 4; Jacek Majkowski, Global Fishery Resources of Tuna and
Tuna-like Species, FAO Fisheries Technical paper No. 483 (FAO, 2005) 2; F G Carey, J M Teal and J W
Kanwisher, Warm Blooded Fish (1971) 11 American Zoologist 137.

14

Richard W Brill and Peter G Bushnell, ‘The Cardiovascular System of Tunas’ in Barbara A Block and
E Donald Stevens (eds), Tuna: Physiology, Ecology and Evolution (Academic Press, 2001) 81.

15

Kathleen A Miller, ‘Climate Variability and Tropical tuna: Management Challenges for Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks’ (2007) 31 Marine Policy 56, 60.
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B Stequert and F Marsac, Tropical Tuna Surface Fisheries in the Indian Ocean, FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper No. 282 (FAO, 1989).
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Jeffrey B Graham and Kathryn A Dickson, ‘Anatomical and Physiological Specializations for
Endothermy’ in Barbara A Block and E Donald Stevens (eds), Tuna: Physiology, Ecology and Evolution
(Academic Press, 2001) 124.
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All the major market species of tuna such as skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye
spawn in warm waters, but the adults migrate widely to feeding grounds in tropical,
temperate or sub-tropical waters, depending on the species.18 Tunas spawn abundantly
in the open water, with spawning females releasing up to 100,000 eggs per kilogram of
body weight per spawning.19 Females can spawn several million eggs per year.20 Tunas
display a strong schooling behaviour in the early life stages, during spawning and also
when foraging.21
Tunas migrate over long distances for purposes of feeding or reproduction. For
example, temperate tunas like albacore migrate across temperate waters to feed and in
tropical waters to spawn. The major species of tuna and tuna-like species have been
known to undertake movements of more than 1000nm.22 A number of studies have been
conducted and different methods employed in the study of tuna migration behaviour.
For example, temperature preference and oxygen tolerance of tuna have been used to
determine areas of accessibility for various species, therefore making it possible for
migration patterns and identification of stocks to be determined.23 Studies of the stock
structure obtained from tag-recapture data, fisheries data and archival tagging
experiments have also been used to indicate the vast movements made by the different
species of tuna across oceans.24
Because of their biological characteristics and the corresponding natural needs,
tunas are categorised as “highly migratory species” under international law. The species
that fall under this category are defined in Annex 1 of the LOSC. The highly migratory
species included in Annex 1 of the LOSC include tunas, bill fishes, sharks and
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FAO, Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries, Fisheries Circular No. 963 (2001) 7.
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Robert Gillet, Tuna for Tomorrow?: Some of the Science behind an Important Fishery in the Pacific
Islands, A Report prepared under RETA128: Alternative Negotiating Arrangements to Increase Fisheries
Revenues in the Pacific (2005) 17.
20

FAO, Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries, Fisheries Circular No. 963 (2001) 7.
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D Gary Sharp, 1979, ‘Areas of Potentially Successful Exploitation of Tunas in the Indian Ocean with
Emphasis on Surface Methods’ in J D Ardill 1984, Tuna Fisheries in the South West Indian Ocean
(1984), http://www.fao.org/ (accessed on 20 May 2010).
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Block, et al, ‘A New Satellite Technology for Tracking the Movements of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna’
(1998) 95(16) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 9384.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC21347/ (accessed 20 May 2010).
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cetaceans.25 Species listed as highly migratory are so listed because they travel
appreciable distances in the areas of the ocean.26 As such, tunas are entirely mobile and
may during their lifetime enter and exit the waters of a number of jurisdictions.27 As a
result, several states have jurisdiction over tuna as they migrate between the coastal
zones of different States and the high seas.
It is argued that, not all tunas move so extensively, and that there are some
coastal species which migrate more widely than some tuna.28 The species categorised in
Annex 1 are therefore not considered representative of all highly migratory species.29
The highly migratory species categorisation of tuna is considered political and not
biological, a factor which is believed to have limited the number of species identified in
Annex 1 of the LOSC.30 The reason for the political categorisation and interest arises
from the high commercial value associated with tuna and their global economic
importance in international trade.

2.3 Life Cycle of Tuna
The tuna species relevant to this thesis fall into the category of principal market
tunas.31 The market tuna species of concern to this thesis are bigeye (Thunnus obesus),
25

LOSC, Annex 1.
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Evelyn Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: the Nonsustainable
Nature of High Seas Fisheries’ (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 255, 257.
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Jacek Majkowski, Methodological Workshop on the Management of Tuna Fishing. (FAO, 2007) 156.
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Ray Hilborn and John Sibert, ‘Is International Management of Tuna Necessary?’ (1988) 12(1) Marine
Policy 31; John Gulland, ‘Policy notes, Tuna and international institutions’ (1988) 12(4) Marine Policy
408.
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(FAO, 2006) 4.
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yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) and skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis).32 These species are
categorised as tropical tunas and they are highly prolific.33
Yellowfin tuna are found in tropical and subtropical seas but absent in the
Mediterranean Sea.34 This oceanic species occur above and below the thermocline and
they prefer a temperature range between 18o and 31oC.35 In terms of volume and
commercial importance, yellowfin comes second after skipjack.36 It has an average
weight of 25kg at maturity, attains sexual maturity at 2.8 years and has a life span of 10
years.37 Yellowfin spawns all year round and is usually to be found in near-surface
waters.38 It is usually marketed in various forms such as canned, fresh, frozen loins,
fresh fillets or smoked. Yellowfin are however used more for canning, and those
targeted by longliners are used for sashimi.39,

40

Up to 25% of the global catches of

yellowfin are from the Indian Ocean.41
Bigeye tuna are also found in tropical and subtropical oceans, with 15% of the
global catches being taken from the Indian Ocean.42 Bigeye has a maximum length of
180cm, weight of 225kg, and attains sexual maturity at 3.5 years.43 Bigeye has the
longest longevity of the three tropical tuna species. Bigeye has a life span of 10-15
32
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33
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years compared to a life span of less than 10 years for skipjack and yellowfin.44 Bigeye
tunas have a high fat content for insulation as they thrive in deeper colder waters
compared to yellowfin and skipjack tunas, making them suitable for sashimi. Bigeye
tolerates low temperatures and low oxygen levels, making them less resilient to
exploitation compared to skipjack and yellowfin tunas.45
Skipjack tunas are found in tropical and subtropical waters. They attain sexual
maturity at 1.5 years, growing rapidly to an average maximum length of 75cm and
weight of 23kg.46 Skipjack are prolific and make up the greater part of global tuna
catches followed by Yellowfin and bigeye, with their commercial importance in the
same order.47 They migrate less than the other tunas and spawn throughout the year
when conditions are favourable.48 Skipjack are generally more resilient to exploitation
than yellowfin.49

2.4 Legal Framework for Managing Tuna
In order to provide a historical perspective on the legal rules governing tuna
resources, an examination of the developments of the law of the sea is necessary. This
thesis does not present these developments in chronological order, but simply provides a
broad overview of the significant developments with respect to tuna.
In recent decades the fisheries regime has undergone substantial changes from
the freedom of the seas to enclosure.50 Historically, the concept of “open access” to the
world’s tuna and all other fisheries resources was the accepted norm that stemmed from
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the principle of freedom of the high seas which was conceptualised by Hugo Grotius.51
Grotius denied that national authority could reign over the high seas aside from a
confined coastal belt associated with coastal States.52 The area of territorial jurisdiction
then, was limited to a 3-nautical mile rule,53 and the area beyond the fishing zone was
free for access by all nations, though it was subject to flag State jurisdiction.54 Grotius’
17th century freedom of the seas concept eventually evolved into customary
international law and even today it remains a significant part of international fisheries
management.55
The doctrine of the freedom of the high seas was based on the notion that ocean
resources were inexhaustible.56 Under this doctrine, the implications for the
sustainability of fisheries resources such as tuna were adverse, as there was no control
of exploitation of fisheries resources beyond the territorial jurisdiction. Since most
States were interested in short-term economic benefits, they did not design management
approaches that would sustain fisheries resources. Tuna, like the other fisheries
resources of the oceans became exposed to overexploitation, as a result of uncontrolled
fishing especially by DWFNs.57 Evidently these fishing activities led to overexploitation and over-capitalisation of most fisheries,58 and the decline of fish stocks
became evident.59
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The resultant disputes between coastal States and DWFNs created the need for
the regulation of fishing activities with respect to access, and the realisation that
management measures needed to be instituted to enhance conservation of marine
fisheries resources as a whole.60 For most coastal States, extended coastal State
jurisdiction over the fisheries resources was the preferred method for controlling fishing
activities in their waters,61 and the unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction by
coastal States therefore ensued.62 The United Nations responded by convening a series
of multilateral Conferences on the Law of the Sea,63 seeking to find conservation and
management solutions for high seas fisheries resources and to regulate the maritime
claims that were being made by coastal States.64 Hence, the codification of the Law of
the Sea, which started from the 1930 Hague codification conference.65
The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources
of the High Seas,66 which was adopted at UNCLOS I was an attempt to respond to the
conservation concerns of the high seas fish stocks, as evidenced by the summary in its
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preamble.67 The High Seas Fisheries Convention which highlighted the consequences of
overexploitation and called for international cooperation amongst States in addressing
conservation issues provided the definition of conservation of the high seas’ living
resources as:
….the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable
yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other
marine products.68
However, the High Seas Fisheries Convention still retained the high seas tenets
which required fishing vessels to observe only the law of their own flag State.69 The
High Seas Fisheries Convention did not concern itself with the conservation of highly
migratory species like tuna and it failed to provide the appropriate mechanisms for
effective regulation and enforcement for the conservation and management of tuna
resources on the high seas for various reasons.
First, the convention did not provide any means of enforcement against States
that were not party to an agreement as far as the conservation of fisheries resources
beyond the jurisdiction of coastal States was concerned.70 Secondly, there were
conflicting political concerns between States regarding some of the provisions. For
example, some States were of the view that a coastal State “should not be entitled to a
special interest solely because of its geographically privileged position”; as such, the
coastal State could easily reach an agreement with other fishing States on issues related
to the conservation of fisheries resources.71 On the other hand, it was the opinion of
67
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other States that the provisions were not sufficient to protect the special interests of the
coastal State.72 Third, disagreements arose concerning the equitable distribution of
resources among States.73 Consequently, many major fishing States failed to ratify the
High Seas Fisheries Convention,74 making the chances of its effectiveness in
conservation of tuna and other fisheries even less.75

2.4.1 Establishment of the EEZ
The negotiations of UNCLOS III resulted in the adoption of the LOSC, a new
international order for the oceans of the world.76 The LOSC revolutionised the legal
regime relative to fisheries and brought to an end the notion of the freedom of the seas
for a large proportion of marine resources. The LOSC also brought about the division of
the oceans into zones and gave greater national control and jurisdiction to States over
significant areas “in terms of human use, of ocean space”.77 With respect to fisheries,
the LOSC introduced various regimes. The most significant regime in relation to the
governance of marine fisheries resources including tuna is the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). In any event, the EEZ was perceived as establishing a balance between those
States laying claim to a 200nm coastal area such as Latin America and African States,
and States that were not particularly supportive of the idea of extending the coastal
jurisdiction of States. Accepted as a compromise of sorts, the EEZ concept gave way to
its inclusion in the LOSC since it was accepted by a majority of contracting States.78
The EEZ concept “changed the jurisdictional framework of fisheries
worldwide”.79 This is because the LOSC permitted coastal States to extend their claims
over jurisdiction to what was previously high seas, thus bringing a significant
72
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proportion of the fisheries resources that had once been freely accessed, under the
jurisdiction of coastal States. Access to fish became the “prerogative of the nearest
State, usually referred to as the coastal State”.80 “More than ninety percent of the global
fish catch is estimated to be taken within waters under the jurisdiction of coastal
States”.81
The creation of the EEZ provided coastal States with the authority to manage
and control access to fish that were in their EEZ either for their “benefit individually or
in cooperation where stocks are shared among two or more States”.82 Churchill and
Lowe argue that EEZs reflect the developing countries’ desire for “economic
development” and for obtaining increased “control over the economic resources off
their coasts, particularly fish stocks” which were for the most part the subject of
exploitation by the fishing vessels of developed countries.83
On another level, the creation of the EEZ meant that some States that previously
benefited from the larger free for all ocean territory, have limited access to fishing
grounds. In this regard, the creation of EEZs is tantamount to transferring “wealth from
distant water fishing nations to coastal States”.84 However, the EEZ also facilitates
motivation for generating wealth via the improved management of fish stocks.85
Regardless, the creation of the EEZs means or is anticipated to mean positive
consequences for EEZ resources with respect to economic development of the relevant
coastal States, particularly those coastal States where fish stocks are entirely significant
to their economies.86
The scope of the EEZ is defined in Part V of the LOSC where its physical range,
legal scope and the rights and obligations of coastal States are provided for. The EEZ is
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defined as ‘an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,87 which shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured’.88 Article 56 of the LOSC sets forth the rights, duties and jurisdiction
of coastal States within their respective EEZs. The sovereign rights entitle States to
explore and exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the EEZ, whether
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil.89 As a result, coastal States have been granted significant access and authority
to the fisheries resources of the EEZ, including tuna. Coastal States are not only able to
utilise the tuna resources in the EEZ for their own benefit but they can also limit access
to these resources and determine how they are to be utilised.90 The creation of the EEZ
means that the effected State owns and manages all of the resources, living and nonliving within the broad expanse of coastline.91
The exercise of coastal State rights is subject to defined general principles of
international law.92 The LOSC provides the scope of coastal States’ rights and
obligations for the purpose of managing and conserving fisheries resources in their
EEZs.93 In view of that, tuna are also subject to these general fisheries obligations.
However, there are additional obligations with respect to the conservation and
management of tuna which will be further analysed below.
The conservation and management responsibilities of coastal States in respect of
the tuna resources in the EEZ include the obligation to determine the allowable catch
(TAC) of the living resources in the EEZ,94 and also to ensure through proper
conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in
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the EEZ are not endangered by over-exploitation.95 In taking measures to prevent overexploitation, the coastal State is required to take into consideration the effects on species
associated with or dependent on harvested species.96 Additionally, data relevant to the
conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged.97
Aside from their conservation obligations, coastal States are also obliged to
promote the objective of optimum utilisation of the living resources of the EEZ.98 To
fulfil this obligation, coastal States are required to determine their capacity to harvest
the living resources of the EEZ.99 Where coastal States do not have the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch, they are required, through agreements or other
arrangements to give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.100 The
coastal State is empowered to regulate the activities of nationals of other States fishing
in its EEZ,101 to ensure that they are consistent with national laws. Accordingly, coastal
States are under an obligation to institute effective compliance and enforcement
mechanisms to ensure implementation of the conservation and management measures
that they have adopted.102

2.4.1.1 Specific Tuna Obligations
The broad migratory range of tunas across jurisdictional boundaries exposes
them to exploitation by several States. As such, tunas cannot be managed unilaterally.
The challenge of managing tuna is that, the conservation and management efforts of one
State can be undermined by the uncontrolled fishing activities of a neighbouring State
or by States fishing on the high seas.103 The LOSC recognises the management
challenges associated with tunas due to their highly migratory nature and takes a
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different approach in terms of the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal States. As such, in
addition to tuna being subject to coastal State authority in the EEZ, there are specific
obligations imposed by the LOSC upon States with respect to tuna. Such obligations
which are aimed at managing tunas across their migratory range are found in Articles 63
and 64 of the LOSC. These articles underpin the principle of cooperative management
of tuna and provide for their management at different levels; a) between opposite and
adjacent to EEZs; and b) between EEZs and the high seas.
An illustration of the distribution of the tuna stocks as reflected in Articles 63
and 64 is provided in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Maritime zones and distribution of shared, straddling and highly migratory fish stocks
as defined by the LOSC104

By virtue of their migratory nature, tunas are considered a “shared fish stock”.
This term is often used by fisheries lawyers to refer to the fish stocks reflected in Article
63(1) of the LOSC.105 This is the sense in which this term will be used in the present
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thesis. As a shared fish stock, tunas are thus subject to Article 63(1) of the LOSC which
stipulates that:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek,
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation
and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this
part [V].
Clearly, the LOSC obliges coastal States to establish cooperative arrangements
for the management of tuna stocks that are shared across EEZs, as well as stocks that
are associated with tuna. It is imperative that for States to discharge the obligation of
cooperation to manage tuna, they ought to negotiate, with a view to agreeing to
establish appropriate conservation and management measures for the relevant fish
stocks.106 Additionally, the measures adopted for the conservation and development of
tuna stocks as a result of such cooperation ought to take into consideration the
provisions relating to States’ rights and obligations over its EEZ resources.
The LOSC does not establish the means by which States are to achieve
cooperation among themselves, or the objectives to be achieved through such
cooperation, nor does it impose a duty upon States to reach an agreement. However, the
sustainability of tuna stocks can hardly be assured without conservation and
management arrangements in place between neighbouring States sharing tuna stocks.107
In practice, it is imperative that an agreement is reached between such States and that
measures are adopted for the effective conservation and management of the relevant
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stocks.108 The incentive for States to cooperate would not only be to maximise the
economic returns from the tuna stocks occurring in their EEZs but also to conserve and
manage them in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of such fish stocks.
Although it is challenging to achieve effective cooperation, some States have
been able to establish cooperative arrangements to manage tuna stocks that are shared
among them. The South Pacific Island States for example, where the most important
tropical tuna resources are found, had several incentives to cooperate in the
management of their tuna resources at the advent of extended fisheries jurisdiction.109
First, the tuna resources in the region were (and still are) economically significant to the
South Pacific Island States. Secondly, most of the States’ intra-EEZ harvests of tuna
were (and still are) taken by DWFNS110 from States that are small and scattered over an
ocean space of 35 million square kilometres.111 Third, these Islands were at low levels
of development and had no capacity to monitor such a large ocean area.112 Lastly, the
Pacific Island States needed to ensure that Japan which was in the position of a
monopolist DWFN within the Pacific Islands region did not play one island State off
against the other.113 These States established the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA) in 1979 to play a facilitative and coordinating role amongst its members.114 The
South Pacific Island States have since pursued cooperation through FFA in the areas of
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fisheries management, establishment of minimum terms and conditions of access for
DWFNs and in monitoring, control and surveillance.115

2.4.1.2 Straddling Stocks
Tunas also straddle the EEZ of one or more States and the high seas. Hence the
term “straddling fish stocks”. Although the LOSC does not use this term, it is defined in
Article 63 (2) of the LOSC which reads:
Where the same stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of
these stocks in the adjacent area.
As straddling fish stocks, tunas are also found on the high seas. Thus, a
necessary requirement of the LOSC and an obligation on States is cooperation to
manage tunas both within the EEZ and in the adjacent high seas. As tunas occur on the
high seas, they are subject to Article 116 of the LOSC which provides the right of States
to fish on the high seas. However, the right of States to fish on the high seas is
conditional. Accordingly, States fishing on the high seas for tunas can only engage in
fishing on the high seas subject to; their treaty obligations;116 the rights and duties as
well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article 63(2), and
articles 64 to 67;117 and the provisions of section 2 of the LOSC.118 In other words, a
State can only exercise its right to fish on the high seas if it has attended to the rights,
duties and interests of coastal States in straddling and highly migratory fish stocks like
tuna and also cooperate in the conservation and management of the high seas segments
of such fish stocks.
The rights and duties referred to above are elaborated in Articles 117-119 of the
LOSC. Article 117 which reiterates the high seas provision of the 1958 High Seas
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Fisheries Convention,119 obligates all States to take, or to cooperate with other States in
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas. In brief, States are obligated to
take measures to ensure that their nationals fishing on the high seas conserve the
relevant tuna stocks. For these conservation objectives to be achieved, Article 118 of the
LOSC requires States to cooperate and establish subregional and regional fisheries
organisations. In addition, States whose nationals exploit identical living resources or
different living resources in the same area are required to negotiate with a view to
taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned.120
Article 119(1) specifically provides the conservation requirements of the high seas
living resources that States fishing on the high seas must meet.121 These requirements
are aimed at safeguarding the management measures of coastal States in the EEZ such
that they are not at risk of being undermined by the activities of vessels fishing on the
high seas. However, the provisions of Articles 116-119 are not clear and have been left
open to conflicting interpretation.122 This may be because high seas resources were not
deemed as important as EEZ resources at this time.123
Both coastal States and DWFNs have an interest in the well being of tuna stocks
owing to the economic benefits which accrue to them.124 DWFNs base their interests on
the freedom of fishing on the high seas, while coastal States have sovereign rights over
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tuna stocks while in the EEZ.125 The requirement in Article 63(2) of the LOSC for these
States to ‘seek to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these fish
stocks in the adjacent area’ provides an opportunity for cooperation between States to
manage tunas on the high seas. However, as in Article 63(1), the LOSC does not
elaborate on how such cooperation might be achieved. Article 63(2) also provides only
for the conservation of straddling fish stocks on the high seas and not the EEZ. It
remains unclear how the adoption of conservation and management measures can be
coordinated between the maritime zones. Nonetheless, it is imperative that the measures
adopted for the EEZ and those of the high seas must achieve sustainability of the tuna
stocks therein.

2.4.1.3 Highly Migratory Species
Tunas are given special attention as highly migratory species under the LOSC
because of their biological characteristics. In the context of highly migratory species,
the LOSC appears to modify the exclusive jurisdictional and sovereign claims that a
coastal state might have.126 Article 64 of the LOSC states that:
The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for highly
migratory species listed in Annex1 shall cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organizations with the view to ensuring conservation and promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species through out the region, both within and
beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate international
organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest these
species in the region shall cooperate to establish such and organization and participate
in its work.
Clearly, the inference is that coastal States do not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over highly migratory species like tuna within the EEZ, but must
cooperate with other States that fish in their respective zones. Article 64 summarises the
requirement for the coastal State to discharge its duty to cooperate with other coastal
States and DWFNs to ensure its sovereign rights under Articles 56, 61 and 62 of the
LOSC are fulfilled with respect to tuna stocks in the region. Cooperation between States
125
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throughout the region may involve coastal States and DWFNs which may be few in
number or quite large. Such States could also occupy an enormous geographic area, as
in the Central and Western Pacific.127 Such cooperation involves the adoption of
conservation and management measures to deal with stocks and fishing in the EEZ and
beyond. Thus, the aims of States within the region cooperating are; to establish the total
allowable catch;128 adopt conservation and management measures that ensure against
over-exploitation;129 consider effects on associated and dependent species;130 contribute
and exchange data;131 and promote optimum utilisation.132 Further, it is a concern of the
coastal State to determine its harvesting capacity133 and to design the terms and
conditions of access to the surplus tuna resources.134
The decisions made by the coastal State are of interest to fishing States in the
region and other coastal States since they bear on shares of the catch; cost of operation;
time of activities; choice of gear; and location of fishing.135 As tuna are highly
migratory, cooperation in this context should aim at a unified management regime
applicable to stocks within and beyond the EEZ.136 The States involved therefore need
to be united in their actions and regulatory measures if they are to achieve their
objectives.137 Thus, it is necessary for the actions of such States to be preceded by
communications designed to lead to agreed measures to be implemented by the coastal
States within the EEZ and by fishing States beyond, in order for them to be consistent
with the requirements of the LOSC.138
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The duty to cooperate as provided for under Articles 63 and 64 of the LOSC can
be compromised by the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty claims conferred by
Articles 56 and 57 of the LOSC. It is not inconceivable that coastal States may seek to
assert their exclusive rights over other States seeking to cooperate under the auspices of
Articles, 61 to 64 of the LOSC. Complicating matters, Article 297 of the LOSC also
prohibits review of the coastal State’s exercise of its LOSC discretionary powers. It is
entirely possible for the coastal State to refuse to cooperate with other States on matters
relating to allowable catches. After all Article 61 provides the coastal State with the
authority to determine its own allowable catch for itself. Article 297 of the LOSC arises
to prohibit a review of the exercise of that kind of discretionary power. Nonetheless, the
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and the obligations of
coastal States and DWFNs are often not subject to enforceable management regimes
outside the EEZ.139 Cooperative management of highly migratory species like tuna is
therefore considered necessary for their long-term sustainability.140
The success of the LOSC with respect to management of straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks was tenuous at best. A number of difficulties would ensue related
to the instrument’s failure to successfully anticipate the problems associated with the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction by coastal States. Although the establishment of the
EEZ brought a significant portion of marine fisheries resources under the jurisdiction of
coastal States, the LOSC did not give much consideration to the management of the
high seas segment of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.141 The LOSC
therefore provided general principles for the conservation, management and optimum
utilisation of these fish stocks which States were required to implement through
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cooperation.142 The inadequacies of the LOSC with respect to the management of these
fish stocks and the resulting challenges are discussed in the following section.

2.4.2 Management of Tuna on the High Seas
The extension of fisheries jurisdiction by coastal States gave way to greater
fishing activities (and competition for stocks) on the high seas by DWFNs,143 thus
increasing the pressure on marine fisheries resources and perpetuating their decline.144
These high seas fishing activities are also thought to have affected the resilience of the
fisheries resources in the EEZ.145 The unregulated activities of DWFNs on the high seas
did not only pose challenges to coastal States’ fisheries management, but they also
undermined coastal States’ conservation efforts and reduced the anticipated economic
benefits for coastal States from EEZ fisheries resources such as tuna.146
While the LOSC mandates States to cooperate for the conservation and
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks like tuna within the EEZ and
beyond, its provisions were considered inadequate and ineffective with respect to
mandating the cooperative management of the high seas segment of these fish stocks.147
The LOSC failed to specify how competences should be distributed among and between
the cooperating coastal States and States fishing in the adjacent areas of specific
EEZs.148 Additionally, the LOSC provisions were not clear concerning the rights of
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coastal States if an agreement on conservation and management measures of high seas
fish stocks is not reached, neither did they adequately address objectives of ecosystem
protection and conservation of biological diversity.149
The sustainable management of fishery resources like tuna which are exploited
by several States requires the support of institutional arrangements that would facilitate
decision making and interaction between such States to aid in achieving judicious
cooperation. The LOSC did not provide a supportive framework for the institutional
arrangements required to ensure rational cooperation for the management of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks like tuna.150 As a result of these weaknesses of the
LOSC, it became difficult to establish effective cooperative regimes for such fishery
resources,151 for lack of appropriate enforcement mechanisms for high seas fisheries. It
became evident that fishing States were evading controls by reflagging their vessels;
data on high seas stocks and catches were unreliable; and fleet sizes were excessive.152
In as much as a coastal State has jurisdiction over tuna resources in the EEZ and
can adopt conservation and management measures to ensure their sustainability, the
same cannot be said for the high seas segment of the same fish stocks. The cooperative
management arrangements for such fish stocks can be undermined by non-participating
States. For instance, if a single State was attempting to conserve tuna stocks located
within its waters or attempted to govern its own State’s fishing activities in a manner
calculated to sustain the longevity of the tuna stock, non-participating states will have
the opportunity to reap the benefits as what is described as “free riding”.153 “Free
riding” threatens the cooperative management regimes for straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks like tuna.154
149

Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press 2nd
ed, 2002) 664.
150

Ibid 672.

151

Gordon Munro, Annick Van Houtte and Rolf Willmann, The conservation and management of shared
fish stocks: legal and economic aspects, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 465 (FAO, 2004) 37.

152

Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press 2nd
ed, 2002) 671.
153

Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna Fisheries: Arrangements, Challenges and a Way
Forward, FAO Technical Paper No. 536 (FAO, 2010) 2; Gordon Munro, Annick Van Houtte and Rolf
Willmann, The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: legal and economic aspects, FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 465 (FAO, 2004) 15.

154

Gordon R Munro, ‘The Management of Internationally Shared Fish Stocks: A Law and Economics
Approach’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L McDorman and Susan J Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean RegimeBuilding: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M Johnson (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 435.

46

A number of fisheries were affected by the lack of effective cooperative
management regimes for high seas segments of such fish stocks resulting from the
inadequacies of the LOSC. For example, China, Korea, Japan and Poland commenced
fishing in the high seas of the “Peanut Hole” area located in the Sea of Okhotsk after
1991.155 This area is surrounded by the EEZ of the Russian Federation. The most
important commercial fish stock in this area is the Alaska Pollock which straddles the
Russian EEZ and the Peanut Hole.156 As no international agreement regarding the
management of these stocks could be reached between the States concerned, Russia
claimed to impose a moratorium on fishing activities in the Peanut Hole area and also to
extend coastal State control in 1993.157 This was because the Alaska Pollock was being
overfished on the high seas and becoming less abundant in the Russian EEZ. As a result
of the ban, some DWFNs voluntarily complied while those ones that did not lost their
quotas to fish in Russia’s EEZ.158 Another example is the cod stock of the “Loophole”
in the Barents Sea which was impacted by unregulated harvesting on the high seas in
the early 1990s.159

2.4.2.1 Agenda 21
The conflicts that resulted from the unregulated fishing activities on the high
seas and the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks necessitated the
need for more responsible fishing, hence the adoption of Agenda 21 at the United

155

R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the sea, (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 307.

156

Alex G. Oude Elferink, ‘The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole De facto Extension of coastal States
Control’ in Olav Schram Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries (Oxford University Press, 2001)
179.
157

Ibid 182. According to the preamble of the resolution, this approach was taken because international
law did not explicitly regulate the regime of fisheries in an area surrounded by the EEZ of one State.
158

R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the sea, (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 307.
Other examples of the high seas stocks that lacked effective cooperative management include; the
groundfish stocks of Grand Banks of Newfoundland in the North-West Atlantic and the Pollock resources
of the “Donut Hole” in the Berring Sea (Russia and USA).
159

Other Vessels operating in the region (under flags of convenience) were from the European
Community, Greenland and Faroe Islands. See Olav Schram Stokke, ‘The Loophole of the Barents Sea
Fisheries Regime’ in Olave Schram Stokke (ed) Governing High Seas Fisheries (Oxford University
Press, 2001) 273. The Loophole is located between the EEZs of Norway and Russia and cod is a shared
and straddling stock in this region. The existing regime proved ineffective in dealing with the challenge of
new comers in the Barents Sea. See Olav Schram Stokke, ‘The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries
Regime’ in Olave Schram Stokke (ed) Governing High Seas Fisheries (Oxford University Press, 2001)
276.

47

Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.160 Agenda 21 underpins
the responsibilities of flag States and cooperation among States at sub-regional, regional
and global levels to manage straddling and highly migratory fish stocks like tuna.161 The
development of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was prompted by the recommendations
of paragraph 17.49 of Agenda 21.162 Based on the recommendations of paragraph 17.50
of Agenda 21, the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks was convened in 1993, with a view to promoting effective implementation of the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.163

2.4.2.2 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was adopted at the sixth session of the United
Nations Conference of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly migratory Fish Stocks in
1995. The objective of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is to ensure the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the convention.164
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It also provides a framework for cooperation among States by establishing the relevant
measures in this regard. In the words of Fontaubert and Lutchman: “the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement goes a long way towards shifting the regime of the high seas from one of
relative laissez-faire to one where States are required to collaborate through regional
fisheries management organisations and arrangements.165
Although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement applies to the conservation and
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas,166 Articles
5, 6 and 7 of the Agreement apply also to such stocks in the EEZ. For that reason,
coastal States are under an obligation to apply the general fisheries conservation and
management principles in Article 5, the precautionary approach,167 and the adoption of
compatible conservation and management measures.168
Part III of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides the mechanisms for giving
effect to the duty to cooperate in the conservation and management of straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas. In this part, the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement recognises the role of RFMOs in providing the mechanism for achieving
cooperation between and among States participating in tuna fisheries.169 The
membership of RFMOs consists of coastal, flag and market States. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement sets out the mechanisms for setting up RFMOs,170 and elaborates on their
responsibilities and functions.171
With respect to the management of tuna, five RFMOs have been established.
These are; the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) established in
1949,172 the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT)
established in 1996,173 the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) established in
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1993,174 the Commission for the Conservation of Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) established in
1994,175 and the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC) established
in 2004.176

2.5 The Duty to Cooperate
The duty to cooperate is a natural corollary of the duty to conserve a shared
natural resource, in that, conservation of an open access regime will only be possible
where all exploiting States agree on, and implement, measures to regulate their
exploitation.177 It is argued that an improved level of cooperation is socially desirable
since an increased cooperation level leads to an increased steady-state fish stock and
also in the total rent of the fishery.178 The following section examines the ‘duty to
cooperate’ in respect of the conservation and management of tuna stocks.
The concept of the duty to cooperate under the LOSC is multilayered in that it is
intricately tied to the duty to negotiate and the duty “not to discriminate”.179 This duty
must be placed in the context of the rights and duties of the coastal State. In this regard,
the coastal State has a duty of conserving and managing the tuna resources in its EEZ,
promoting optimum utilization and at the same time determine the total allowable catch
which is the most fish that can be landed in its EEZ.180 Although, these rights and
obligations appear to be entirely exclusive, they are subject to onerous conditions that
may only be achieved through cooperation with other States. States are therefore
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required to seek, in good faith, to develop joint conservation and management measures
for tuna stocks in the EEZ and beyond.181
The duty to cooperate is clearly encompassed by Articles 63, 64, 117 and 118 of
the LOSC as well as Article 8 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Under the LOSC,
States are required to cooperate to establish sub-regional or regional organizations for
managing and conserving tuna stocks.182 Under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the
duty to cooperate requires not only an obligation to create RFMOs, but also that unless
RFMO members or non-members agree to the management and conservation measures
set by the RFMOs they will not be able to fish in the applicable region.183 This raises
the question of how third States (non-RFMO members) are to participate in the work of
RFMOs.
The provision of Article 63(2) of the LOSC enables third States to comply with
their duty to cooperate for the conservation of straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks like tuna. As previously discussed in section 2.4.1, Article 63(2) requires States
to ‘…seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organisations,
to agree..’, while Article 64(1) requires that States ‘……participate in its work’, thereby
making it possible for non-member States to participate in good faith in the work of
RFMOs.184 For that matter, RFMOs play an important role as a medium through which
States can negotiate and adopt conservation measures with respect to tuna.
Although Articles 63 and 64 of the LOSC call for a duty to cooperate with
respect to the management of tuna stocks in the regions described, they fall short on
guidance. For example, the LOSC does not provide for legal consequences in the event
that cooperation among States is not achieved.185 It therefore follows that cooperation is
primarily a process of negotiation between the relevant States.186 In which case, third
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States are not compelled to comply with the conservation and management measures
adopted by RFMOs, as the duty to negotiate is a duty of behaviour rather than a
result.187
Article 118 of the LOSC obliges States to enter into negotiations with a view to
taking the necessary measures for the conservation of high seas living resources. The
obligation to negotiate does not contain an absolute requirement to reach agreement.
Although third States are not compelled to comply with the conservation and
management measures adopted by RFMOs, it is imperative that the negotiation process
carried out in good faith would require their positive participation such as sharing
expertise, experience or information to assist the work of the RFMO if it is to be
meaningful.188 Cooperation is largely a matter of negotiation in its initial stages.189
Fisheries experts contend that there is a legal content in the obligation to negotiate as
evidenced in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.190

2.5.1 Mechanisms for International Cooperation
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement operationalises the duty to cooperate as
established in the LOSC.191 The Agreement is more meticulous on the duty to cooperate
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and provides the mechanisms that give effect to this duty.192 Article 8 of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement builds on Articles 63(2) and 64 of the LOSC with respect to the
conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks. It also
builds on Articles 117-119 of the LOSC in respect of the duty to cooperate on the high
seas. Article 8 (3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides States with an interest in a
particular high seas straddling and highly migratory fish stock with the liberty to
subscribe to RFMOs or arrangements establishing conservation and management
measures with respect to such stocks. Moreover, in any region where there is no RFMO
or arrangements, States are required to cooperate with a view to creating one or the
other or both.193
Articles 9 and 10 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provide for more definitive
cooperation. Article 9 contemplates a situation in which an RFMO has not yet been
established and provides the aspects that States cooperating in the formation of an
RFMO are required to consider. States are thus required to agree on the stocks to which
the conservation and management measures adopted apply, and the area of
application.194 Further, States are also to agree on the relationship between the work of
the new organisation or arrangement and the role, objectives and operations to already
existing fisheries management organisations,195 and also on the mechanism by which
the new organisation will obtain scientific advice and review the status of stocks.196
Article 10 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, stipulates the requirements for
States in fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through RFMOs or other arrangements.
These requirements include, inter alia, agreeing on, and complying with conservation
and management measures that ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks;197 agreeing on participatory rights such as
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allocation of allowable catch;198 standards for collection, reporting, verification and
exchange of data,199 and establish cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring,
control, surveillance and enforcement.200
Moreover, Article 17 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement states that non-members
who do not apply the conservation and management rules of RFMOs are nonetheless
obliged to cooperate with them under the provisions of both the LOSC and the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement.201 Such a State shall not authorise vessels flying its flag to engage in
fishing operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which
are subject to the conservation and management measures established by such
organisation or arrangement.202
The duty to cooperate and its implications for non-contracting States raises the
question of whether or not it violates the principle of pacta tertiis. This principle
maintains that treaties may only bind those who are parties to the relevant treaty and
may not bind third parties.203 The fundamental idea is that, a sovereign State may only
incur legal obligations if it consents to those legal obligations.204 However in the
context of the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, member States implicitly
accept the duty to cooperate under any instrument or regulatory framework arising
under these instruments since they accept the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
and all of its rules of reference and instruments created under it.205
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The concept of the ‘duty to cooperate’ within the meaning of the LOSC and the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement is therefore a unique application of international law. It
encapsulates the idea that the conservation, management and utilisation of tuna stocks
requires multi-State cooperation on a number of levels. It also assumes that all States
have a common interest in the conservation and management of highly migratory fish
stocks such as tuna. Cooperation as reflected in the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement is instructive in this regard. Although, competing interests among DWFNs
and coastal States can compromise effective cooperation, a cooperative approach that
balances the interests of coastal States and DWFNs would be desirable. For this reason
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement calls for the creation of RFMOs to facilitate
cooperation. Cooperation is entirely germane to the conservation and management of
tuna.

2.5.2 Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures Across Maritime
Jurisdictions
Article 7(2) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides that conservation and
management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under
national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and
management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their
entirety.206 This article captures the idea of reciprocity by providing for the
implementation of measures within the EEZ and on the high seas that are comparable.
The term ‘compatible’ is not defined by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. For the
purposes of this thesis ‘compatible’ means that conservation and management measures
applied to tuna stocks in high seas areas are to be consistent with those applied by States
in areas under their jurisdiction. This definition relates to the broad migratory range of
tunas across jurisdictional boundaries. Compatible conservation and management
measures across these jurisdictional zones are thus to be established in the framework of
the cooperative mechanisms discussed in the previous section (2.5.1).
Accordingly, it is implied that the application of the compatible provision should
not lessen the effectiveness of rights or obligations of the provision with which it is to
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be compatible.207 The fundamental idea is that, the application of the measures of both
regimes should achieve a similar if not an equal result. In the tuna industry where
interests among the participating States are in conflict, a delicate balancing act is
required. Cooperation is regarded by the international legal instruments as a means of
balancing such conflicting interests so as to achieve compatibility among the different
legal regimes of the participating and interested States.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement enumerates several factors that States need to
take into account when determining compatible conservation and management measures
for tuna stocks. These factors include, inter alia, previously agreed measures
established and applied to tuna stocks by coastal States and DWFNs, as well as
measures established by RFMOs,208 the biological unity of tuna stocks including the
geographical particularities of the region concerned (zonal attachment),209 the respective
dependence of the coastal States and DWFNs on the stocks concerned and on the impact
of management measures on the resources as a whole.210 In connection with this, Article
116 of the LOSC obliges DWFNs not to undermine the management efforts of coastal
States with respect to tuna stocks on the high seas, by subjecting the freedom of fishing
on the high seas to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States.211
The requirement of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement for compatibility of the EEZ
and the high seas regime is recognition of the need to manage tuna stocks in their
entirety. It also underscores the interconnectedness of the ecosystem. Accordingly, Hey
argues that for conservation measures to be effective, they ought to be applied to tuna
stocks throughout their range, irrespective of the legal regimes applicable to the ocean
areas in which the tuna stocks occur.212 Essentially, States participating in the fisheries
207
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for tuna have a duty to cooperate so that conservation and management measures are
compatible. The imposition of the requirement for compatible measures and the general
conservation obligations in Article 5 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, underscore the
connection between the EEZ and the high seas management of tuna stocks. This aspect
is reinforced by other international instruments.213
As established earlier, tuna stocks may be impacted by the fishing activities
occurring across the high seas and EEZ.214 The rationale for compatible measures
between these maritime zones is to ensure that the measures applied in these zones can
function together towards the effective management of tuna fisheries because of their
biological unity,215 especially since the interests of DWFNs in tuna fisheries may vary
from that of coastal States. The measures established for the high seas areas and those
adopted in the EEZ may be similar or, if they differ they must have an equivalent
effect.216
Although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement establishes the principle of
compatibility, it does not give precedence of RFMOs over coastal States or vice versa,
in the establishment of conservation and management measures for tuna stocks.
Consequently, there is a difficulty of how these measures could be harmonised in order
to achieve compatibility measures. This decision is left to coastal States and individual
RFMOs within their own unique circumstances.
The difficulty that RFMOs may be faced with regarding the management of tuna
stocks in their entirety is that coastal States have sovereign rights to manage the tuna
resources in their EEZs.217 For this reason, RFMOs cannot restrict the freedom of
coastal States’ sovereign rights over the living resources within their EEZ. To do so
213
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would be tantamount to infringement on the sovereign right of the coastal State by the
RFMO. Yet, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement does not provide any guidelines regarding
how compatible measures between maritime zones are to be achieved. It would be
assumed that, since the UN Fish Stocks Agreement also recognises and acknowledges
the sovereign rights of coastal States in their EEZs,218 the coastal State ought to adopt
conservation and management measures whose effect must be matched by the measures
established for the high seas. Burke maintains that the coastal States’ conservation and
management regimes in areas under national jurisdiction take precedence over that
established in the high seas.219
Pursuant to Article 7(2)(a) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement the conservation
and management measures adopted by the coastal State within areas under national
jurisdiction take precedence and the measures established for the high seas for the same
stocks should not undermine the effectiveness of the coastal State measures. If this be
the case, then high seas measures must meet the standard set by the coastal State
measures,220 if compatibility of these measures is to be achieved. The assumption would
be that, the standard of coastal State measures is effective in achieving the long term
sustainability of the tuna stocks in the region. However, if the coastal State standards
are less effective or non-existent, it is argued that “the most effective approach to
designing compatible conservation measures is to proceed on a regional basis, treating
the relevant ocean space as an integrated whole and adopting measures that apply to the
relevant ocean space as an integrated whole and adopting measures that apply to stocks
throughout their range.221 Even so, a challenge arises of how to assess the compatibility
of EEZ and high seas measures.222
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In the absence of the relevant guidelines, RFMOs sometimes become primarily
responsible for the establishment of compatible measures in areas under the jurisdiction
of States and on the high seas. In such a case, the coastal State adapts to the practices of
the RFMO.223 The lack of clarity in the law may be the reason most RFMOs have not
necessarily formulated specific measures in accordance with the requirements of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement with respect to compatibility. It is notable, however, that the
issue of compatibility was considered one of the most difficult at the UN Conference on
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish stocks, especially because it touched on the
freedom of fishing and sovereign rights of coastal States.224
While the concept of compatibility of measures has not yet been widely
implemented, some RFMOs have acknowledged its importance in their Convention
text. The Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean225 has incorporated the provisions
from Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in respect to compatibility. Being the
newest tuna RFMO, the WCPFC which was established by the WCPF Convention has
adopted several measures which incorporate the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. Accordingly, the provisions of the WCPF Convention mirror those of
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Article 7(2) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.226 The WCPF Convention has also
incorporated the provisions of Article 7(2)(a)-(f) with respect to the issues to be taken
into account by members when establishing compatible conservation and management
measures for tuna stocks in the Convention Area.227
Additionally, the WCPF Convention requires the coastal State to ensure that the
measures adopted and applied by it to tuna stocks within areas under its national
jurisdiction do not undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted by the WCPFC in
respect to the same stocks.228 Other RFMOs like ICCAT simply provide
recommendations that do not necessarily reflect the compatibility requirement of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement but which may lead to the compatibility of measures in
areas under the jurisdiction of States and those of the high seas.229
Notably, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement recognises that jurisdictional
boundaries are biologically insignificant since tuna stocks migrate freely across EEZs
and the high seas. Hence the requirement obligating States to take into account the
biology of stocks and the relationships between the distribution, fisheries and
geographical particularities of the region.230 The biological unity of tuna stocks and
their distribution are significant in establishing the extent of the stock in order to
manage it in its entirety. As established in section 2.2, the biological characteristics of
tunas determine their migration, seasonality and consequently their distribution. These
aspects are vitally important in regulating tuna catch levels. The following section
focuses on the measures that States are required to implement for the conservation and
management of tuna fisheries subject to the obligation to cooperate in accordance with
the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
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2.5.3 Implementation of Tuna Conservation and Management Measures
Having discussed the provisions contained in the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement as they relate to the duty to cooperate for the conservation and management
of tuna, this section will focus more sharply on those provisions that specifically draw
attention to the elements of such cooperation. These include the determination of total
allowable catch; data submission and sharing; and compliance and enforcement.

2.5.3.1 Determination of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
Article 61(1) of the LOSC provides that the coastal State “shall determine the
allowable catch” of living resources within its EEZ. The word “shall” as it appears in
this Article means that the duty to make such a determination is compulsory. The
quantum of the TAC is however discretionary as stipulated in Article 297(3)(a) of the
LOSC. Article 297(3)(b) of the LOSC makes provision for mediation proceedings when
a coastal state “arbitrarily” refuses to determine its allowable catch. Thus, it is
conceivable that Article 61(1) of the LOSC is “only discretionary as to the result
achieved though mandatory as to the fact of its exercise”.231
The TAC is defined as “the total allowable catch to be taken from a resource in a
specified period (usually a year), as defined in the management plan”.232 It may be
allocated to the States concerned in the form of quotas, as specific quantities or
proportions.233 The TAC is employed as a means of limiting the commercial
exploitation of fish stocks. In this regard, its purpose is to ensure that no more fish are
caught from a stock than is biologically justifiable.234
Although the TAC has become one of the main tools of present-day fisheries
management,235 it is a complex process involving different agents and institutions.236
The setting of the TAC has to counterbalance other fisheries management objectives
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including economic social and political objectives.237 Not only does the implementation
of the TAC require the availability of adequate and reliable data, which is often costly
and difficult to obtain, but also skilled personnel are required to analyse such data.238
The implication is that the TAC should be based on the status of tuna stocks. However,
in practice fishing precedes determination of the TAC. In which case, the abundance of
the fish stocks is not accurately determined. The exploitation of such stocks may be
detrimental in the event that the stock in question is already overexploitated. In reality,
an assessment of fish stocks ought to be carried out before States commence fishing
activities, to determine the initial biomass, if coastal States are to fulfil their obligation
under Article 61(1) of the LOSC. Most States, particularly developing coastal States are
not able to determine the TAC for lack of financial and technical resources.239 Even for
developed States, catch quota regulations are expensive,240 and difficult to administer.241
According to the LOSC, negotiation and cooperation to determine the level of
TAC for tuna stocks is to be achieved via bilateral agreements or through RFMOs.242
However, no further guidance is provided, except that the best scientific evidence
available to the coastal State should be taken into account, and that the coastal State
shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the EEZ is not endangered by overexploitation.243 In addition, the management measures adopted by the coastal State are
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to “be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which
can produce the maximum sustainable yield” (MSY).244 Taken as a whole, the tone of
Article 61 of the LOSC strongly suggests that the coastal State may have a broad
discretionary power in determining the TAC.

2.5.3.1.1 Maximum Sustainable Yield
MSY is defined as ‘the highest theoretical equilibrium yield that can be
continuously taken (on average) from a stock under existing environmental conditions
without affecting significantly the reproduction process’.245 If the MSY is exceeded, the
biomass of the tuna stock cannot regenerate to previous levels and a lower yield is
therefore obtained.246 It is possible that such stocks could collapse if the MSY is
exceeded significantly.247
Although the MSY concept has been used in fisheries management since the
1950s,
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MSY is flawed.249 MSY as a benchmark used in fisheries management to establish the
TAC is considered flawed because it only addresses the effects of fishing on the target
stock, but neglects the effects of fishing on associated stocks or on its wider impact on
the marine ecosystem.250 Consequently, it becomes impossible to determine a constant
value of MSY from a stock.251
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In the case of tuna stocks, the MSY would need to address a specific objective
such that if for example, the stocks need rebuilding, the reference points should lead to
such an objective.252 Hence the proposal of the third session of UN Fish Stocks
Conference for MSY to be adopted as a “limit reference point” as opposed to being a
“target reference point”.253 Economists also argue that the failure of the MSY concept to
include

the

economic

objectives

of

fisheries

leads

to

overfishing

and

overcapitalisation.254 Consequently, tuna stocks management based on MSY could
result in overexploitation.255

2.5.3.1.2 Constraints to Determination of the TAC
Regarding TAC levels for tuna stocks, the negotiations between coastal States
and fishing States are instrumental in determining the overall TAC, allocating the TAC
between the States and formulating the relevant management scheme which would
accommodate further adjustments of the TAC as deemed necessary. While this may
appear to be a relatively simple exercise, it is difficult to achieve when dealing with tuna
fisheries which involve varied participating states using various gears types and fishing
techniques and targeting different species.256 In addition, the tuna on the high seas are

252

Ibid.

253

Ibid. “Limit Reference Point” indicates the limit beyond which the state of a fishery is not considered
desirable and fishery development should stop before reaching it. “Target Reference Point” corresponds
to a state of a fishery which is considered desirable and management action should aim at bringing and
maintaining the fishery at this level. See FAO Fisheries Glossary http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/
(accessed 19 June 2010).
254

John J Rooney, ‘Impact of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act on Fisheries in
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone’, in Donna R Christie, ‘It Don’t Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of
Coastal States Fisheries Management’ (2004) 14(1), Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 1;
Yoshifumi Tanaka, A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance: The Case of Zonal and Integrated
Management in International Law of the Sea (Ashgate Publishing, 2008) 55.
255

Gail Lutgen and Andrew Neil, ‘Maximum Sustainable Yield of the Marine Capture Fisheries in
Developing Archipelagic States- Balancing Law, Science, Politics and Practice’ (2008) 23(1) The
international Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1-37. Although in many respects the inadequacies of
TACs have similar origins and correspond to those of MSY, where TACs have replaced the role of MSY,
the situation is much improved. See G L Kesteven, ‘MSY Revisited: A Realistic Approach to Fisheries
Management and Administration’ (1977) 21(1) Marine Policy 73, 73.
256

The participating States are at different economic levels (developed and developing States), some are
coastal others DWFNs. Also Different fishing techniques are used which can impact the extent of
exploitation. The tuna species targeted may be overexploited or underexploited, juveniles or adults. For
example, Australia targets juvenile southern bluefin tuna. See A Willock and I Cartwright, Conservation
Implications of Allocation under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WWF Australia
and TRAFFIC Oceania, 2006) 12.

64

traditionally regarded as consisting of “an open-access resource, belonging to
whomever catches them”.257
As the diverse interests of States participating in tuna fisheries, different species
and gears create difficulties in the determination of the TAC, a number of variables
need to be taken into account when determining the TAC for tuna fisheries, in order to
ensure the stability of long-term agreements between States. First, as coastal States and
DWFNs may have different national interests, they may be at variance on the level of
TAC and its allocation among members of an RFMO. In the interest of the long-term
sustainability of such stocks, these competing interests need to be reconciled. States
cooperating pursuant to Articles 63 and 64 of the LOSC are challenged with the
complex issues of regulating and allocating the TAC for multinational tuna stocks as the
LOSC neither provides for joint determination of the TAC by all States concerned, nor
the basis of national allocation. Such a situation begs the question of how the TAC for
tuna should be determined and therefore allocated among the relevant States.258 In order
to improve the chances of achieving cooperation among States, it is essential that they
perceive fairness and equity in the allocation of the TAC.259
A further difficulty arises due to the large number of participants to an
agreement, uncertainty over the participation of new entrants and the possibility of ‘free
riding’ by non-participants to an agreement.260 Third, the integrity of TAC allocations
needs to be supported by effective enforcement to ensure compliance with the allocation
and other conservation and management measures.261
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2.5.3.1.3 TAC Allocations
The issue of allocation is fundamental to the long-term sustainability of tuna
262

stocks.

As tuna stocks on the high seas are not owned by any State, RFMOs allocate

fishing opportunities between their members as a means of regulating the exploitation
of such stocks. Allocations are made in terms of tonnes or number of vessels and these
are mostly based on historical information of the fishery, such as harvest levels and
stock sizes.263 Another criterion is the zonal attachment (geographical distribution of
tuna stocks).264 Allocations therefore relate to which States have been fishing and the
area in which they have been fishing. When these opportunities are allocated in form of
individual quotas to States for example, the sum total should not exceed the
internationally agreed national allocation.265
Basing the allocation of fishing opportunities on historical catches can be
problematic in that, some States may be interested in entering a fishery but have no
history of having been fishing in a particular region. Such a State would be excluded in
the allocation process. Although it remains the main criteria for allocation, this method
may be considered discriminatory.266 Chand et al propose that a more accurate method
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of allocation would be for States to apportion allocation of harvesting rights as a
percentage of a total allowable catch.267
Some RFMOs have developed criteria for catch allocation through negotiation
with contracting parties, as a means of incorporating the individual national interests of
States. The effectiveness of such allocations is contingent upon obtaining consensus
between States.268 For instance, ICCAT has developed comprehensive criteria for
allocation of fishing possibilities for the tuna stocks under its purview. The criteria
relate to past and present fishing activity of qualifying participants; the status of stock(s)
to be allocated and the fisheries; status of the qualifying participants; and compliance,
data submission and scientific research by qualifying participants.269 Regarding the
status of qualifying participants, the criteria under this category consider, inter alia, the
dependence on the stocks of the coastal States, the economic and social importance of
the fishery for such participants, and their right to engage in fishing on the high seas for
the stocks to be allocated.270 Unlike the detailed measures adopted by WCPFC on
allocations, the ICCAT criteria are non-binding and may therefore not be strictly
applied.
With respect to allocation, a challenge for RFMOs is to provide mechanisms for
allocation that balance conservation interests with the economic and social interest of
States.271 This situation is further complicated by new entrants to tuna fisheries under
the purview of an RFMO, as States exercise their right to fish on the high seas. The
allocation of participatory rights to new entrants and fishing entities in RFMOs is
fundamental to the effective management of tuna fisheries.272 This is because new
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entrants anticipate a share of the allocation. The participation of new entrants may affect
the allocation in two ways. First, it may require that the allocation be further subdivided,
thus reducing the shares of existing members.273 Second, the TAC may need to be
increased, thus exerting pressure on tuna resources,274 thereby threatening their
sustainability.

2.5.3.1.4 Participation of New Entrants
Pursuant to Article 8(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, RFMOs are required
to admit “States having a real interest” in a particular fishery.275 Further, the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement requires States to “agree, as appropriate, on participatory rights such
as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort”.276 Although the term ‘real
interest’ is not further defined, it could be taken generally to mean any States that are
interested in entering the fishery- ‘new entrants’. In which case, RFMOs are obligated
to admit new members. However, their admission is contingent upon the new entrants
being willing to abide by the conservation and management measures adopted by the
RFMO. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement obligates States cooperating through RFMOS
to agree on means by which the fishing interests of new members or participants will be
accommodated,277 and enumerates the criteria for their admission.278 The consideration
of the “status of the tuna stocks” and the “existing fishing efforts” in the allocation of
TAC to new members suggests that RFMOs ought to be cautious to make allocations
only for stocks that are not yet overexploited.
timely manner. See, Kim Hang Pham Do, Henk folmer and Henk Norde, Fishery Management Games:
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Decreasing fishing opportunities can make allocation difficult.279 Some States
which are members of RFMOs may resist the new members for fear of losing a share in
fisheries which are already fully exploited or over-exploited thereby encouraging the
possibility of non-members with an interest in the fishery to engage in unauthorised
fishing activities.280 Additionally, members may be reluctant to share the returns of their
investment in the fishery with new-comers. A new comer admitted into such a fishery
will be considered to be a “free rider” whose participation could result in noncooperation by the existing members.281 In situations where tuna stocks are
oversubscribed and fully allocated among members of an RFMO, cooperation within
the framework of the RFMO may then result in the adoption of new allocation
criteria.282 Nonetheless, it is suggested that, according to Article 8(3) and (4) of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement, new entrants must be offered a ‘just and reasonable’ share of
the TAC under an [RFMO] management plan.283
The approaches adopted by RFMOs in determining the participatory rights of
new entrants are diverse. IATTC has established a purse seine fleet capacity limit. The
Commission limits fishing in IATTC’s Convention area to the purse seine register, thus
requiring that new entrants to IATTC access the purse seines by replacing vessels on the
register with a vessel(s) of similar capacity.284 These conditions appear restrictive to the
admission of new entrants and reflect the unwillingness of such RFMOs to share fishing
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opportunities with them.285 This is more the case especially for developing States which
will continually be left to settle for the leftovers.286 A different approach is taken by
ICCAT whose allocation criteria discussed earlier is modelled upon the provisions of
Article 11 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and provides an open invitation for new
entrants. Similarly, CCSBT has admitted members without reductions in the quota
allocated to existing members.287

2.5.3.1.5 Participation of Non-Members
Non-members of RFMOs may engage in illegal fishing activities by registering
their vessels in States that are not members of an RFMO. The ‘free riding’ behaviour of
non-members is difficult for RFMOs to control (especially since RFMOs can only
enforce their measures on members), and undermines the effectiveness of the
conservation and management measures adopted by RFMOs. However, by being nonmembers of an RFMO, States are not exonerated from the obligation to cooperate in the
application of conservation and management measures established by the RFMO.288 In
this regard the UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires that such States give effect to their
duty to cooperate by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures
established by RFMOs.289 Further, members of RFMOs are required to exchange
information concerning the fishing activities of non-members’ vessels engaged in
fisheries for tuna, and to take measures consistent with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
and international law to deter the activities of such vessels which undermine the
effectiveness of the conservation and management measures of RFMOs.290
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires members of RFMOs to encourage nonmembers to implement the conservation and management measures it has established
and to give them benefits commensurate with their commitment.291 In practice RFMOs
285
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have implemented this obligation by inviting non-members to participate as cooperating
non-members. For example, CCSBT through its Extended Commission has established
such a status to enable non-members who harvest southern bluefin tuna or through
whose EEZ southern bluefin tuna migrates to cooperate with the Commission. Such
States or entities may apply to the Extended Commission for membership and upon
admission may negotiate catch limits.292 As cooperating non-members of the Extended
Commission they can participate in meetings but are not entitled to vote.293
Nonetheless, the challenge of allocation may result in the allotment of
inadequate quotas for some members or cooperating non-members. In a situation where
the allotment is considered inadequate by a member, that member who is dissatisfied
may choose not to adhere to the quota allocations.294 Such members often breach their
quota limits. Some RFMOs have responded to such situations through the adoption of
measures to deal with recalcitrant members. Both CCSBT and ICCAT have adopted
such measures.295

2.5.3.2 Data Contribution and Sharing
Under the LOSC, coastal States are obligated to contribute and exchange
available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks.296 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement further
elaborates on the obligations of coastal States and DWFNs with respect to tuna fisheries
data and requires them to “collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate
data concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, catch of target and nontarget species and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I, as well as information from
292
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national and international research programmes”.297 Further, RFMOs are required to
compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data, as described in Annex I,
to ensure that the best scientific evidence is available, while maintaining confidentiality
where appropriate.298
The standard requirements for the collection and sharing of data relating to tuna
are provided in Annex I of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, including the types of data
States are required to collect and share through RFMOs. An obligation for flag States
under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement concerning data, is to collect and exchange
scientific, technical and statistical data on tuna stocks,299 ensuring that they are detailed,
provided in a timely manner,300 and that the accuracy is verified.301 As States are
required to cooperate in the collection and provision of data through RFMOs, the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement obligates them to agree on standards for collection, reporting,
verification and exchange of fisheries data.302 Additionally, States are required to agree
on the specification of data and the format in which they are to be provided to [RFMOs]
taking into account the nature of the stocks and the fisheries for those stocks.303 The
specific types of data that States are required to share through RFMOs include catch and
effort data,304 data on target and non-target species305 biological data,306 and vessel
identification and gear related data.307

2.5.3.2.1 Catch and Effort Data
Data from tuna fisheries are required in decision making with respect to the
management of the fishery. Data are used to evaluate the fisheries performance in
relation to management objectives and to fulfil regional requirements. The extent to
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which objectives are achieved is assessed using indicators, which are generated from
data.308 The types of data specified under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement that States are
required to share through RFMOs with respect to tuna are significant for States to meet
their management objectives. Thus, they form an important aspect of the analysis in the
present thesis.
First, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement stipulates the types of catch and effort data
that States are required to submit to RFMOs.309 Catch data are the most common
fishery-dependent data that are used as the basis for stock assessment in most fisheries.
Catch is a function of fishing effort and abundance of the fished population. Hence,
changes in the proportion of the population harvested and in abundance of the target
species are reflected by the trends in catch over time.310 Catch in numbers or weight
corresponds to the removals of biomass and individuals from the ecosystem, and is the
fundamental impact fishing has on fish populations.311 Fishing effort is a measure of the
amount of fishing.312
Catch estimates are used to calculate catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) or catch rate,
which is a simple and attractive index of abundance commonly used for stock
assessment diagnosis in international fisheries.313 The use of CPUE as an index of stock
abundance is based on a relationship which relates catch to abundance and effort.314
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Thus, a decline in CPUE denotes a decline in the stocks. Units of effort are dependent
on the types of gear used. For example, the measures used to determine CPUE units in
tuna fisheries are numbers of vessels, vessel days and in longline, number of hooks.
Catch data (target, non-target and dependent and associated species) should
include reported catch, discards and non-reported catch (for example, IUU catches). The
former two categories may be estimated, otherwise catches may be obtained from log
books, fishery observers, shoreside or dockside monitoring. To obtain any reliable
interpretation of changes in the status of stocks from catch data, a long time series of
comparable catch data is required.315 Fisheries scientists standardize CPUE for purposes
of accuracy when constructing the index of abundance used in stock assessment.316
Accurate stock assessment is vital to the provision of sound scientific advice on the
management of tuna fisheries. Under the best circumstances, the level of detail in catch
data will be categorised such that it provides a wide range of assessment methods that
can utilise the catch data.317

2.5.3.2.2 Practice of RFMOs Regarding Data Contribution
Through their various decision making mechanisms, RFMOs have adopted
measures directed at implementing their obligations related to data submission for tuna
stocks under their purview. Such measures stipulate the standard, format and types of
data that States are required to submit, usually on an annual basis. For example, ICCAT
stipulates the data required from contracting parties and prompts them on an annual
basis to submit these data.318 Article IX of the Convention obligates contracting parties
to furnish ICCAT with any available statistical, biological and other scientific
information that may be required for the Convention to achieve its objectives.319
315

FAO, Guidelines for the Routine Collection of Capture Fishery Data. Prepared at the FAO/DANIDA
Expert Consultation Bangkok, Thailand 18-30 May 1998, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 382 (FAO,
1999) 16.
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Mark N Maunder and Andre E Punt, ‘Standardizing Catch and Effort Data: A Review of Recent
Approaches’ (2004) 70, Fisheries Research 141, 141; J Joseph, ‘Standardizing Fishery- Dependent Catch
and Effort Data in Complex Fisheries with Technology Change’ (2006) 16 Reviews in Fish Biology and
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ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics is mandated to develop and
recommend policy procedures for the collection, compilation, analysis and
dissemination of fisheries statistics regarding fishing activities in the convention area
and biological information on the stocks.320 This includes the format in which data is to
be submitted.321
As an effort towards improving the quality of ICCAT’s data on tuna stocks, the
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics evaluates any omissions in data
submitted by contracting parties and appraises the Secretariat on the effects of such data
omissions on new stock assessments and their effect on management advice.322 An
explanation is required of the apparent omissions in data and any possible capacity
challenges, and future strategies for correction of shortcomings by contracting parties.323
These requirements of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics seem to be
aimed at ensuring that problem solving regarding statistical data is appropriately
targeted. This is because the Compliance Committee or the Permanent Working Group
for the improvement of ICCAT statistics and conservation measures identifies the
problematic data deficiencies and recommends appropriate actions by the respective
contracting party.324
RFMOS like ICCAT and IATTC have adopted measures requiring the annual
submission of catch and effort data from contracting parties. ICCAT requires data on
nominal yearly catches by fishing fleet, species, year, gear, region also specifying
whether from the EEZ or high seas,325 while IATTC requires data to be given by species
and fishing gears and where practical via vessels log books and unloading records or in
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aggregate form.326 As required by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, IATTC further
stipulates the detail of aggregated data to be submitted.327 Although such scales of data
are sufficient for stock assessment, data at finer scales are required for standardization
of CPUE series. Such fine scales are essential for RFMOs to reduce uncertainties in
their findings328 for purposes of management advice or for establishing the effect of
fishing on tuna stocks.
In fulfilling the requirement for timely submission of data, RFMOs have
adopted measures specifying the deadlines for data submission. IATTC for example,
requires catch and effort data submitted by 30 June, while the general requirement for
ICCAT is July 31. The various stocks under the purview of ICCAT have different data
submission dates ranging from April to August.329 Timeliness in data submission can
make a difference in the exploitation levels of tuna stocks. For instance if a stock is
facing the risk of being overexploited, a possible management decision may be to
require a closed season to reduce mortality. If the availability of sufficient data on such
a stock is not timely for such a decision to be made, the stock may be exposed to
overexploitation.

2.5.3.2.3 Biological Data
The second requirement of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in regard to data is
for States to share specific types of biological data through RFMOs.330 Hey affirms the
importance of biological information in providing the most prominent extra-legal
element that may induce States to cooperate with respect to the exploitation of fish
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IATTC, Resolution on Data Provision (Resolution C-03-05). http://www.iattc.org (accessed 8 July
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329

ICCAT, Guidelines for Submitting Data and Information Required by ICCAT. http://www.iccat.int
(accessed 8 July 2010).

330

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Annex I, Article 3(2)(a-c) lists the types of data as; composition of catch
according to length, weight and sex; other biological information supporting stock assessment, such as
information on age, growth, recruitment, distribution and stock identity; and other relevant research,
including surveys of abundance, biomass surveys, hydro-acoustic surveys, research and environmental
factors affecting stock abundance, and oceanographic and ecological studies.

76

stocks like tuna.331 Biological data in fisheries provide information on the productivity
of a stock as well as the effects of the environment on such productivity. For example,
the fecundity, spawning, growth and feeding patterns of tuna stocks provide an
understanding of their seasonal availability and recruitment for purposes of
management. Although an expensive exercise, tagging has been conducted by some
RFMOs in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans to obtain biological data on tuna. The
information yielded from experiments with such tags includes, inter alia, stock
structure, growth, mortality, schooling behaviour and physiology.332 A key purpose of
data from tagging programmes is to reduce uncertainty in stock assessments. An
example of such a programme is the Pacific Tuna Tagging Programme which WCPFC
is undertaking to improve stock assessment and management of skipjack, yellowfin and
bigeye tuna in the Pacific Ocean.333

2.5.3.2.4 Data for Non-Target Species
Thirdly, the data required for non-target, dependent and associated species334
include small target species,335 finfish,336 sea turtles and seabirds. RFMOs like ICCAT,
IATTC and WCPFC are discharging their obligations concerning such data by imposing
both voluntary and mandatory measures upon their members concerning these species.
ICCAT requires all members to submit annual reports of catch and effort data of sharks
331
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in accordance with its data reporting procedures,337 while IATTC requires its members
to establish and implement a national plan of action to conserve and manage shark
stocks in accordance with the FAO International Plan of Action for the Conservation
and Management of Sharks.338 Concerning sea turtles, the measures adopted by IATTC
and ICCAT are not mandatory but they encourage members to collect and provide all
available information on fishery interactions with sea turtles.339 A similar requirement
applies for seabirds in both RFMOs.340 WCPFC on the other hand requires members to
implement the International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds
in Longline Fisheries (IPOA-Seabirds) and to provide all available information on
interactions with seabirds to enable the Commission to design mitigation measures for
the incidental catch of seabirds.341

2.5.3.2.5 Vessel-Related Data
Lastly, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides a detailed list of vessel-related
data to be collected by States and submitted to RFMOs.342 The increase in fishing
mortality in tuna fisheries has been attributed to increased fleet carrying capacity and
efficiency of tuna fishing vessels.343 An increase in fishing capacity may also lead to
harvesting of small fish thus, making it difficult to achieve conservation and
management objectives in tuna fisheries. As a result, tuna fishing fleets often move to
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new fishing grounds in search of better catch in size and quantity.344 Apart from fishing
effort, vessel-related data is vital for vessel identification to enable monitoring of
vessels operating in the convention areas of the various RFMOs. Flag States are also
required to establish a national record of fishing vessels authorised to fish on the high
seas and to share the information with interested States.345
All RFMOs have established records of various vessels operating within their
convention area. They maintain a record of fishing vessels346 and some, carrier
vessels.347 Generally RFMOs maintain ‘positive lists’ of vessels authorised to fish, as
well as lists of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU fishing,348 for purposes of
compliance. These are available in public domain. Most RFMOs provide specifications
for marking and identification of vessels as required by the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement,349 and other relevant information about the vessels.350
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2.5.3.3 Compliance and Enforcement
The effectiveness of the conservation and management measures adopted by
coastal States unilaterally or through the relevant RFMOs in respect of tuna resources
depends on the level of compliance to these measures by fishing vessels both in the EEZ
and on the high seas. The enforcement of these measures is fundamental to the longterm sustainability of tuna resources. The LOSC provides the enforcement measures
applicable to the conservation and management of [tuna] fisheries in the EEZ. On the
high seas, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement stipulates the enforcement measures relative
to the conservation and management of [tuna] fisheries.

2.5.3.3.1 Enforcement of Fisheries Law in the EEZ
In the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage
the [tuna] resources in the EEZ, the coastal State may take measures necessary to ensure
compliance with the laws and regulations adopted in conformity with the LOSC.351 The
LOSC in Article 73(1) provides the right for coastal States to take such measures such
as boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings in exercising of its sovereign
rights to conserve and manage the [tuna] resources in the EEZ. Thus, the coastal State
may exercise such power against foreign fishing vessels operating in the EEZ. Vessels
attempting to evade enforcement measures can be subjected to hot pursuit.352
The LOSC inserts safeguards in its provisions against undue detention,353 thus
limiting the powers of coastal States to arrest and detain fishing vessels. As such,
vessels and crews are to be released upon the postage of a reasonable bond or other
security.354 The bond is thus held as surety against possible penalties. The enforcement
of the prompt release obligation is facilitated by Article 292 of the LOSC which
requires the question of release from detention to be resolved through a court of law or
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tribunal if a vessel is detained for more than 10 days, unless the parties otherwise
agree.355
Article 73(3) of the LOSC adds that, coastal State penalties for violations of
fisheries laws and regulations in the EEZ may not include imprisonment, in the absence
of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal
punishment.356 Even so, some States’ laws deviate from this requirement of the LOSC.
Hence, the legislation of some thirty-two States Parties to the LOSC, provide for
imprisonment even in the absence of agreements with other States.357 In the event of the
arrest or detention of a foreign vessel, the coastal State is required to notify the flag
State promptly of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.358
Most developing coastal States are constrained financially in the enforcement of
their jurisdiction in the EEZs, thereby encouraging foreign fishers to disregard national
fisheries regulations.

2.5.3.3.2 Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries
As previously discussed the migratory nature of tuna requires that they are
managed in their entirety, irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries. This creates a need
for enforcement measures that applicable in areas beyond the EEZ. The LOSC defines
the rights and responsibilities of States on the high seas. According to Article 87 of the
LOSC, all States have freedom to fish on the high seas subject to the interests of other
States and the rights under the LOSC with respect to the high seas.359 Article 116 of the
LOSC reiterates this right, making it conditional upon: a) the treaty obligations of
States; b) the rights and duties of coastal States in article 63(2), and article 67; and c)
the provisions of Section 2 of the LOSC. States therefore have a right to fish for tuna
subject to the provisions of article 64 of the LOSC. Article 117 and 118 of the LOSC
provide a duty for States to take measures to conserve [tuna] on the high seas, and an
obligation for States to cooperate in the management of [tuna] on the high seas
respectively.
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The UN Fish Stocks Agreement fortifies the LOSC provisions relative to
compliance and enforcement with an international framework for the conservation and
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks on the highs seas.360 As
fishing vessels on the high seas are under the jurisdiction of the flag State, the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement seeks to enhance flag State responsibility and enunciates the duties
of the flag State with respect to controlling the fishing activities of its vessels on the
high seas. This includes undertaking appropriate enforcement action.
Article 18(1) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement obligates the flag State to take
such measures as may be necessary to ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with
subregional and regional conservation and management measures and that they do not
engage in any activity which undermines the effectiveness of such measures.361 Further,
a State can only authorise the use of vessels flying its flag for fishing on the high seas
only where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of such
vessels.362
States Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement have a duty to ensure that their
vessels comply fully with the relevant requirements. Moreover, the flag State is required
to implement a number of measures calculated to ensure compliance by vessels flying
its flag. These measures include, inter alia, the control of vessels on the high seas by
means of fishing licenses; adoption of regulations pertaining to these licenses; the
establishment of a national record of fishing vessels authorized to fish on the high seas;
requirements for marking of fishing vessels and fishing gear; requirements for recording
and timely reporting of vessel position, catch, fishing effort and other fisheries data;
requirements for verifying catch; monitoring, control and surveillance of such vessels
by inspection schemes, observer programmes and vessel monitoring systems, and
regulation of transhipment on the high seas to ensure compliance with subregional,
regional and global measures.363
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Article 19 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides for a plethora of
compliance and enforcement obligations on the part of the flag State. In this regard, the
flag State is required to monitor its vessels fishing on the high seas and in the EEZ and
to ensure compliance with conservation and management measures implemented by the
applicable RFMO. Flag States are also required to cooperate in the investigation and
sanctioning of any infractions by its vessels or nationals in the relevant fishing zones.
In this regard, the onus is primarily on the flag State to ensure compliance with the
relevant measures and enforce them irrespective of where the violations occur.364
The element of cooperation is reflected in article 20 of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement which requires the flag State to request for assistance from other States
regarding investigation of an alleged violation. The progress and outcome of such
investigations should be availed to all States having an interest in, or affected by, the
alleged violation.365 Upon notification by another State of an alleged violation, the flag
State must respond accordingly and take enforcement action with respect to the vessel if
the evidence so warrants.366
There are exceptions to exclusive flag State jurisdiction with respect to fishing
vessels on the high seas.367 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement deviates from the rules of
customary international law by giving enforcement powers on the high seas, to other
parties to the Agreement in addition to the flag States. In connection with this, the
Agreement provides a framework for regional cooperation in enforcement,368 and
further, gives a State party which is a member of an RFMO, the right to board and
inspect fishing vessels flying the flag of another State party, so as to ensure compliance
with conservation and management measures for tuna stocks, whether such a State party
is a member of the RFMO or not.369 Essentially, a State party to the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, and whose vessels fish in the region must adhere to the management
measures adopted by the RFMO of which it is not a member. If such an inspection
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368

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 20.

369

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 21(1). The basic procedures for boarding and inspection are
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confirms any violation of the RFMOs measures, the relevant enforcement action should
be effected.370
Related to the obligation of flag States to take enforcement action is port State
control. Although unrelated to fisheries, the LOSC recognises sovereign rights of the
coastal State over its ports.371 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement is more precise
concerning port State control of fishing vessels and recognises the right and duty of a
port State to take measures in this regard.372 Pursuant to article 23 of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement, port States are also given enforcement powers to take action against
vessels visiting their ports. As a result, a port State may, inter alia, inspect documents,
fishing gear and catch on board fishing vessels when fishing vessels are voluntarily in
its ports or at its offshore terminals.373 Port States are encouraged to adopt regulations
empowering the relevant national authorities to prohibit landings and transhipments of
catch that has been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of
subregional, regional or global conservation and management measures on the high
seas.374

2.2.3.3.3 Practice of RFMOs Regarding Enforcement on the High Seas
Within their management regimes, RFMOs have adopted measures directed at
promoting compliance with the enforcement measures established in respect of their
members. Regarding flag State duties, the measures adopted by ICCAT and WCPFC
are quite comprehensive and consistent with the provisions of the LOSC and UN Fish
Stocks Agreement. ICCAT requires flag Contracting Parties, Cooperating-nonContracting Parties (CPCs), Entities or Fishing Entities whose vessels fish in the
ICCAT Convention area to, inter alia, adopt the relevant measures to enable their
vessels comply with and not undermine ICCAT conservation and management
measures; authorize their vessels to fish in ICCAT Convention area by means of fishing
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authorisation, licenses or permits; not to authorize their vessels to fish in the ICCAT
Convention area unless they can effectively exercise responsibility in respect to such
vessels, including monitoring and controlling their fishing activities; and investigate and
follow up on an alleged violation by a vessel.375
Each CPC is also required to maintain an up-to-date record of fishing vessels
authorized to fish in the ICCAT Convention area and to mark such vessels and fishing
gear accordingly.376 ICCAT subjects fishing vessels to a data recording system377 and a
record of vessels.378 It is notable that, unlike the WCPFC, ICCAT has not adopted
measures regarding the application of sanctions in response to violations. The WCPF
Convention stipulates that sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate
in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever
they occur and deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activity.379
As to port State measures, ICCAT, WCPFC, CCSBT and IATTC have adopted
some terms and conditions regarding port State control of fishing vessels. ICCAT
provides for port inspection schemes requiring inspection of fish, fishing gears and
documents,380 and also requires port State parties to allow vessels to land or tranship
fish only after an inspection has been carried out.381 ICCAT has also established a
comprehensive list of requirements and port State verification measures for
transhipment operations in ports by large scale tuna vessels (LSTVs) of CPCs.382 The
WCPFC port State measures are similar to those required under Article 23 of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement.383 CCSBT on the other hand only prohibits landings of SBT by
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vessels that are not on the authorised vessel list,384 while IATTC prohibits the landing
and transhipment of fish products from IUU-listed vessels.385
The FAO recognises port State control as a very useful tool in deterring IUU
fishing activities.386 On this point, the FAO Committee on Fisheries endorsed a Model
Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
a non-binding international instrument describing minimum port State measures to be
applied by port States and RFMOs to any vessels involved in fishing activities,
including support ships and carrier vessels.387 Based on the Model Scheme, FAO has
developed a legally-binding instrument on port State measures with the intention to
harmonise port State controls.388 Port contact of fishing vessels is instrumental in the
verification of tuna catch data and can aid in detecting violations by flag States. Many
RFMOs have begun implementing the measures recommended by the FAO Port State
Model Scheme.
A key component of enforcement in tuna fisheries is monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS).389 The purpose of MCS is to ensure that fisheries management
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measures are implemented fully in an efficient and speedy manner.390 The underpinning
objective for all MCS programmes is to facilitate sustainable resource use.391 The MCS
tools that may be employed by States include vessels monitoring system (VMS), vessel
registers, observers, and boarding and inspection. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement
requires cooperation by all States with respect to compliance with and enforcement of
conservation and management measures for straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks,392 and provides an array of MCS measures to be taken by the flag State in
respect of vessels flying its flag.393
To reinforce the effective exercise of flag States’ responsibility for fishing
vessels flying their flag, RFMOs have established MCS measures including boarding
and inspection of tuna fishing vessels, VMS, and regional observer programmes.
WCPFC stipulates the boarding and inspection procedures to be applied by its
members,394 while CCSBT, ICCAT and IATTC have established programmes to
monitor transhipments of tuna at sea.395 CCSBT requires that an observer be on board
the carrier vessel during the transhipment,396 while ICCAT and IATTC require that all
transhipment operations of tuna and tuna-like species take place in port.397 In addition,
IATTC requires observers on large scale purse seine vessels. The requirement for
transhipments in port serves to reduce the incidences of laundering of catch resulting
from the difficulties of monitoring at-sea transhipments.398 The CCSBT transhipment
390
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program is harmonised with those of the IOTC and ICCAT.399 Both ICCAT and IATTC
have established requirements for VMS.400 Although compliance is still a challenge for
most RFMOs, better coordination and cooperation among them could improve their
performance.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter first reviewed the biology of tuna as a basis for the development of
the international legal framework for the sustainable management of tuna fisheries.
Second, an overview of the evolutionary development of the international legal
framework governing tuna from the period of the regime of freedom of fishing on the
high seas to the management of tuna under the LOSC has been presented. The
provisions of the LOSC concerning fisheries in the EEZ have been examined, and
attention has been devoted specifically to the additional legal requirements for highly
migratory fish stocks like tuna. These requirements include the duty of cooperation
between States to manage and conserve tuna in the EEZ and on the high seas. The
efforts of the LOSC have been supplemented by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and
RFMOs established to facilitate cooperation between States. It is established that such
cooperation can only be achieved through negotiation in good faith.
Finally, the chapter examined the provisions that draw attention to the elements
of cooperation established under the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the
approaches adopted by tuna RFMOs to implement them. It is established that measures
such as the determination of TAC and data contribution for tuna fisheries remain
difficult for most coastal States to achieve making it hard for RFMOs to meet their
conservation and management objectives. The difficulty of allocating fishing
opportunities/quotas and enforcing them, often results in States breaching their quota
limits or RFMOs increasing TAC levels thereby threatening the sustainability of tuna
fish stocks. RFMOs play a central role in achieving the conservation and management
objectives of the high seas segment of tuna fisheries.

Jurisdiction: Current Principles and Frameworks and Future Directions’, held at the University of Utrecht,
21 November 2008.
399

Transhipment http://www.ccsbt.org (accessed 26 November 2009).

400

ICCAT, Recommendation Concerning Minimum Standards for the Establishment of a VMS in the
ICCAT convention Area (Recommendation 03-14); IATTC, Resolution on the Establishment of a VesselMonitoring System (Resolution C-04-06).

88

CHAPTER 3
THE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR TUNA
MANAGEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
3.1 Introduction
As seen in chapter 2, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement establishes the role of
RFMOs as the mechanism through which international management of tuna fisheries
can be achieved both in the EEZs and on the high seas. Essentially, RFMOs have a
responsibility to adopt appropriate conservation and management measures to ensure
the long-term sustainability of tuna stocks under their purview as required under
international law. Cooperation among the States involved in the Indian Ocean tuna
fisheries is achieved through the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
The objective of this chapter is to review the regional institutional framework
for the management of the tuna resources of the Indian Ocean. This chapter is of two
parts. The first section provides a background to the governance framework for tuna
resources of the Indian Ocean prior to the establishment of the IOTC. This section is
necessarily descriptive, in order to provide a review of the events leading up to the
establishment of the IOTC. In the second section, the establishment of the IOTC is
discussed including the relevant provisions of the Agreement for the Establishment of
the IOTC,1 which is the basic document establishing the structure of the Commission.
The IOTC Agreement stipulates the objectives, functions and resources of the IOTC as
well as its area of competence. In addition, the Agreement provides for decision making
processes, regulates membership, decision-making and voting. The rules adopted by the
IOTC to manage the Indian Ocean tuna resources are analysed in chapter 4.

3.2 The Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Indian Ocean Prior to the
Establishment of the IOTC
The need for the establishment of an organisation devoted to the management of
Indian Ocean tuna fisheries was prompted by the significant increase in the artisanal and
industrial catches of tuna and tuna-like species in the region in the 1980s.2 During this
1

Agreement for the Establishment of the IOTC http://www.iotc.org/, hereinafter the IOTC Agreement.
(accessed 10 August 2010).
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J J Kambona and S H Marashi, Process for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission,
FAO Fisheries circular No. 913 (FAO, 1996). The catch of tuna and tuna-like species rose from 150,000
in the early 1960s to 306, 905 in 1980, and to 566,231 in 1985. Industrial catches were mainly by Japan,
Korea and Taiwan.
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time, the tuna fishing fleet of the European Community (EC) established its interests in
the Western Indian Ocean, specifically in Seychelles which has remained the most
important transhipment port in the region to date.3 The response to increased fishing
pressure on the region’s tuna fisheries was the establishment of an organisation with the
appropriate management structure and authority capable of responding to the challenges
brought about by such an increase.
The relevant issues concerning such an organisation were identified following
two government consultation sessions in Rome in 1987 and in Bangkok in 1988
respectively. Prior to the establishment of such an organisation, the living marine
resources of the Indian Ocean (inshore, offshore and oceanic) were under the mandate
of two subsidiary bodies established within the framework of FAO, namely, the Indian
Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC) and the Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFIC).4
A third organisation, the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (WIOTO),5 was also
in operation to cater for the concerns of the small island States.

3.2.1 The Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC)
The IOFC was established in 1967 by Resolution 2/48 adopted by the FAO
Council at its forty-eighth Session under Article VI(I) of the FAO Constitution.6 Article
VI(I) of the FAO Constitution enables the Conference or the Council to establish
Commissions.7 The area of competence of the IOFC included the Indian Ocean and
adjacent seas excluding the Antarctic area and coinciding with FAO Statistical Areas 51
(Western Indian Ocean) and 57 (Eastern Indian Ocean). The IOFC which covered all
living marine resources was mandated to promote, assist and coordinate national
programmes for fishery development and conservation; to promote research and

3

J J Kambona and S H Marashi, Process for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission,
FAO Fisheries circular No. 913 (FAO, 1996).
4
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Migratory Fish Stocks’ (2007)31 Marine Policy 56, 67.
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S M Marashi, Summary Information on the Role of International Fishery and other Bodies with Regard
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C908 (FAO, 1996).
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See FAO, The Basic Texts of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Article
VI(I), (Volumes I and II, 2000 edition).
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development activities in the area; and to address management problems, with special
emphasis on the management of offshore resources.8
The membership of the IOFC was open to Member States and Associate
Members of the FAO.9 At the inception, the IOFC had three priorities for action,
namely, the improvement of fisheries statistics; the management of heavily exploited
stocks; and development of international programmes in the Indian Ocean region.10
However these objectives were difficult to achieve as the IOFC had no regulatory
powers.11 Hence, the IOFC established a committee whose role was to provide the
necessary assistance in formulating management measures for heavily exploited tuna
stocks in 1968.12 However, the committee focused its attention on monitoring tuna
fishing activities and reviewing the State of tuna and did not particularly provide advice
on specific measures for managing tuna.13
The realisation that the management of tuna in the region required proper
institutional structures and expertise created a need for the IOFC jointly with the IPFIC
to initiate a broad coordination and implementation programme of tuna fishery
development. By restructuring the membership of the committee in 1980 and reestablishing its terms of reference, the IOFC started achieving improved technical and
scientific advice relating to Indian Ocean tuna by 1985.14 In the meantime,
investigations for a broad coordination and implementation programme had been
initiated in the late seventies through the Indo-Pacific Tuna Development and
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(FAO, 2002) 3.
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Management Programme.15 The technical and scientific advice from the committee was
thus instrumental in the decisions made with the support of the Indo-Pacific Tuna
Development and Management Programme in respect of the Indian Ocean Tuna fishery.
The Indo-Pacific Tuna Development and Management Programme held expert
consultation sessions prior to the meetings of the IOFC committee and provided the
necessary scientific advice.16 As a result of various consultations between the IOFC and
IPFC, the IOFC tuna committee at its tenth session in 1988 arrived at a conclusion that
there was a need to establish institutional arrangements which would be suitable for the
formulation, adoption and implementation of management measures for the Indian
Ocean tuna fisheries.17 A number of government consultation sessions were held in
order to design the arrangements for the establishment of the IOTC. It was agreed that
the new body for managing Indian Ocean tuna should be established within the
framework of FAO.
Upon the establishment of the IOTC, the IOFC lost its main function of
managing tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean.18 Two main issues contributed
to the failure of the IOFC. First, the financial constraints on IOFC made it difficult for it
to meet its obligations, as its funding was derived from the FAO and contributions of
donors and the participating States.19 Such funding was insufficient and caused delays
or even cancellations of regular sessions and implementation of the IOFC’s
recommendations.20 Second, the attendance and participation of members at sessions
was very poor, making it difficult for decisions to be made.21 Thus, it became necessary
to restructure the IOFC to include proper institutional and financial support and
15
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commitments, including financial commitment, by the members.22 Once the IOTC was
formed, the fisheries management of other fish stocks which were more localized
remained under the subsidiary committees of the IOFC at sub-regional level.23 As the
functions of the IOFC had become obsolete, it was abolished by Resolution 1/116 of the
FAO, in 1999.24

3.2.2 The Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission
The Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC)25 was initially established as the
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council.26 The APFIC was the first of ten Regional Fisheries
Bodies established by FAO.27 The mandate of APFIC is to promote the full and proper
utilisation of living aquatic resources in the Asia-Pacific region through international
cooperation.28 The long-term objective of APFIC is to ‘promote the full and proper
utilization of living aquatic resources by the development and management of fishing
and culture operations and by the development of related processing and marketing
activities in conformity with the objectives of its members’.29 APFIC is constantly
reviewing the functions and structure of the Commission to accommodate the changes
in global fisheries and recognises the urgency for its members to adopt the relevant
international instruments for the long-term sustainability of fisheries resources.30
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3.2.3 Western Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (WIOTO)
Aside from the IOFC and APFIC, another organisation that has been involved in
the conservation and management of tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean
prior to the establishment of the IOTC is the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.
WIOTO was established in 1991 and entered into force in 1994.31 WIOTO, which is no
longer operative had been established in the interests of the small island States of the
Southwest Indian Ocean region whose needs did not seem to be addressed by the
prevailing FAO initiatives in the region at the material time.32 Its objectives included
harmonization of fisheries policies; relations with DWFNs; fisheries surveillance and
enforcement; fisheries development; and access to EEZs of members.33 The funding
States to WIOTO included Kenya, Seychelles, Comoros, Tanzania, Mozambique, India,
Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius and Sri Lanka.34

3.3 The IOTC Historical Background
As the fishing activities of DWFNs in the Indian Ocean increased, so did the
catch of tuna. As a result of these activities, it became evident that the long-term
institutional arrangements for the management and regulation of tuna fishing in the
region needed to be established. Additionally, the funding which was directed towards
the provision of scientific information important for management of tuna stocks in the
region appeared uncertain.35
After a series of government consultations, the IOFC Committee for the
Management of Indian Ocean tuna adopted the solutions from these consultations and at
its tenth session acknowledged the need to establish a new body in accordance with the
provisions of Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.36 By establishing an institution
31
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within the framework of FAO, it was understood that the new body could maintain a
certain degree of autonomy, but at the same time, benefit from the financial and
technical support provided by the organisation.37 Thus, a draft Agreement for the
establishment of IOTC was prepared by FAO incorporating the views of members and
was reviewed accordingly.38

3.3.1 An FAO, Article XIV Commission
The support provided by FAO to RFMOs is fundamental to enhancing their
operations in promoting the long-term sustainability of fisheries through their
conservation and management efforts. This is most significant for tuna fisheries whose
management requires international cooperation. It is thus necessary to illustrate the role
of the FAO in setting up RFMOs such as the IOTC under its constitution.
The proposition to establish the IOTC was in accordance to the provisions of
Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. The work of FAO through RFMOs like IOTC
aims to promote international fisheries cooperation in order to improve the conservation
and management of fisheries resources. To date, ten FAO regional fisheries bodies
(RFBs) have been established in accordance with either Article VI or Article XIV of the
FAO constitution.39 The former category of RFBs only performs advisory duties and is
dependent on FAO for financial and administrative support,40 while the latter are more
autonomous and can provide for additional contractual obligations among States parties,
apart from the obligations already assumed under the FAO Constitution.41
37
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The category of RFBs that is relevant to the present thesis fall under FAO
Article XIV Commissions. An example of an RFB established under Article XIV of the
FAO Constitution is APFIC, which is one of the longest standing RFBs in the world.42
APFIC has an advisory role and provides its members with scientific and management
advice. In this regard, the Agreement establishing APFIC provides a mandate for the
Commission to formulate and recommend measures, and to initiate and carry out
programmes or projects to conserve and manage resources.43 Also referred to as RFBs,
RFMOs are differentiated from RFBs as they have a management mandate. FAO
defines RFMOs as “intergovernmental fisheries organizations or arrangements, as
appropriate that have the competence to establish fisheries conservation and
management measures”.44 Aside from the IOTC, the General Fisheries Commission for
the Mediterranean is an RFMO mandated to formulate and recommend measures for the
conservation of living marine resources including, inter alia, regulating fishing methods
and fishing gear, and regulating total catch and effort allocations amongst members.45
The FAO is mandated to collect, analyse, interpret and disseminate information
relating to food, nutrition and agriculture, including fisheries and marine products.46 In
addition, the organisation is mandated to promote, and where appropriate recommend
national and international action in respect to, inter alia, conservation of natural
resources and the adoption of international policies with respect to agricultural
commodity arrangements.47 In this regard, the FAO recognises the essential role played
by RFMOs like IOTC in reinforcing regional cooperation concerning the conservation
and management of tuna.48 Correspondingly, chapter 2 illustrated the emphasis
international fisheries instruments place on the duty of States to cooperate either directly
42
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or through subregional or regional organisations in the conservation and management of
tuna. The FAO plays a significant role in supporting RFMOs by dealing with issues that
hamper their effectiveness such as overcapacity and improvement of fleet capacity.49

3.3.2 Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
The amendment of Part R of the Basic Texts of the FAO in 1991, established
more flexibility and autonomy for Article XIV Commissions, and gave them more
extensive responsibility and authority.50 Part R addresses the “principles and procedures
which should govern conventions and agreements concluded under Articles XIV and
XV of the Constitution, and Commissions and Committees established under Article VI
of the constitution”.51 To this end the FAO Conference revised Resolution 46/57 by
Resolution 8/91, enabling Article XIV Commissions, among other things, to establish
autonomous budgets in anticipation of the establishment of IOTC.52
The first conference for the Adoption of a draft Agreement for the establishment
of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission was held in 1989 followed by a technical
conference in 1992.53 The Agreement for the Establishment of the IOTC,54 was adopted
in 1993, endorsed by IOFC in 1994, and entered into force on 27 March 1996, thus
enabling the IOTC to become fully operative.55 The IOTC Agreement empowers the
Commission to adopt binding conservation and management measures,56 and also
defines IOTC’s Area of competence.57 The IOTC Agreement requires members of the
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Commission to ensure that their national legislation is consistent with the provisions of
the Agreement.58
The IOTC Agreement takes cognizance of certain provisions of the LOSC. In
particular, the provisions of Articles 56, 64, and 116-119 of the LOSC are
acknowledged. These articles address the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal
State in the EEZ, highly migratory species, and conservation and management of high
seas resources respectively.59 These aspects are fundamental to the conservation and
management of tuna stocks in the region. The functions that underline the management
role of the IOTC are facilitated by, inter alia, its organisational structure, membership,
decision-making, funding and the general administration of the Commission. These
factors are examined in the following section.

3.4 The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
The Agreement that establishes an RFMO dictates its mandate, and ideally
reflects the relevant international law and internationally-agreed standards for the
management of fish stocks under its purview.60 Thus, the mandate of the IOTC is
twofold. First, The IOTC derives its mandate from the IOTC Agreement. The objective
of the Agreement and hence, the mandate of the IOTC, is ‘to promote cooperation
among its Members with a view to ensuring, through appropriate management, the
conservation and optimum utilisation of stocks and encouraging sustainable
development of fisheries based on such stocks’.61
Second, is the mandate derived from the commitment made by member States of
the Commission in international agreements, some of which are legally binding. A great
majority of the IOTC members are States Parties to the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement which require them to cooperate through the IOTC to discharge certain
obligations in respect of the conservation and management of tuna stocks. Among the
non-binding instruments in which members of the Commission have made
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commitments to pursue specific objectives through participation in the IOTC is the
FAO code of Conduct.
The IOTC area of competence includes the Western and Eastern Indian Ocean
regions (FAO areas 51 and 57 respectively), as represented in Figure 5.62 This area
covers the Indian Ocean and the adjacent seas, north of the Antarctic Convergence.63

Figure 5. IOTC area of competence (FAO Areas 51 and 57)64

Pursuant to Article V of the IOTC Agreement, the Commission has, inter alia,
the following functions and responsibilities in accordance with the principles expressed
in the relevant provisions of the LOSC:
a) To keep under review the conditions and trends of the stocks, and to gather,
analyse, and disseminate scientific information, catch and effort statistics and other data
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marine fishing areas. The marine fishing areas cover the waters of the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian and
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codes. http://www.fao.org (accessed 7 August 2010).
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relevant to the conservation and management of the stocks and to fisheries based on the
stocks covered by the IOTC Agreement;
b) To encourage, recommend, and coordinate research and development
activities in respect of the stocks and fisheries covered by this Agreement, and such
other activities as the Commission may decide appropriate, including activities
connected with transfer of technology, training and enhancement, having due regard to
the need to ensure the equitable participation of Members of the Commission in the
fisheries and the special interests and needs of Members in the region that are
developing countries;
c) to adopt, in accordance with Article IX and on the basis of scientific evidence,
conservation and management measures, to ensure the conservation of the stocks
covered by the IOTC Agreement and to promote the objective of their optimum
utilization throughout the Area, and;
(d) to keep under review the economic and social aspects of the fisheries based
on the stocks covered by the IOTC Agreement bearing in mind, in particular, the
interests of developing coastal states.
The species under the management mandate of IOTC are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. IOTC Species65

IOTC SPECIES
Tuna
Albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga)
Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus)
Skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis)
Southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii)
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares)
Billfish
Black marlin (Makaira indica)
Indo-Pacific blue marlin (Makaira mazara)
Indo-Pacific sailfish (Istiophorus platypteru)s
Striped marlin (Tetrapturus audax)
Swordfish (Xiphias gladius)
Neritic tuna
Bullet tuna (Auxis rochei)
Frigate tuna (Auxis thazard)
Indo-Pacific king mackerel (Scomberomorus guttatus)
Kawakawa (Euthynnus affinis)
Longtail tuna (Thunnus tonggol)
Narrow barred Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus
commersoni)
65
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3.4.1 Organisational Structure of the IOTC
An effective organisational structure is essential for the coordination of activities
within the IOTC. Such a structure would contribute to the efficient functioning of the
IOTC and also facilitate decision making regarding the adoption of appropriate
measures for the governance of tuna stocks in IOTC’s Area of competence. The
administrative functions of the IOTC are carried out by the secretariat which is hosted in
Victoria, Seychelles. The secretariat which manages the daily activities of the IOTC
may also establish subsidiary bodies with specific functions.66 Such subsidiary bodies
include the scientific committee and the technical working parties. The Chairperson of
the IOTC convenes its annual regular session.67

3.4.1.1 Membership of the IOTC
The effectiveness of IOTC in achieving its objectives is dependent upon the
active participation of coastal and fishing States in the Indian Ocean region. All
Members and Associate Members of FAO are eligible to the membership of the
Commission if they are; a) coastal States or Associate Members situated wholly or
partly within the Area; b) States or Associate Members whose vessels engage in fishing
in the Area for stocks covered by the IOTC Agreement; c) regional economic
integration organizations of which any State referred to in a) or b) is a member and to
which that State has transferred competence over matters within the purview of the
IOTC Agreement.68
In addition, the Commission may, by a two-thirds majority of its members,
admit to membership any other States that are not Members of FAO, but are Members
of the United Nations, or of any of its specialized Agencies, or of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, provided that such States are; a) coastal States situated wholly
or partly in the Area; or b) States whose vessels engage in fishing in the Area for stocks
covered by the IOTC Agreement.69 Thus, members of the IOTC are obliged to
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IOTC Agreement, Article XII; IOTC, Rules of procedure, Rule XII.
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cooperate with each other and to encourage eligible States to become members of the
Commission.70
States wishing to become members of the IOTC are required to deposit an
instrument with the Director-General of FAO accepting to be bound by the provisions
of the Agreement.71 The Director-General in turn, is required to inform the IOTC and
FAO Members, as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations of acceptances
that have become effective.72 Pursuant to Article XXIV(c)(i) of the IOTC Agreement,
the Director-General also informs each Member and Associate Member of FAO who
have accepted the Agreement and non-Member States admitted to the IOTC of the
application of a non-Member State to be admitted to membership in the IOTC. The
current membership of IOTC is presented in Table 2.

70

IOTC Agreement, Article IV(3).
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IOTC Agreement, Article XVII (1)&(2).
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IOTC Agreement, Article XVII (3).
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Table 2. Current Members and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties of IOTC73

MEMBER
Australia
Belize
China
Comoros
Eritrea
European Community
France
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Republic
Japan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mauritius
Oman, Sultanate of
Pakistan
Philippines
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
COOPERATING PARTIES
Maldives
Senegal
South Africa
Uruguay

ACCESSION DATE
November 1996
May 2007
October 1998
August 2001
August 1994
October 1995
December 1996
January 2005
March 1995
July 2007
January 2002
June 1996
September 2004
March 1996
January 1996
May 1998
December 1994
April 2000
April 1995
January 2004
July 1995
July 2008
June 1994
December 1996
April 2007
March 1997
March 1995
October 2002
COOPERATING SINCE
March 2010
May 2006
June 2005
May 2007

The membership of IOTC is significant in giving effect to its capacity for
governance. The IOTC Agreement provides the rules of procedure for membership
application. As the FAO plays a central role in the admission of members to IOTC, it is
necessary that the FAO is appraised on these procedures every now and then to ensure
that only the members designated in the IOTC Agreement are admitted. For example,
the Commission found that the FAO Depository overlooked the relevant membership
73

Adopted from: Report of the IOTC Performance Review Panel (2009) 12: IOTC, Report of the
Fourteenth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Busan, Korea, 1-5 March 2010.
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requirements in the case of Sierra Leone. Regarding Sierra Leone’s membership
application to the IOTC, the requirement under Article XXIV(c)(i) of the IOTC
Agreement was overlooked. Sierra Leone’s instrument of accession was submitted and
accepted by the depository in FAO in 2008. However, the IOTC Members had not been
consulted concerning the eligibility of Sierra Leone as required pursuant to Article
XXIV of the IOTC Agreement. The IOTC therefore considered unprocedural, the
decision by the FAO to admit Sierra Leone into Membership based on the requirements
of the IOTC Agreement. The decision by the FAO also overlooked the requirement
under the IOTC Agreement for the necessary two-thirds majority vote of the IOTC
members as stipulated in Article IV(2).
Indeed, the FAO was working on the presumption that the right procedure had
been followed; first, by assessing if the document submitted by Sierra Leone was
legally acceptable, and secondly, by assessing Sierra Leone’s eligibility for
membership. Yet, according to the IOTC Members, Sierra Leone did not meet the
relevant criteria as stipulated in Article IV of the IOTC Agreement.74 In particular, the
IOTC Members pointed out that, Sierra Leone is neither a coastal State in the IOTC
area, nor has it recently reported fishing activity in the IOTC area.75 In this case, the
depository in FAO failed to follow the right procedure, and although one of the criteria
for the acceptance of Sierra Leone’s membership was eligibility, the legal requirements
of the IOTC Agreement regarding eligibility were not met.
The Commission has since submitted a request to FAO for further investigation
into the procedures employed in verifying the eligibility criteria in this case. The IOTC
Members also stressed that the appropriate consultation be made in future, prior to any
acceptances by the depository at FAO, and especially in situations similar to the Sierra
Leone case where the State was not at all eligible for membership in accordance with
the IOTC Agreement.76
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3.4.1.2 Participation Criteria
As was noted in section 3.4.1.1, the membership of IOTC is limited to Members
and Associate Members of the FAO. Such membership restriction contradicts the
provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement which promote open membership to States
with ‘a real interest’ in tuna stocks under the purview of the IOTC, and also the
obligation for States and fishing entities to cooperate fully with the relevant RFMOs.77
The cooperation of all States and fishing entities with fishing vessels operating in
IOTC’s area of competence is fundamental to the effective conservation and
management of tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean.
Regarding non-members, the IOTC has resolved to invite Non-Contracting
Parties to participate in its work.78 Non-contracting Parties can thus apply to the
secretary of the IOTC to become Contracting Parties or attain the Status of Cooperating
Non-Contracting Parties.79 This is consistent with the provision of Article 17(3) of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Further, non-members who are Members or Associate
Members of the FAO are admitted to Commission meetings as observers upon
request.80 The IOTC does not however provide for cooperation with fishing entities as
required under Article 1(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.81 This omission in
IOTC’s provisions prevents Taiwan which is considered as an entity from becoming a
member of the Commission. As Taiwan is a major fishing nation in the Indian Ocean,
its participation in the conservation and management of tuna stocks in the region is
significant.

3.4.1.2.1 Participation of Fishing Entities
The term ‘fishing entity’ first appeared in an international legal instrument when
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was adopted.82 Article 1(3) of the UN Fish Stocks
77

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 8-17.
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IOTC, Resolution 98/05 on Cooperation with Non-Contracting Parties.
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IOTC, Resolution 03/02 on Criteria of Attaining the Status of Cooperating non-Cooperating Party.
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The IOTC Agreement, Article VII; IOTC, Rules of Procedure of IOTC, Rule XIII(2)&(3).
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Article 1(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement states that; this Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to
other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas.
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Peter S C Ho, ‘The Impact of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in International
Fisheries Fora’ (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law 133, 133. Other International
instruments which have made provisions for the participation of fishing entities include; the FAO Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995, Article 1.2 and 4.1. and the International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), Article 5. The
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Agreement provides that; the Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing
entities whose vessels fish on the high seas. As Taiwan is the only fishing entity, it is
believed that this provision was intended for Taiwan’s integration into the international
regulatory system of fisheries governance,83 thus making vessels flying the Taiwanese
flag subject to regional management and regulations,84 through participation in RFMOs.
However, the status of Taiwan limits its participation in the international management
of high seas fish stocks.85
As a Republic of China, Taiwan has limited international recognition and has
been excluded from most global and regional fishery instruments dealing with high seas
fisheries.86 Taiwan’s participation in global and regional agreements for international
management of high seas fish stocks is equally limited. Since the IOTC has not
established an effective mechanism for the participation of fishing entities, its
membership restriction has prevented Taiwan, as a fishing entity from becoming a
member of the Commission,
Taiwan is one of the world’s leading DWFNs, and its tuna fishery is the most
important distant water fishery.87 Taiwan’s purse seine fleet of 34 vessels is the second
largest in the world after Japan.88 Taiwan is a major fishing State in the Indian Ocean,
term had appeared earlier in FAO documents such as the FAO Fisheries Report No. 484, Supplement,
Papers Presented at the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, Rome 7-15 September 1992 (52)
http://books.google.com.au (accessed 10 August 2010).
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Development & International Law 123,123.
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having started tuna longline fishing in 1963,89 with a longline fleet that is currently
catching about 30% of the total bigeye catch.90 Taiwan had a total of 640 longliners and
a catch of 27,000tonnes in 2008.91 Between 2004 and 2008, the annual catch for
longliners was 95,000tonnes.92 Although Taiwan’s tuna catches in the Indian Ocean are
quite substantial,93 Taiwan can neither discharge its obligation to cooperate, nor can
IOTC address issues related to non-cooperation or non-compliance of fishing entities.94
Considering Taiwan’s substantial fishing activity in the Indian Ocean, it’s participation
in the work of IOTC is fundamental to the effective conservation and management of
tuna stocks in the region. It is necessary for the IOTC to make it a priority to address the
issue of Taiwan’s participation in the Indian Ocean fishery.
Taiwan can be understood as being an entity possessing full autonomy in the
conduct of its external fisheries relations and of matters provided for in relevant
international law.95 With this viewpoint, Taiwan has pursued contracting party status in
RFMOs. Pursuant to Article 17(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the burden is
upon States which are members of RFMOs to request fishing entities which have
fishing vessels in the relevant area to cooperate fully in the implementation of the
established conservation and management measures. Such entities shall enjoy benefits
from participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with
these measures.96 Consequently, Taiwan can enjoy the benefits of harvesting tuna if its
vessels comply with the measures adopted by RFMOs such as the IOTC.
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Currently, Taiwan is represented at the IOTC meetings by “invited experts” who
are ranked as observers.97 This status does not allow such experts to represent their
country or make any commitments on the implementation of management measures
under consideration by the IOTC.98 Although there have been claims of laundering
activities by Taiwan over the years,99 the IOTC has fallen short of taking measures to
sanction Taiwan over practices which undermine its efforts in meeting its conservation
objectives, and it does not also have the mechanism to obligate Taiwan to submit
statistical data as required.
For vessels flying Taiwan’s flag to comply with measures adopted by the IOTC,
it must participate in decision making regarding the tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean.
Taiwan’s tuna fishery is the most important of all its fisheries, with the distant water
fishery being the major sector in the fishing industry.100 As such, Taiwan can be
considered as a State that has ‘real interest’ in the tuna fisheries of the Indian Ocean as
stipulated in Article 8(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.

3.4.1.2.2 Practice of RFMOs Regarding Entities
Because of the importance of Taiwan’s tuna fishery, Taiwan is exercising great
efforts in the international conservation of management of tuna fisheries.101 In this
respect, Taiwan has established domestic regulations in line with the resolutions
adopted by RFMOs, and has also implemented a fleet size reduction programme.102
Recognising the role of Taiwan in tuna fisheries, some RFMOs have adopted
approaches to address the issues of Taiwan’s participation in their tuna fisheries.
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Taiwan’s status notwithstanding, the need for its participation has been
recognised by some RFMOs which have established appropriate mechanisms through
the enabling implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Recognising the
considerable fishing activities of Taiwan in the South Pacific, States from the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean have incorporated an instrument in the provisions of the
WCPF Convention that enabled Taiwan to implement the Convention.103 Taiwan was
fully involved in the deliberations of the preparatory conference to establish the
Commission, and signed the ‘Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities’ to
enable its involvement and implementation of the WCPF Convention.104 This incident
set a legal precedent and catalysed the participation of Taiwan in other RFMOs.105
Other RFMOs in whose work Taiwan is participating are CCSBT, ICCAT and
IATTC.106

3.4.1.3 The Scientific Committee
The IOTC is obliged to establish a permanent Scientific Committee which
provides scientific advice on the status of the tuna stocks under its purview.107 In
addition, sub-commissions may be established to deal with specific tuna stocks,108 as
well as working parties which analyse the technical problems related to the management
goals of the IOTC.109 The Committee comprises scientists who are representatives from
member States and invited experts.110 The committee provides advice to the IOTC and
sub-commissions on research and data collection, status of stocks and management
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matters.111,112 The chairperson, who is elected by the Scientific Committee,113 may
convene working parties to carry out stock assessments of the relevant species and
advice the Committee accordingly.114
Although the IOTC Agreement does not list the duties of the Scientific
Committee, these duties are stipulated in Rule X(10) of IOTC’s Rules of Procedure.
These functions include, inter alia, recommending policies and procedures for the
collection, processing, dissemination and analysis of fisheries data;115 develop and
coordinate research in collaboration with members of the Commission in support of
fisheries management;116 keeping the Commission informed on the status of the relevant
stocks and offering management advice to the Commission and sub-commissions
accordingly,117 and assisting in the exchange and review of research information among
scientists.118 The Scientific Committee holds annual meetings to analyse the reports of
IOTC member States and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, with respect to their
tuna fisheries, statistical systems and research programmes, as well as the measures that
they may have adopted in response to the recommendations from the Committee.119
Sub-commissions on the other hand, have a duty to review the relevant stocks and
recommend the appropriate management measures to the Commission.120 A review of
the IOTC in 2009, recommended that detailed provisions for these bodies should be
included in the IOTC Agreement as well as being stipulated in the Rules of
Procedure.121
To date, the Commission has established five working parties related to the
different species. The active working parties include ecosystems and bycatch (WPEB),
tropical tunas (WPTT), billfish (WPB), fishing capacity (WPFC), and data collection
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and statistics (WPDCS).122 These parties develop models, identify procedures for stock
assessment, review the stock structures and carry out stock assessments of the relevant
tuna species.123 The results from the working parties are directed to the scientific
Committee for management recommendations to the Commission.

3.4.2 Decision-Making Structure of the IOTC
According to the IOTC Agreement, decisions and recommendations are taken by
a majority vote.124 The IOTC has established different decision-making procedures for
various types of decisions. First, are the Conservation and Management measures,
which are binding on Members and are to be adopted by a two-thirds majority.125 The
two-thirds majority rule also applies to the Rules of Procedure which the Commission
may adopt and amend.126 Second, decisions are passed in the form of Resolutions that
are binding on Commission Members, unless there is specific objection on the part of
the Members or Recommendations which are non-binding and rely on the voluntary
action of Members.127 Third, the Commission is required to adopt its budget by
consensus, although a two-thirds majority rule will apply if a consensus is not
reached.128 Fourth, to amend the IOTC Agreement a three-quarters majority is
required.129
The IOTC Agreement contains an objection procedure which enables members
to object to the conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission
within a specified period, and even opt out of any of these measures with no
justification whatsoever.130 Such a procedure is considered outdated, and one which is
likely to impair the Commission’s implementation and compliance mechanisms.131
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It is imperative that for the conservation and management measures of IOTC to
be effective, its members ought to be willing to cooperate by implementing at national
level, the decisions taken by the Commission and by discharging their international
obligations as stipulated in international instruments.

3.4.3 Administration and Finance
The Secretary of the IOTC is appointed by the FAO Director- General, with the
approval of the Commission in accordance with Article VIII of the IOTC Agreement.
Although the staff of the Commission are appointed by the Secretary and are under the
Secretary’s supervision, both the Secretary and the staff are appointed under the terms
and conditions of the FAO, and they are responsible to the Director-General, for
administrative purposes.132
The budget of the IOTC is not fully under the control of its members and the
Secretariat. As an FAO Commission, the financial regulations of IOTC must conform to
those of the FAO. Consequently, the FAO controls the manner in which the
Commission’s budget is discharged. A budget prepared by the Director-General is
approved by the Conference of FAO in accordance with the Rules and Financial
Regulations of FAO.133 The administrative budget expenses of the Commission are
derived from Members’ contributions which are made to an autonomous budget adopted
during its normal sessions annually.134 The Commission determines the level of
members’ contributions based on their economic status and their ability to make
financial contributions. The contributions are determined according to the members’
Gross National Income as assessed by the World Bank.135 In 2007 the World Bank
classified countries as low income if the per capita Gross National Income was less than

The Evolving Role of RFBs and International Agreement on Decision-Making Processes. FAO Fisheries
Circular No. 995 (FAO, 2004),
132

IOTC Agreement, Article VIII (1).
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IOTC Agreement, Article VIII (3).

134

IOTC Agreement, Article XIII (1), (3) and (4); IOTC Financial Regulations, Regulation III (4).
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According to the OECD Glossary, the GNI comprises the total value produced within a country (Gross
Domestic Product), less primary incomes payable to the non-resident units plus primary incomes
receivable from non-resident units. http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/search.asp (accessed 31 August 2010).
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US$935; as high income if it was higher than US$11,455 and as middle income those
countries with per capita GNI between US$935 and US$11,455.136
The IOTC may also receive donations from willing donors for the fulfilment of
its functions.137 Altogether the contributions and donations to the Commission are held
in a Trust which is administered by the Director-General of FAO.138 The FAO charges
organisation costs at 4.5% of the Commission’s total budget.139 For example, from the
total expenditure of US$1,737,373 in 2009, the FAO servicing costs were US$78,564,
while a total of US$82,493 is projected in service fees to FAO for a budget of
US$1,824,667.140
In accordance with Article XIII (8) of the IOTC Agreement, the members’ right
to vote is determined by the status of their contribution. According to the Secretariat,
Members of the Commission are often in arrears in the payment of their financial
contributions.141 As a result, such members may lose their right to vote as provided in
Article XIII(8) the IOTC Agreement. Accordingly, a Member which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions shall not be eligible to vote if its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount of contributions due from it for the two preceding calendar years.
However, the Commission may allow such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the
failure to pay was due to conditions beyond the control of the Member. It is imperative
that failure by Members to remit their financial contributions to the Commission in a
timely manner impairs its decision making process and ultimately hinders the
Commission from fulfilling its mandate. Delays in Members’ annual contributions may
be attributed to the fact that most of the States in the IOTC area of competence are
developing coastal States, which are faced with financial constraints.
A great majority of the IOTC Members are opposed to the current budgetary
arrangements between the Commission and the FAO. The European Commission (EC),
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IOTC, Report of the Fourteenth Session of the Indian Ocean tuna Commission, Busan, Korea, 1-5
March 2010.
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IOTC Agreement, Article XIII (6).
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IOTC Agreement, Article XIII (7).
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IOTC, Report of the Tenth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Goa-Indian, 22-26 May
2006; IOTC, Report of the Ninth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Victoria, Seychelles, 30
May- 3 June 2005.
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for example has expressed its concerns regarding the lack of transparency and
accountability to the Commission’s budget of 2006 and accounts of 2005.142 In response
to these concerns, the IOTC standing committee on administration and finance
recommended that regular external financial audits of the secretariat be carried out to
enhance the accountability and transparency in IOTC’s financial affairs.143 Additionally,
the results of the IOTC performance review indicated that IOTC’s budgetary
relationship to FAO is detrimental to the efficiency of the Commission’s work, since
neither members nor the secretariat are in full control of the budget.144 Although FAO is
required to contribute to the budget of the IOTC in accordance with Article VIII(3) of
the IOTC Agreement, such contributions have not been forthcoming. The general
recommendation of the Review panel in this respect and from a legal standpoint is that
the IOTC Agreement be amended accordingly.145

3.4.4 The IOTC and FAO Framework
The IOTC has initiated a process that will enable the Commission to review its
association with FAO in accordance with Article XX of the IOTC Agreement, in order
to meet its challenges concerning fishing entities, and finance and administration. To a
great extent, the review has been prompted by the demand for a performance review of
RFMOs by the international community to assess their effectiveness and efficiency in
delivering their mandate. It has been suggested that an amendment to the IOTC
Agreement will enable IOTC to be placed outside the framework of FAO and
modernise the Commission, thus enabling Taiwan to participate in the work of the
Commission. In this respect, there was consensus that the texts of the IOTC agreement
and the rules of procedure be amended accordingly. The IOTC recognises the
contribution of FAO in its operations especially in its formative years and has
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The EC representative proposed a change in the institutional framework of IOTC as the only solution
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established a cooperation agreement to maintain a strong relationship between IOTC
and FAO.146

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the regional institutional framework for tuna
management in the Indian Ocean by examining the governance framework. An
examination of the provisions of the IOTC Agreement has shown that some relevant
aspects of international fisheries law which could be translated into management
strategies have been omitted from the IOTC Agreement. For example, the modern
elements of fisheries management such as the precautionary and ecosystem-based
approaches are not addressed. Most of the provisions of the LOSC and UN Fish Stocks
Agreement including MCS measures are also not reflected. These anomalies impede the
effectiveness and efficiency of the IOTC. The objection procedure in IOTC’s decision
making structure is also seen as an impediment to its implementation and compliance
mechanisms.
It has also been shown that the limitation on participation to the IOTC has
prevented Taiwan which is a major fishing State from participating in the work of the
Commission. Taiwan is also prevented from cooperating with other fishing and coastal
States through the IOTC, making it difficult for the IOTC to take measures to sanction
Taiwan over practices which undermine its efforts in meeting its conservation
objectives, and it does not also to obligate Taiwan to submit statistical data as required.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES
ADOPTED BY THE IOTC
4.1 Introduction
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission has a key role to play in the long-term
sustainability of tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean. The IOTC in consultation with its
Members has a responsibility of conserving and managing the tuna stocks under its
purview. Thus, the IOTC is required to adopt the appropriate conservation and
management measures consistent with international law.
In this chapter, the conservation and management measures adopted by the
IOTC for the management of the Indian Ocean tuna resources are analysed and assed in
order to determine their consistency with the international fisheries instruments
discussed in chapter 2. The role of the IOTC in enhancing regional cooperation and
regulating the utilisation of tuna resources in the Indian Ocean is also examined. The
internationally agreed measures in the framework of the IOTC provide the necessary
context for analysing Kenya’s implementation of its international and regional
obligations relating to tuna in chapter 6.

4.2 Conservation and Management Measures
The adoption of conservation and management measures is central to the work
of the IOTC. A requirement of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is for States to cooperate
through RFMOs in adopting measures that ensure the long-term sustainability of tuna
stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilization.1 States are also required
to agree on and comply with such measures.2 The adoption of such measures is
facilitated through the decision-making procedures of the IOTC. The effectiveness of
these measures is reliant upon the commitment of Members to address issues that are
critical to the sustainability of tuna resources under the management mandate of the
IOTC. Such decisions also ought to have a sound basis. Accordingly, Article 10(j) of
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement obligates States, through RFMOs to agree on decisionmaking procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and management
measures in a timely and effective manner.
1

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 5(a).

2

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 10(a).
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The conservation and management measures of the tuna stocks under the
auspices of the IOTC are embodied in the Resolutions and Recommendations which are
adopted at the Commission’s annual sessions.3 As discussed in the previous chapter
(3.4.2), the resolutions of the IOTC are binding on members, while the IOTC
recommendations are voluntary. To date, the IOTC has adopted forty-six Resolutions
and eleven Recommendations. The resolutions adopted by the IOTC address various
aspects of tuna fisheries management including the approaches to conservation of target
species and non-target species, data contribution and sharing, and compliance and
enforcement.
Although the IOTC Agreement does not stipulate the conservation principles for
fisheries management to be adopted by members of the IOTC, it acknowledges the
requirement for members to promote the optimum utilisation and sustainable
development of tuna stocks under the purview of the IOTC.4 Additionally, Article
V(2)(c) of the IOTC Agreement reiterates this requirement and obliges the Commission
to adopt conservation and management measures in accordance with Article IX and on
the basis of scientific advice. These requirements are consistent with the provisions of
the LOSC5 and the UN fish Stocks Agreement.6 The procedures concerning
conservation and management measures are stipulated in Article IX of the IOTC
Agreement.

4.2.1 Approaches to Species Management
The principal market tuna species under the purview of the IOTC are bigeye
tuna, skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, Albacore, and swordfish. The tuna fishery in the
Indian Ocean harvests not only these target species, but also impacts other species
which are not targeted or wanted. As was noted in chapter 2(2.5.2) such species which
are referred to as non-target species may include, inter alia, fish, sharks, sea turtles and

3

In contrast to the IOTC, the WCPFC has adopted a different practice with respect to the nomenclature
for its decisions. Unlike IOTC, the resolutions of WCPFC are non-binding to its members and
cooperating non-members, while its conservation and management measures are binding. See
http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures (accessed 2 January 2010).
4

The IOTC Agreement, Preamble; Article V (1) & (2)(c).

5

LOSC, Arts. 61 (2), 62(1), 64(1).

6

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 5(a) and (b).
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birds, taken up as by-products which may be retained for their market value or by-catch
which may eventually be discarded.
The LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provide the need for States
cooperating through RFMOs not only to establish conservation measures for tuna
fisheries but also to take into consideration the effects on species associated with or
dependent upon harvested species, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations
of such species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously
threatened.7 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement broadens the focus further to include the
tuna fishery ecosystem8 and emphasises the need for a precautionary approach to the
management of the fishery.9 An analysis of the conservation of target and non-target
species follows.

4.2.1.1 Status of Target Species
The target species of concern to the present thesis are Skipjack, bigeye and
yellowfin tunas. Bigeye in the Indian Ocean is caught by industrial longline and purse
seine fleets, with Taiwanese vessels being the major longline fleet.10 As the stock size
and fishing pressure are close to the optimal, the current assessment of the Indian Ocean
stock of bigeye tuna undertaken by the scientific committee concludes that the bigeye
stock is fully utilised.11 The scientific committee has registered its concerns about the
relative decrease in adult bigeye, considering the gradual decline of the stock size
indicators since the 1970s. The results of the stock assessment conducted in 2009,
indicate that the current (2008) exploitation levels of bigeye (107,000tonnes) are below
the current estimate of MSY (110,000tonnes), and that the catches of bigeye should not
exceed this level.12 On the basis of scientific advice, the IOTC has committed to seek to

7

LOSC, Arts. 61(4) and 119(1)(b); UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Arts. 5(e) and 6(3)(c).

8

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Arts. 5 and 7.

9

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 5(c) and 6.

10

IOTC, Report of the Ninth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles, 6-10 November
2006. The piracy acts off Somalia have greatly reduced the catches associated with FADS. See, Report of
the Twelfth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles, 30 November-4 December 2009.

11

IOTC, Report of the Twelfth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles, 30 November-4
December 2009.

12

Ibid.
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adopt appropriate measures to address the recommendations of the scientific committee
in respect to the conservation of bigeye.13
Skipjack is known to be highly productive and resilient and is not prone to
overfishing. However, the scientific advice is that, the stock should be closely
monitored in 2010.14 The stocks size and fishing pressure is therefore considered to be
within acceptable limits. Skipjack is caught by purse seine. Concerning yellowfin tuna,
the stock is considered to have been recently overexploited and is subject to continuous
overfishing.15 In the period 2003-2006, the catches of yellowfin tuna were
extraordinarily high.16 This phenomenon has been attributed to an increase in
catchability by surface fleets due to a high level of concentration across a reduced area
and depth range.17 Although the assessment of the yellowfin tuna stock in the Indian
Ocean remains complex and the stock status uncertain,18 these high catches are believed
to have accelerated the decline in stock biomass.19
Yellowfin is caught by purse seine and longlines. The fishing mortality of
yellowfin has been exceeding the MSY-related level (current MSY level is
300,000tonnes) and the recruitment is declining.20 It is believed that the decline in
recruitment may exacerbate overexploitation,21 and that in 3-5 years time the stock will
become overfished.22 Future catches of yellowfin tuna are uncertain considering the
vessels which have left the fishery for various reasons, including for security reasons
owing to piracy off the coast of Somalia.23 There are no specific Resolutions adopted in
13

IOTC, Resolution 02/08, ‘On the Conservation of Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Indian Ocean’.

14

IOTC, Report of the Fourteenth Session of the IOTC, Busan, Korea 1-5 March 2010.

15

IOTC, Report of the Twelfth Session of the Scientific Committee Victoria, Seychelles, 30 November -4
December 2009; Report of the Fourteenth Session of the IOTC, Busan, Korea 1-5 March 2010.
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IOTC, Report of the Ninth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles 6-10 November
2006.
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IOTC, Report of the Twelfth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles, 30 November-4
December 2009.

19

Ibid.

20

IOTC, Report of the Twelfth Session of the Scientific Committee, Victoria, Seychelles, 30 November-4
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Mombasa, Kenya 15-23 October 2009.
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regard to yellowfin, but a general provision on the tuna stocks in the area of IOTC
competence applies to it.24 During its fifth session, the scientific committee registered
its concerns regarding the status of yellowfin which was said to be close or above MSY
and adopted resolution 02/08 which seeks solutions for the reduction of mortality on
juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna.25 An examination of the various approaches that
have been adopted by the IOTC to manage target species and conservation of non-target
species follows. The approaches for managing target species include fishing capacity,
fishing effort and setting of catch limits. Concerning non-target species, conservation
measures of marine turtles, seabirds and sharks are examined.

4.2.1.1.1 Management of Fishing Capacity and Fishing Effort
The size of the world’s tuna fleets is a matter of concern, such that many
governments and industry desire to limit or reduce the number and total capacity of
vessels that harvest tuna.26 As fishing fleets continue to grow in number and improve in
efficiency, States and RFMOs alike are becoming concerned that the increased
harvesting capacity will make it more difficult to implement and sustain effective
conservation measures for tuna.27 Such excess fishing capacity in the world’s tuna fleets
could lead to overfishing of tuna populations, and to harvests in excess of demand.28
Fishing capacity is defined as the maximum amount of fish over a period of time that
can be produced by a vessel or fleet of vessels if fully utilised, given the biomass and

24

IOTC, Resolution 10/01, ‘For the Conservation and Management of Tropical Tunas Stocks in the IOTC
Area of Competence’.

25

IOTC, Resolution 02/08, ‘On the Conservation of Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Indian Ocean’.

26

James Joseph, Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 982
(FAO, 2003) ix. Efforts to reduce the world’s tuna fleets include those of the Organisation for Promotion
of Responsible Tuna Fisheries for buying and retiring excess longline capacity and the World Tuna Purse
Seine Organisation efforts to place a moratorium on the entry of new purse seine vessels into the world’s
tuna fisheries. See also James Joseph, Past Developments and Future Options for Managing Tuna
Fishing Capacity with Special Emphasis on Purse Seine Fleets, A Report within the framework of FAO
Project GCP/INT/851/JPN (2005); FAO, Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity; Conservation and
Socioeconomics, Second Meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee of the FAO Project, Madrid,
Spain 15-18 March 2004.

27

James Joseph, Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 982
(FAO, 2003) iv.
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age structure of the fish stock and the present state of the technology.29 Capacity
management in tuna fisheries is difficult because both tuna and the vessels that harvest
them travel long distances across the world’s oceans both on the high seas and in the
EEZs of coastal States.30
In addition to establishing a working party on fishing capacity,31 the IOTC has
adopted a number of measures to limit the capacity of tuna fleets operating in the IOTC
Area. The IOTC has adopted measures imposing limits on large fishing vessels of
Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties (CPCs) by size and
numbers, and gear type. The IOTC requires Contracting Parties and CPCs which have
more than 50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC Record of Vessels to limit the number of their
fishing vessels larger than 24 meters length overall to the number of its fishing vessels
registered in 2003 in the IOTC Record of Vessels.32 Contracting Parties and CPCs are
also required to notify the IOTC Secretariat, the lists of vessels, by gear type, over 24
meters overall length and over, 24 meters if they fished outside the EEZs.33 Another
measure adopted by the IOTC to manage fishing capacity is aimed at reducing IUU
fishing activities by large scale tuna vessels and also to reduce the catch of juvenile
bigeye tuna.34
In addition to the fishing capacity measures, the IOTC has adopted binding
management measures, relating to fishing effort, aimed at limiting the catch of bigeye.
Resolution 01/04 aims to limit the fishing efforts of non-Members of the IOTC whose
vessels fish bigeye tuna. The IOTC requests non- Members to reduce their efforts in
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James Joseph, Past Developments and Future Options for Managing Tuna Fishing Capacity with
Special Emphasis on Purse Seine Fleets, A Report within the framework of FAO Project
GCP/INT/851/JPN (2005)
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FAO, Report of the Technical Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity, La Jolla,
California, United States, 15-18 April 1998. FAO Fisheries report No. 586.
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James Joseph, Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 982
(FAO, 2003) vii.
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IOTC, Resolution 03/01, ‘On the Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting parties and
Cooperating non-Contracting Parties’, para 1.
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IOTC, Resolution 09/02, ‘On the Implementation of a Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting
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IOTC, Resolution 99/01 ‘On the Management of Fishing Capacity and on the Reduction of Catch of
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2002, in relation to the 1999 levels.35 Another strategy that the IOTC has adopted for
effort control is time and area closures to limit catches of yellowfin and bigeye. Time
and area closures are considered very effective tools for fisheries management.36 Closed
seasons in fisheries are used to protect stocks during life stages that are critical (for
example, spawning) or as a means to lower catch.37 Thus, closed seasons reduce the
catching power and fishing mortality by limiting the amount of fishing to a desired level
in order to increase stock size,38 and may aid in the recovery of depleted stocks.39
In order to reduce the fishing pressure on yellowfin and bigeye tuna stocks, the
IOTC has taken steps directed at the closure of defined areas. Resolution 10/01 of the
IOTC establishes a closure of a defined area for purse seine vessels according to the
recommendations of the scientific committee.40 The resolution is applicable in 2011 and
2012 for all vessels of 24 meters overall length and over, and under 24 meters if they
fish outside their EEZ.41 The area will be closed for longline vessels each year from
12.00pm on 1st February to 12.00am on 1st March, and from 12.00pm on 1st November
to 12.00am on 1st December for purse- seine vessels.42

4.2.1.1.2 Setting Catch Limits
The IOTC has adopted a single measure limiting the catch of bigeye taken by
Contracting Parties and CPC’s. The catch of bigeye tuna is to be limited to the levels

35

IOTC, Resolution 01/04 ‘On Limitation of Fishing Effort of Non-members of IOTC whose Vessels Fish
Bigeye Tuna’.
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Kanchan Ratna Chopra (ed), Ecosystems and Human Well-being: policy Responses: Findings of the
Responses Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (Island Press, 2005) 201. The
effectiveness of time and area closures is more pronounced when they are combined with other measures.
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(accessed 6 February 2010).
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IOTC, Report of the Fourteenth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Busan, Korea 1-5
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IOTC, Resolution 10/01 for the Conservation and Management of Tropical Tunas Stocks in the IOTC
Area of Competence, para 2.
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reported by the scientific committee.43 In connection with the bigeye catch limits
imposed by the IOTC, Taiwanese vessels fishing in the IOTC area from 2005, have
been limited to an annual quota of 35,000tonnes of bigeye tuna.44 Although the
management measures involving the setting of catch quotas for bigeye were to be
addressed at the tenth meeting of the IOTC, it was felt that more work was needed to
further develop the concept.45
The IOTC further considered proposals to introduce catch restrictions on
yellowfin and bigeye, including catch allocations for members during the twelfth
meeting. However, no consensus was reached and the proposals were not considered.46
The IOTC anticipates the adoption of measures for quota allocation in 2012 to
supplement these efforts.47

4.2.1.1.3 Analysis of IOTC Approaches to Management of Target Species
The IOTC achieves its mandate by adopting conservation and management
measures facilitated through its decision-making procedure. The lack of adoption of
appropriate conservation and management measures reflects some degree of noncommitment on the part of Members and flaws in the decision-making procedures of the
IOTC. An examination of the management approaches for target species reveals a
number of flaws in the management of the Indian Ocean tuna fisheries.
Although the IOTC places emphasis on capacity limits, these limits are not
combined with catch quotas. Generally, a mechanism that imposes capacity limits
without limiting the total catch has its consequences. The response is that, the fishing
industry tends to improve the efficiency of their vessels to enable them to spend more
days at sea.48 Consequently, larger quantities of tuna are caught. The IOTC could
possibly minimise mortality of tuna by combining capacity limits with catch quotas.
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The IOTC could set an overall quota and allocate it among the participants in the
fishery, thereby setting a limit on the quantity of fish each participant can harvest. By so
doing the number of vessels that could operate in the IOTC area is limited by the fishing
opportunities available to the participants.
A key basis for the conservation of tuna is the setting of the total allowable catch
(TAC). As was discussed in chapter 2(2.5.1), the TAC is a management approach that
limits the commercial exploitation of fish stocks in order to ensure that no more fish are
caught from a stock than is biologically justifiable. The TAC is also fundamental to the
allocation of fishing opportunities in RFMOs. States are thus required to agree, as
appropriate, on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of
fishing effort.49 To date, the IOTC has not established any measures in respect of the
TAC. The report of the IOTC performance review has identified the need for the
Commission to explore other approaches to the management of target species, such as
the TAC.50
The decision-making procedure of the IOTC is required to facilitate the adoption
of conservation and management measures for tuna stocks under its purview. Such
procedures should be sound,51 and effective in meeting the obligations of the IOTC.52
The IOTC records its binding decisions relating to conservation and management
measures through Resolutions and adopts non-binding decisions which take the form of
Recommendations. Proposals can be made by subsidiary bodies such as the scientific
committee or other technical meetings such as the compliance committee,53 and also by
the Members of the IOTC for consideration at meetings.54 These may be adopted
immediately as Resolutions which create legal obligations on Members of the IOTC, or
they may remain as Recommendations which are sequentially numbered including by
years. Therefore, the Resolutions and Recommendations adopted by the IOTC should
49

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 10(b).
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not only be directed at meeting the objectives of the Commission for the tuna stocks
under the purview of the IOTC, but also respond to the scientific advice provided to the
Commission. As such, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires measures to be based on
the best scientific evidence. The political will of members to make the appropriate
decisions and implement them is vital for the effective governance of the Commission.
It thus becomes evident that the conservation and management measures
adopted by the Commission in respect of target species are not consistent with the
principles set out in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Additionally, measures have not
been adopted to address specific issues relating to the conservation of such species. For
instance, although the status of yellowfin tuna appears uncertain, and that of bigeye over
utilised the Commission has yet to adopt appropriate measures to address these issues.
Moreover, no measures have been adopted to prevent further decline of the yellowfin
stocks or to ensure their recovery even though it has been established that the stock,
which is overexploited, is also predicted to become overfished in 3-5 years time.
A significant flaw in the decision-making approach followed by the Commission
is the possibility for members to object to conservation and management measures. The
political will of members can be reflected in the objection process.55 The objection
procedure in the IOTC Agreement can result in a Member not being bound by a
conservation and management measure. The likelihood of members who opt to
undermine the conservation objectives of the Commission is great. The procedure
equally causes unnecessary delays in the entry into force of such measures and could
even result in failure to reach a decision.56 Further, if objections to such measures are
made by more than 1/3 of the Members of the Commission, then the other Members are
not bound by that measure.57 Such delays are not consistent with the requirement of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement of timeliness and effectiveness.
As the decision-making process is provided in the IOTC Agreement, a possible
solution would be to amend the Agreement. However, as observed by Edeson, many
States are reluctant to undertake the revision of the constitutive treaty of an RFMO due
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to the slow process that this may involve.58 Thus, it is easier to achieve a de facto
amendment of such agreements through the practice of Members or the adoption of
resolutions which constitute that practice.59 In adopting its measures, the IOTC may
consider the recommendation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference of
2006 regarding members that opt-out which states that: “States through RFMOs should
ensure that post opt-out behaviour is constrained by rules to prevent opting-out parties
from undermining, clear processes for dispute resolution and a description of alternative
measures that will be implemented in the interim”.60
It has been proposed in a recent report on recommended best practices for RFMOs
that, the objector should also be required to give valid reasons for its objection and not
simply lodge one.61 The WCPF Convention for example, requires the objector to give a
statement of the grounds for objection and also to circulate the statement to all Members
of the Commission.62 Additionally, the permissible grounds should be restricted.63 The
Commission would need to establish interim measures for the rights of the other
members, the status of the stocks and the wider ecosystem while an objection is being
considered.64 To date the IOTC has not imposed any condition that would serve as a
deterrent on Members who object to a conservation and management measure.
Members can also object to a conservation and management measure without providing
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a valid reason, thereby contributing to the ineffectiveness of the management of the
IOTC.
The commitment of Members of the Commission to participate in the work of
the IOTC is fundamental to the achievement of its objectives. Recognising the
challenging responsibilities that the present day RFMOs are faced with, the
international community emphasises the need for political will to strengthen and
modernise them.65 To achieve such changes it is essential that all Commission Members
ratify the relevant legal instruments, particularly the UN Fish Stocks Agreement which
governs high seas tuna stocks. To date, only fifteen out of twenty-eight Members of the
IOTC have ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.66 A high level of trust and
credibility between Member States is essential for commitment to RFMO change. A
well-structured dispute settlement scheme for all aspects of RFMO operations is
fundamental for the development of such trust and credibility. However, negotiations
undertaken on changes to the operation of an RFMO need the appropriate institutional
support that would leave little or no scope for opting out without consequence.67

4.2.1.2 Approaches to Conservation of Non-Target Species
The incidental catch and mortality of non-target species in tuna fisheries are
perceived as a concern due to their wider ecological impacts. By-catch in commercial
fishing operations affects marine fisheries in several ways. These include impacts on top
predators, removal of individuals from many species, elimination of prey, and waste.68
Consequently, by-catch has emerged as a major issue of global concern.69 The
sustainability of tuna fisheries depends highly on ecosystem health. As such, ecological
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and ecosystem considerations have become a priority in fisheries management with the
realisation that a more holistic approach to fisheries management is needed.
The Ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) management has emerged from the
concerns of the impacts of fishing on the wider ecosystem apart from the target species.
The FAO defines EAF as follows: “An Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) strives
to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking account of the knowledge and
uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems and their
interactions and applying an integral approach to fisheries within ecologically
meaningful boundaries”.70
The main objective of the EAF is the sustainable use of the whole ecosystem
and not just targeted species.71 The EAF combines ecosystem management and fisheries
management, recognising the interactions between fisheries and the ecosystem which
support them, as well as human interactions.72 Such an approach aims to conserve
ecosystem structures, processes and interactions through sustainable use, thereby
ensuring the integrity of the ecosystem. The purpose of an ecosystem approach to
fisheries is to plan, develop and manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the
multiple needs and desires of societies, without jeopardising the options for future
generations to benefit from the full range of goods and services provided by
ecosystems.73 Ecosystem management involves ecosystem complexity, and uncertainty
in predicting impacts, thus requiring a certain degree of precaution.74 In the absence of
sufficient tuna fisheries data, ecosystem based management could be used to develop
precautionary safety margins such as reduced catch limits or larger closed areas.75
Some of the fundamental principles of EAF have been derived from the LOSC.76
These principles are reflected through the provisions of the LOSC that impose
conservation and management obligations upon States to ensure that the living
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resources of the EEZ are not endangered by over-exploitation,77 to maintain and restore
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce maximum sustainable
yield and take into account the economic needs of coastal fishing communities, fishing
patterns and interdependence of stocks.78 These principles are fortified by the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement79 which also obligates States to protect biodiversity in the marine
environment as a whole.80 Further, States are required to assess the impacts of fishing,
other human activities and environmental factors on target stocks and species belonging
to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks.81 The UN
Fish Stocks Agreement also requires States to minimize pollution, waste, discards, catch
by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species and impacts on associated or
dependent species, through measures including the use of environmentally safe fishing
gear.82 Thus, Article 5 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement on non-target species is far
more elaborate than the general requirement of Article 61(4) of the LOSC for States to
consider the effects on associated and dependent species.83
In respect of non-target species, the IOTC has adopted resolutions in respect of
marine turtles,84 seabirds,85 and sharks.86 The Resolutions on seabirds and marine turtles
have been derived from Recommendations which had earlier been made concerning the
incidental mortality of seabirds,87 and mitigating the impact of fishing operations on sea
turtles.88 The adoption of these Resolutions reflects the commitment of the IOTC to
establish mitigation measures for the conservation of seabirds and turtles.
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4.2.1.2.1 Marine Turtles
The resolution on marine turtles requires Contracting Parties and Cooperating
non-Contracting Parties (CPCs) to implement the appropriate measures relating to
turtles in accordance with the FAO Guidelines to Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in
Fishing Operation (hereinafter the FAO Guidelines) and to report their progress
accordingly.89 The FAO Guidelines are aimed at reducing interactions between sea
turtles and fishing gear and to reduce the proportion of sea turtle mortality in marine
capture fisheries.90
The IOTC requires CPCs to furnish available information to the Scientific
Committee on successful mitigation measures and other impacts on sea turtles in the
IOTC Area, such as the deterioration of nesting sites and swallowing of marine debris.91
Fishermen are also required to bring aboard, if practicable, any captured hard shelled
turtle that is comatose or inactive and foster its recovery, including aiding in its
resuscitation before returning it to the water.92 The IOTC has established specific
requirements for each of the fishing gears with respect to mitigation measures for
marine turtles. In this regard, CPCs with gillnet, longline and seine vessels are to require
that operators of such vessels record and report all incidents involving marine turtles in
their logbooks (including species, location of capture, conditions, action taken on board
and location of release).93 CPCs with longline vessels must ensure that operators of such
vessels carry line cutters and de-hookers to facilitate the appropriate handling and
prompt release of marine turtles. These operators should also be required to carry and
use dip-nets where appropriate.94 CPCs with seine vessels shall ensure that operators of
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such vessels avoid encirclement of marine turtles or safely release any marine turtle that
may become entangled.95
The IOTC also acknowledges the activities undertaken to conserve marine
turtles and habitats on which they depend within the framework of the Indian OceanSouth East Asian Marine Turtle Memorandum of Understanding (IOSEA), in particular
its Resolution to Promote the use of Marine Turtle Bycatch Reduction Measures by
IOSEA signatory States. In this regard, the IOTC encourages CPCs to collaborate with
IOSEA and take into account the IOSEA MoU.96

4.2.1.2.2 Seabirds
Concerning seabirds, CPCs are encouraged to implement the International Plan
of Action for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries (IPOASeabirds).97 In this regard, Contracting Parties and CPCs are required to update the
Scientific Committee, and the IOTC of the status of their National Plans of Action
(NPOAs) for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries. CPCs are
required to employ effective mitigation measures aimed at reducing levels of seabird
bycatch.98 Accordingly, fishing operations are to be conducted such that hooklines sink
beyond the reach of seabirds as soon as possible after they are put in the water.99
The minimum technical standards for mitigation measures are provided in
Annex 1 of Resolution 10/06 of the IOTC. These standards provide guidance for the
methods and specifications for implementing mitigation measures for seabirds. The
mitigation measures for seabirds include, inter alia, bird-scaring lines which deter birds
from approaching the branch line, weighted branch lines which can be attached to
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branch lines, and management of offal discharge.100 The design and deployment of bird
scaring lines (tori lines) is provided in Annex II of Resolution 10/06.

4.2.1.2.3 Sharks
In reference to sharks, Cooperating non-Contracting Parties (CPCs) are to take
the necessary measures requiring their fishermen to fully utilise their entire catches of
sharks.101 This means that all parts of the shark must be retained by the fishing vessel
excepting the head, guts and skins, to the first point of landing. In connection with this,
CPCs are to require their vessels to not have onboard fins that total more than 5% of the
weight of the sharks onboard, up to the first point of landing.102 Accordingly, any fins
harvested in contravention of Resolution 05/05 of the IOTC should not be retained
onboard fishing vessels, transhipped or landed.103 Further, the release of live sharks,
especially juveniles and pregnant sharks caught incidentally is encouraged in fisheries
not directed at sharks.104 Resolution 10/12 of the IOTC prohibits retention on board
vessels of thresher sharks, their transhipment, landing, storing, selling or offering for
sale any part or whole carcass of these sharks. Thresher sharks are to be released
unharmed. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has classified
all species of thresher shark as globally vulnerable.105
The IOTC has made some progress in fulfilling the mandate given to it in
respect of non-target species. Whereas the IOTC has not specifically incorporated
ecosystem based considerations into its mandate, it has established the Working Party
on Ecosystem and By-catch (WPEB) to provide the relevant advice on, inter alia, the
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conservation of non-target species.106 For instance, the responsibilities of the working
Party with respect to marine turtles include; developing recommendations for mitigation
measures, to develop guidelines for the appropriate handling and release of by-caught
turtles and standards for data collection, and to produce a marine turtle identification
guide.107 The IOTC is also considered by the Parties to the Agreement on the
Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels as the RFMO with the strongest mitigation
measures for seabirds.108 Equally importantly, the IOTC has also taken a precautionary
and internationally cooperative approach in the conservation of thresher sharks.
In respect of discards, the IOTC requires Contracting Parties and CPCs to
encourage purse seine vessels to minimise discards of bluefin, yellowfin and skipjack
tunas, by retaining on board and landing all fish unless they are unfit for human
consumption.109 Additionally, the measures adopted by the Commission in respect of
non-target species which are considered either vulnerable or endangered are entirely
consistent with Articles 61(4) and 119(1)(b) of the LOSC and Article 5(e) of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement.

4.2.1.2.4 Analysis of the IOTC Approaches to Conservation of Non-Target Species
As the mandate of the IOTC derives from the IOTC Agreement, it is necessary
for it (the Agreement) to reflect the provisions concerning the management of tuna
stocks, non-target and associated or dependent species and the marine ecosystem as
provided for in international fisheries instruments. Notably, the IOTC Agreement does
not fully incorporate the relevant provisions of the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement in this regard. The IOTC Agreement has not included any provisions
requiring the adoption of conservation and management measures directed at non-target
species and species associated with or dependent upon tuna. Neither has it provided for
the protection of biodiversity in the marine environment,110 or addressed the
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requirements to minimize pollution, waste, discards, and catch by lost or abandoned
gear.111 It is necessary that these aspects are incorporated in the IOTC Agreement in
recognition of their role in the management of tuna fisheries.
The effects of fishing on non-target species is not accounted for in the
management practices of the IOTC. Whereas the IOTC has adopted mitigation measures
for turtle, seabird and shark bycatch, it has not established catch limits for them.
Further, despite the adoption of measures to mitigate sea turtle by-catch by releasing of
turtles caught or entangled in longlines, and also the use of dip-nets, the IOTC is yet to
develop the relevant guidelines. For the effective conservation of sea turtles the
Commission needs to develop these guidelines which are readily available from other
organisations.
The IOTC review specifies the need for the IOTC Agreement to incorporate
ecosystem based considerations such as the adoption of conservation and management
measures for non-target species and species dependent on or associated with target
stocks.112 It suffices to note that the IOTC has focused on the major commercial stocks,
namely skipjack, bigeye, yellowfin, swordfish and albacore. The status of the rest of the
stocks is reported as uncertain.113 For these stocks, no quantitative assessments have
been carried out and there are no reliable indicators.114 This means the effect of the tuna
fishery on these species is not known. The following sub-section discusses the data
contribution and sharing provisions of the IOTC including for target species and nontarget species, and vessels characteristics.

4.2.2 Data Contribution and Sharing
To achieve effective management of the tuna fisheries under its purview, the
IOTC requires good quality data. Such data are essential for the purposes of obtaining
best scientific evidence upon which to base conservation and management decisions
necessary for the long-term sustainable utilisation of tuna fisheries. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement compliments the LOSC with respect to the obligation of States to cooperate
111
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in the contribution and exchange of tuna fisheries data.115 Thus, Article 5(j) of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement requires States to “collect and share, in a timely manner,
complete and accurate data concerning fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position,
catch of target and non-target species and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I, as well as
information from national and international research programmes.” Additionally, the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides the need for coastal and flag States cooperating
through RFMOs, to agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification and
exchange of data,116 and also to compile and disseminate accurate and complete
statistical data, as described in Annex I, to ensure that the best scientific evidence is
available, while maintaining confidentiality where appropriate.117
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement also stipulates the obligations of flag States in
respect to data provision, requiring them to provide such information as may be
necessary in order to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement.118 In connection with
this, flag States are to take measures including “requirements for recording and timely
reporting of vessels position, catch of target and non-target species, fishing effort and
other relevant fisheries data in accordance with subregional, regional and global
standards for collection of such data.119 Further, flag States are required to collect and
exchange scientific, technical and statistical data with respect to [tuna fisheries],120 to
ensure that the data are collected in sufficient detail to facilitate effective stock
assessment,121 and to take appropriate measures to verify the accuracy of such data.122
These obligations are to be fulfilled in accordance with the specifications in Annex 1 of
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Additionally, flag States are obligated to cooperate, to
agree, on the specification of data and the format in which they are to be provided to
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[RFMOs], taking into account the nature of the stocks and the fisheries for those
stocks.123

4.2.2.1 Data on Target Species
As established earlier in chapter 2(2.5.2), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
stipulates the types of data to be collected and submitted to RFMOs by States. These
include catch and effort data,124 biological data,125 and vessel identification and gear
related data.126 The IOTC has adopted several measures requiring submission of data by
Members and CPCs. First, the Commission requires CPCs to submit nominal catch data
which comprises the total catch by species and gear for all species under the IOTC
mandate.127 Second, is catch and effort data for: a) surface fisheries comprising catch
weight by species and fishing effort, purse seine data stratified by fishing mode (e.g.
free swimming schools or schools associated with floating objects); b) longline fisheries
made up of catch by species, in numbers or weight, and effort as the number of hooks
deployed; and c) coastal fisheries by species, fishing gear and fishing effort.128 Third, is
the size data for all gears and species covered by the IOTC mandate according to the
guidelines set out by the scientific committee.129 Lastly, are the activities of supply
vessels and the use of fish aggregating devises (FADs) which are part of the fishing
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effort exerted by the purse seine fleet.130 These data are to be submitted according to
specific timelines.131
In addition to these specific data requirements, the Commission requires each
flag CPC to ensure that all purse seine vessels flying its flag and authorized to fish
species managed by the IOTC be subject to a data recording system.132 In this respect, a
logbook with relevant data is to be submitted to the flag State and coastal State
administration for onward transmission to the IOTC Secretariat and the Scientific
Committee by June 30th of the following year on an aggregated basis.133 These same
requirements apply to longline fishing vessels, which in addition should specifically
include information of the vessel, trip and gear configuration on one part, and
information of longline operation and catch on the other.134

4.2.2.2 Data on Non-Target Species
Aside from data directly related to target fish stocks, States are required to
collect and share data on non-target and associated or dependent species.135 States are
also obliged to develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of
fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their environment, and
adopt plans which are necessary to ensure the conservation of such species and to
protect habitats of special concern.136
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IOTC, Resolution 10/02, Mandatory statistical requirements for IOTC Members and Cooperating
non-Contracting Parties, para. 5.
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all other fleets are to submit final data for the previous year no later than 30 June.
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provide data for use by Working Parties and the Scientific Committee.
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The IOTC has adopted measures in respect of marine turtles, seabirds and
sharks. For marine turtles, the Commission requires that Contracting Parties and CPCs
submit to the Scientific Committee, data on numbers of animals caught. In this regard,
CPCs are required to collect (including through logbooks and observer programs) and
provide to the Scientific Committee all data on their vessels’ interactions with marine
turtles in fisheries targeting the species covered by the IOTC Agreement.137 The IOTC
encourages CPCs to collect and voluntarily provide the Scientific Committee with all
available information on interactions with seabirds, including incidental catches in all
fisheries under the purview of the IOTC.138
In the case of sharks, the IOTC requires CPCs to submit data on catches of
sharks on an annual basis, and in accordance with IOTC data collecting procedures,
including historical data.139 Thus, the IOTC requires catch, effort and size data on
sharks to be submitted in accordance with the IOTC data reporting procedures.140

4.2.2.3 Data on Vessel Characteristics
The information on vessel characteristics and operations in the fishery is also
significant for tuna management. Under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, flag States are
obliged to establish a national record of fishing vessels authorised to fish on the high
seas and to share the information as required.141 As established in the previously in
chapter 2(2.5.2), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement specifies the types of data that States
should collect.142
The IOTC maintains a record of vessels authorised to fish in the IOTC Area and
requires them to submit information relevant to their characteristics, vessel monitoring
system (VMS) programme activities, and transhipment activities. In respect of vessel
characteristics, all CPCs are required to submit to the secretary, records of foreign flag
vessels licensed to fish within the IOTC Area of Competence including information on,
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inter alia, the IOTC number; name and registration number; the flag at the time of
issuing the license; the main target species; and period of license.143
Concerning the VMS programme, each Contracting party and CPC is required
to adopt a vessel monitoring system for all vessels greater than 15 metres registered in
the IOTC record of vessels.144 The IOTC also requires all transhipments to take place in
port unless otherwise authorised, and establishes a programme to monitor transhipment
at sea and also a record of vessels authorised to receive transhipments at sea in the
IOTC Area.145 The IOTC also shares data and maintains confidentiality as required
under international law. A certain level of data on Indian Ocean tuna fisheries has
become more accessible through the IOTC website. However, the catch of individual
vessels is not to be identified within a time/area stratum, and where an individual vessel
can be identified, the data has to be aggregated by time, area or flag to preclude such
identification before it is available in public domain.146 Otherwise, catch-and-effort and
length-and-frequency data of a finer level can only be released upon written
authorisation of the data sources and with the permission of the secretary to IOTC.147
The IOTC also provides for the safeguard of records and databases.148

4.2.2.4 Constraints to Data Contribution
Despite the fact that the IOTC has adopted elaborate measures specifying the
format and timeframe for submission of tuna fisheries data, many of the Members have
continually failed to fulfil their data reporting obligations. The completeness and quality
of data on tuna submitted by Members is a matter of deep concern for the IOTC. This
issue has been discussed at various Commission sessions in the last ten years. Not only
is the quality and timeliness of such data essential for decision making but the stock
assessment capabilities of the secretariat are also reliant upon it.
143
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According to reports of the IOTC Scientific Committee the quality and
timeliness of data from fishing fleets are affected by several factors. These include ‘late
reporting, absence of catch series from vessels known to be operating in the region,
uncertain catch reports (including large longliners from Seychelles), and lack of catch
and effort information for non-reporting longline and purse seine fleets’.149
Additionally, the limited statistical systems of many Indian Ocean coastal States limit
their ability to provide the quality data required for stock assessment by the IOTC
working parties.150 The quality of data is further compounded by the fact that more than
50% of the total catch of IOTC species is taken by the artisanal fishery whose catch
estimates are not very reliable.151 As a result, there are significant gaps and errors in the
provision of data to the IOTC.
The data for all non-target species also remains uncertain, incomplete or
unavailable. This makes it difficult for bycatch levels to be estimated. Consequently, the
IOTC’s efforts to effectively mitigate the impact of tuna fisheries on bycatch are
restrained. For example, in spite of a few IOTC Members developing National Plans of
Action on sharks,152 it has been difficult to obtain shark bycatch data by species, and
only South Africa and the EC have submitted detailed statistics on sharks since the
fourth session of the WPEB in 2008.153 For this reason the WPEB has recommended
steps to be taken to improve the state of data on these species as a priority over the
existing data reporting specifications of the IOTC.154 On ecosystem approaches, the
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WPEB encourages more work on ecological risk assessment

analysis to aid in

quantitative stock assessment for bycatch species in data-poor conditions.155
In respect of seabirds and turtles, data collected by observers has been submitted
only by South Africa for vessels operating in its EEZ, while the EC has reported turtle
bycatch by its purse seine fleet.156 The shortfalls in data remittance impede the work of
the IOTC working parties and distort the assessment of tuna stocks in the region.157
Generally, when data is overly delayed, it can neither be authenticated nor verified and
this compromises its utility and reliability.158 Consequently, the IOTC is limited in the
quality of management advice that can be provided to its members. The late submission
of data is also contrary to the requirements of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.159
Nevertheless, the problem of data quality and late submission is not unique to the IOTC.
Data issues have emerged as a matter of concern across all RFMOs. These issues were
also highlighted during the UN Fish Stocks Agreement review Conferences (2006 and
2010),160 and the Joint Tuna RFMO meeting of 2007.161
As the contribution of data has been inconsistent and inadequate, the reduced
data quality and low levels of reporting have reduced the quality of stock assessment for
most of the IOTC species.162 In some cases the statistical data has been incomplete,163
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and the mandatory deadlines have not been met.164 In addition, the attendance at the
meetings of the technical working parties and the Scientific Committee has been poor
and national reports late.165 Participation in these meetings is fundamental to the quality
of scientific knowledge which underpins the management advice provided to the
Commission. Member input is also essential and it will often cultivate more
commitment and support to the decisions made at such meetings because of their
investment in the process. It is essential that Members participate in these meetings if
the management decisions of the IOTC are to be informed by the best scientific advice
available.
The problem of non-attendance in technical meetings and the Scientific
Committee may be due to multiple factors. First, most developing States are constrained
financially. Secondly, some of these States may not have the appropriate expertise to
participate meaningfully in these meetings.166 The Commission has made progress
towards establishing a fund for support to scientists from developing States to
participate in technical meetings.167 This may have been as a result of the
recommendations made by the Performance Review Panel in 2009. Since adequate
funding is critical to facilitate developing States in the attendance of technical meetings,
the Commission needs to ensure the sustenance of the fund it has established for this
purpose. At present, it is not clear if the available resources are adequate or how a longterm funding will be achieved.
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4.2.2.5 Shortcomings of IOTC Requirements on Data Provision
There is a need for the Commission to enforce its data submission requirements.
Despite the failure by Members to meet their obligations with respect to the
Commission’s data submission requirements and deadlines, no penalties have been
imposed on the offenders. Instead, the Commission has only made mention of its
intention to consider imposing sanctions on such offenders in the future.168 This is not
sufficient to encourage Members to comply with relevant measures. The Commission
may need to consider the establishment of penalties which can be applied in cases where
States are in contravention of IOTC data submission requirements, thereby deterring
would be offenders. Alternatively, the Commission could consider incentives that
would encourage States to submit their data. The Pew Environmental Group has
recommended to the recent UN Fish Stocks Review Conference that, RFMOs should
adopt a “No data-No Fishing” approach in response to insufficient information about
the state of target and associated and dependent species. The Pew Environmental Group
suggests that any member State that fails to submit information on its fishing activities
should be prohibited from fishing.169
Although the approach proposed by PEW could be applied to developed States,
it may prove impossible to apply in the case of developing States whose financial,
technical and human resources are limited. There is a need for the IOTC not only to
identify the underlying causes of untimely and inaccurate data submission by States, but
also to enhance their capacities and develop their capabilities in the areas of collecting,
processing and collating tuna fisheries data. Nonetheless, the IOTC has started making
efforts to support developing coastal States in improving their statistical systems
through cooperation with the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation of Japan. Since
2002 the IOTC has been implementing a capacity building project which aims to assist
developing States from the region to enhance their capacities in fisheries data collection
and statistics. The project which is being funded by Overseas Fishery Cooperation
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The Pew Environmental Group, Finding Sustainability: Recommendations to the UN Fish Stocks
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144

Foundation has contributed immensely to improved quality of data.170 The Indian Ocean
Tuna Tagging programme has also contributed to improved data quality.
An initiative such as the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation cannot be
sustained without an assurance of sufficient funding, neither can it assist all the
deserving States. It calls for efforts on the part of the IOTC to locate sustainable sources
of funding.171 It is necessary for the Commission to develop a long term funding
strategy towards the achievement of sustained quality of tuna fisheries data in the Indian
Ocean. Following the recommendations of the Performance Review Panel, the
Commission has reinstated the Working Party on Data Collection and Statistics whose
role is to address the technical statistical issues.
As demonstrated, the IOTC is faced with uncertainty in relation to the status of
tuna stocks under its mandate and also the non-target species. Under such circumstances
when knowledge is limited, the Commission needs to take precautionary measures. The
UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires States to apply the precautionary approach in the
face of uncertainty.172 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries echoes the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement on this aspect of fisheries management.173 States are
therefore required to take conservation and management measures even in the absence
of adequate scientific information by applying the guidelines set out in Annex II of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement. States are required to determine stock-specific reference
points and the action to be taken if they are exceeded.174 By applying the precautionary
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approach, States are able to address fisheries management problems proactively, thereby
ensuring the sustainability of fisheries resources and associated ecosystems.175
Although the IOTC has adopted resolutions and made recommendations that are
consistent with the precautionary approach, the IOTC Agreement does not provide for
this concept. Contrary to the requirement by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the IOTC
has not developed a fisheries management structure that precisely incorporates the
precautionary approach into its decision making. The requirement of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement is consistent with the recent report on recommended best practices
for RFMOs which recommends that members of RFMOs, in recognition of the role of
uncertainty in fisheries resource management, should ensure that the precautionary
approach to resource management is an integral part of their convention or decisionmaking process.176
The IATTC, for example is required to apply the precautionary approach under
the Antigua Convention and the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation
Programme.177 The Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme
has broad implications for the precautionary approach and ecosystem-based
management.178 The IATTC applies the precautionary approach in the determination of
its fisheries conservation measures, capacity controls and bycacth restrictions,179 and
has established a working group on reference points in this regard.180
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Whereas the IOTC has adopted measures addressing some of the relevant
provisions of the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the IOTC Agreement has
not incorporated some of the modern principles of fisheries management in these
instruments. The report of the performance review views this flaw in the IOTC
Agreement as a potential hindrance to the IOTC’s effectiveness and efficiency in
delivering its mandate.181 In spite of this flaws that the IOTC Agreement may have, the
delivery of the IOTC mandate is reliant upon the political will of its Members. In as
much as States may have diverse national interests and economic priorities they need to
have a collective approach towards the achievement of the conservation objectives of
the IOTC. The onus is upon the Members to participate in the work of the IOTC by
making decisions that will ensure the long-term sustainability of the tuna resources
under the management mandate of the IOTC and by adhering to the resolutions and
recommendations that they have agreed upon. In the words of Satya Nandan;
“…..it is these States that must bear the primary responsibility of the failure of RFMOs
to achieve conservation objectives. The RFMO is only the vehicle by which its
Members reach collective decisions”.182
In recent years, there have been growing concerns about the performance of
RFMOs within the international community. These concerns have been raised in
relation to the role of RFMOs in ensuring the long-term sustainable use and
conservation of the world tuna stocks. In an effort to improve the conservation and
management of tuna stocks globally, the international community has focused on the
need to strengthen RFMOs in order to enhance their capabilities in fulfilling their
obligations under the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
To this end, the UN Fish Stocks Review Conference has made recommendations
directed towards the efficient operation of RFMOs through the establishment of
appropriate conservation and management measures. These recommendations include,
inter alia, modernising the constitutive instruments of RFMOs, their mandates and
practices, as well as reviewing their performance against emerging standards, in
conformity with the recommendations of the UN Fish Stocks Review Conference in
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2006.183 Other important developments towards strengthening RFMOs include the
establishment of guidance for best practices in RFMOs,184 and development of
coordinated measures which has been brought about by cooperation between RFMOs
initiated through the Kobe process.185 Following the recommendations of the UN Fish
Stocks Review Conference, the IOTC has undergone a performance review. As a result,
the Commission has adopted several measures following the recommendations of the
performance review including through increased cooperation resulting from the Kobe
meetings.186
While the goals and operations of RFMOs may be relatively clear, undertaking
the necessary changes is not always straightforward.187 The momentum for change in
RFMOs can be generated by having a common agreed starting point for reform in terms
of principles, processes and objectives.188 In relation to the role of States Members of
RFMOs, the UN Fish Stocks Review Conference in 2010 emphasised that the obligation
to comply with management measures of RFMOs rested on States Members themselves
and that these Members ultimately bore primary responsibility for the failure of RFMOs
to achieve conservation objectives.189
The compliance and enforcement measures adopted by the IOTC are examined
in the following sub-section. These include flag State duties, port State measures, and a
number of measures concerning monitoring, control and surveillance.

183

Report of the Resumed Review Conference on the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, New York, 24-28 May
2010- A Conf.210/2010.
184

See, Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations:
Report of an Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries
Management Organisations (London, United Kingdom: The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Chatham House, 2007) 76.; A Willock and M Lack, Follow the Leader: Learning from Experience and
Best Practice in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. (WWF International and TRAFFIC
International, 2006).

185

The Kobe Process of cooperation began with a meeting of the five tuna RFMOs in Kobe, Japan in
2007. Cooperation has been carried out to harmonize catch documents and vessel registries, combat IUU
fishing, coordinate observer programs for transhipment and provide relevant information through
common websites like www.tuna-org.org. See Review 2010 para 80.
186

IOTC, Anonymous, Report of the IOTC Performance Review Panel (2009).

187

OECD, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, (OECD, 2009) 20.

188

OECD, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, (OECD, 2009) 21.

189

Report of the Resumed Review Conference on the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, New York, 24-28 May
2010- A Conf.210/2010.

148

4.2.3 Compliance and Enforcement
The long term sustainability of tuna stocks under the management mandate of
the IOTC is reliant upon the implementation of the conservation and management
measures adopted by its Members. Individual fishing vessels must also comply with
these measures if the conservation objectives of the IOTC are to be achieved. Effective
enforcement of these measures is equally fundamental to the achievement of the
Commission’s conservation objectives. These efforts require the support of an adequate
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) mechanism.
Article 73 of the LOSC confers upon the coastal State a right to take the
necessary measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings, to
ensure compliance with laws and regulations adopted in respect of the EEZ. On the high
seas, States have a duty to take, or cooperate with other States in taking, measures for
their respective nationals for the conservation of resources.190 Under the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement States are required to cooperate to ensure compliance with and enforcement
of [RFMO] conservation and management measures for [tuna] stocks.191 In this respect,
flag States are obligated to ensure compliance with RFMO conservation and
management measures by vessels flying their flags.192 Thus, flag States are required to
implement measures in this regard. The compliance and enforcement obligations of flag
States are provided in Article 19 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
As established in chapter 2(2.5.4), port States can also exercise jurisdiction on
vessels calling at their ports.193 The central role assumed by port State measures in
supporting the long-term sustainability objectives and governance of tuna fisheries has
increasingly been recognised internationally. These measures have become instrumental
especially in Combating IUU fishing activities. Also fundamental to the enforcement of
RFMO conservation measures is effective monitoring, control and surveillance
(MCS).194 The measures that the IOTC has adopted in relation to these aspects are
discussed further in the sections that follow.
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4.2.3.1 Flag State Duties
The concept of flag State duties is fundamental to the effectiveness of
international fisheries instruments. A requirement of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
concerning flag States is the establishment of a national record of fishing vessels
authorised to fish on the high seas and provision of access to the information contained
in that record on request by directly interested States in conformity with flag State
laws.195 As a means of controlling the activities of such vessels on the high seas, flag
States shall require them to carry fishing licenses, authorisations or permits on board.196
Flag States are also required to mark fishing vessels and fishing gear for identification
in conformity with international standards.197 Although the IOTC Agreement does not
reflect flag State measures, the IOTC has adopted measures consistent with these
requirements. In this regard, the IOTC has adopted a resolution requiring the
establishment and maintenance of a record of vessels that are authorised to fish for tuna
and tuna-like species in the IOTC Area (hereinafter referred to as AFVs).198 Vessel
records are essential for the Commission to establish its fishing capacity goals.
AFVs not entered in the record are deemed not to be authorised to fish for, retain
on board, tranship or land tuna and tuna-like species.199 The flag CPCs are to authorise
AFVs to operate in the IOTC Area only if they can fulfil the requirements and
responsibilities under the IOTC Agreement, ensure the AFVs comply with the
conservation and management measures of the Commission and ensure that such AFVs
have no history of IUU fishing activities.200 In addition, CPCs are required to take
measures, under their applicable legislation to prohibit the fishing for, the retaining on
board, the transhipment and landing of tuna and tuna-like species by AFVs which are
not entered into the IOTC record.201 CPCs are also required to notify the Secretary of
any factual information showing that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting AFVs
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not on the IOTC record to be engaged in fishing for and/or transhipment of tuna and
tuna-like species in the IOTC Area.202
Concerning authorisation of fishing and vessel identification, the IOTC has
adopted Resolution 01/02 ‘Relating to Control of Fishing Activity’, requiring fishing
vessels to carry on board documents issued and certified by the competent authority in
respect of authorization to fish, vessel name, port in which registered and number of
registration, international call sign, names and addresses of owner, length and engine
power of vessel.203 Fishing vessels should also be appropriately marked in conformity
with international standards such as the FAO Standard Specification for the Marking
and identification of Fishing Vessels as well as gears.204 Fishing vessels are also
required to keep a bound fishing logbook.205
The Compliance level of Member States in regard to some aspects of Resolution
07/02 is a matter of concern to the Commission. In particular, authorised vessel records
do not contain the time period that the vessels are authorised for fishing or transhipping
even though it is a requirement. Vessel volume must also be reported as Gross Tonnage
(GT) and not GRT as practised by some Member States.206

4.2.3.2 Port State Measures
There is increasing international recognition of the value of port State control in
fishery conservation and management.207 The scope of port State measures can
complement other instruments in ensuring compliance with established conservation
and management measures for tuna.208 The LOSC confirms the right of port States over
their ports. Pursuant to Article 25(2) of the LOSC, port States can take necessary steps
to prevent any breach of the conditions to which a port call is subject. Further,
according to Article 218 of the LOSC, port States may undertake investigations or
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institute proceedings against vessel discharge in violation of applicable international
rules. Thus, port States can take measures to ensure vessel compliance in relation to port
access. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement augments these rights and duty of port States
and gives discretion to States over fishing vessels calling into their ports. Thus, in
Article 23(1), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides the right and duty of a port State
to take measures to promote the effectiveness of [RFMO] conservation and
management measures. Accordingly, a port State may inspect documents, fishing gear
and catch on board fishing vessels, when the vessel is in its ports or at its offshore
terminals.209 Additionally, a port State may prohibit landings and transhipments if the
catch is taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of conservation and
management measures on the high seas.210 The FAO Code of Conduct also requires
States to take responsibility regarding port access in respect of compliance with
international law.211
The IOTC Agreement has not incorporated provisions concerning the duties of
Members as port States. However, the IOTC has adopted measures in this regard.
Resolution 05/03 enables Contracting Parties and CPCs to inspect documents, fishing
gear and catch on board fishing vessels.212 The resolution requires that CPCs adopt
regulations to prohibit landings and transhipments that undermine the effectiveness of
conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission. Thus, the flag
States and the Commission are to be notified in the event of incidences of violation by
foreign vessels as a result of port inspections.
The IOTC has also adopted Resolution 10/11 ‘On Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ which
contains similar provisions to those of the FAO ‘Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’.213 The
adoption of these measures appears to have been as a result of the recommendations of
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the IOTC review.214 Resolution 10/11 stipulates the measures to be taken in respect of
entry into port; use of ports; inspections and follow up action; role of the flag State;
requirements of developing States and the duties of the Commission. The requirements
for entry into port include an advance request for port entry, designation of ports,
decision making on port entry and issuing of authorization or denial.215 The use of a
port can be denied, pursuant to the laws and regulations of a port State and consistent
with international law, that a vessel lands, tranships, packages and processes fish that
have not been previously landed and for other port services if, inter alia, the vessel is
suspected to have engaged in IUU fishing or if the fish on board is taken in
contravention of coastal State or RFMO requirements.216
The inspection process involves a series of steps. These include the conduct of
inspections; format of reporting results and their transmittal; training of inspectors; and
actions to be taken after inspection. Where, following an inspection it is believed that a
vessel has engaged in IUU fishing, it should be denied landing upon notification to the
flag State, the IOTC Secretariat and other relevant organisations.217 The IOTC is
required to facilitate in building the capacity of developing States to implement the
effective port State measures and also to keep an updated list of designated ports, prior
notification periods of Member States and the corresponding competent authority and
also transmit inspection reports to relevant RFMOs.218
It is in the interest of IOTC Member States to address the high level of IUU
fishing activities in order to avoid consumer-imposed sanctions against their exports.
However, the Commission’s programme of inspection in port has not facilitated the
implementation of port State measures in the IOTC Area and the incidences of IUU
fishing are considered high.219 The occurrence of such incidences has been attributed to
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weak port State duties, and the lack of coordination in the region, precise port State
measures and appropriate human capacity.220
It would be beneficial for the IOTC to implement the Model Scheme on Port
State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (hereinafter the
FAO Model Scheme) adopted by the FAO Committee on Fisheries.221 This Scheme
provides a suite of recommended international minimum port State measures, which are
to be applied by RFMOs or individual port States through the adoption of regional
memoranda of understanding (MOU). The implementation of a regionally or globally
coordinated approach to port State control is seen as a huge deterrent to IUU operators
who shift operations between ports or tranship at sea, especially because individual
States are limited in the action they can take,222 or some are unwilling to apply effective
port State measures. For example, vessels on the east African coast have been known to
avoid port Victoria in the Seychelles where stringent port State measures are applied,
for alternative ports where controls are implemented less rigorously.223 The illegal
fishing activities cannot be controlled unilaterally. By applying port State measures
uniformly throughout the region the activities of such vessels would be much
controlled.
The FAO Model Scheme has been supported by the Port State Agreement.224
The measures provided by the FAO Model Scheme include, inter alia, the terms and
conditions for landing, procedures for inspection and actions to be taken in the event of
any violations. The annexes of the FAO Model Scheme contain information to be
provided prior to entry into port by foreign fishing vessels, port State inspection
procedures for foreign fishing vessels, results of port State inspectors, training for port
220
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State inspectors and information system on port State inspections.225 By implementing
the FAO Model Scheme, the IOTC can develop an effective system of port State control
and thereby revise its measures accordingly. The FAO Model Scheme provides a step
by step procedure which States can take to achieve such control over IUU fishing
activities. Notably, Resolution 10/11, though so elaborate has only recently come into
force (March 2011). In the interim, there is a need for the Commission to improve port
State control procedures. The scope of Resolution 05/03 could be expanded so that it
takes into account the developments on port State measures reflected in the FAO Model
Scheme. Although the implementation of such a Scheme is to be facilitated by the
IOTC, the efforts of the Commission must be supported by the cooperation of Member
States through the enactment of appropriate national legislation.

4.2.3.3 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Measures
To reinforce the effective exercise of flag States’ duties for fishing vessels flying
their flag, States are required to implement measures related to monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS). Under the LOSC, the coastal State may, in the execution of its
fisheries regulations, take various MCS measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
and judicial proceedings, to ensure compliance with its laws and regulations.226 The UN
Fish Stocks Agreement obligates States to cooperate in the implementation and
enforcement of [tuna] conservation and management measures through effective
monitoring, control and surveillance.227
The purpose of MCS is to ensure that fisheries management measures are
implemented fully in an efficient and speedy manner.228 The underpinning objective for
all MCS programmes is to facilitate sustainable resource use.229 The monitoring
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component of MCS entails collection, measurement and analysis of fishing activity.230
The aspect of control involves specified terms and conditions under which [tuna]
resources can be harvested, usually included in national fisheries legislation.231 Finally,
the surveillance aspect involves regulating and supervising fisheries to ensure
compliance with the fishery regulations.232 The measures to be implemented in relation
to an effective MCS system include a vessel monitoring system (VMS),233 an observer
scheme,234 and a boarding and inspection scheme.235 Also related to MCS is
transhipment and market-related measures.

4.2.3.3.1 Vessel Monitoring Systems
The vessel monitoring system (VMS) is one of the key components of an MCS
program both at national and international level. As an element of MCS, the VMS plays
an important role by providing information on vessel position and in monitoring the
activities of fishing vessels, which are vital for improved fisheries management. Aside
from being used to monitor the position of fishing vessels VMS can also be used to
transmit catch and effort data to RFMOs and flag States.236 It was seen in chapter 2 that
catch and effort data provide the basis for fisheries management measures. Such data,
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collected through VMS can be delivered to States in a timely manner, thus improving
the monitoring in real time of exhaustion of quotas or total allowable catch.237
Under the LOSC, vessels of fishing States operating in the EEZ of coastal States
may be required to provide specific information such as vessels positions reports.238 The
UN fish stocks Agreement requires coastal States and States fishing on the high seas to
collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data concerning fishing
activities on vessels position,239 and to develop appropriate technologies in support of
fishery conservation and management.240 On the high seas, flag States are required to
implement vessel monitoring systems in accordance with subregional, regional and
global programmes.241 Flag States also have a duty to take measures for requirements
for recording and timely reporting of vessel position,242 and monitoring, control and
surveillance of such vessels, their fishing operations and related activities by the
development and implementation of vessel monitoring systems.243
In this respect, the IOTC has adopted Resolution 06/03 which obliges
Contracting Parties and CPCs to adopt a satellite-based vessels monitoring system
(VMS) for vessels greater than 15metres in length overall, registered on the IOTC
Record of Vessels which operate in the IOTC Area and which fish on the high seas.244
CPCs are required to collect information in respect to vessel identification, current
geographical position of the vessel and the date and time of the fixing of the position of
the vessel.245 They are also required to submit an annual report to the IOTC Secretariat
on the progress and implementation of the VMS programme by 30 June of each year.246
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Most CPCs have not met the reporting requirements set forth in the resolution
and although the secretariat has provided a VMS reporting template, very few CPCs
have submitted reports.247 Despite the VMS being mandatory, some CPCs have not
implemented it.248 Failure by CPCs to Implement VMS systems may undermine the
effectiveness of the IOTC in detecting non-compliant fishing vessels in the IOTC Area
and also in the collection of data vital for management purposes. As demonstrated in
section 4.2.2, the IOTC is yet to resolve the uncertain state of tuna stocks and quality of
data in the IOTC Area. VMS data can enhance the effectiveness of MCS programmes in
the IOTC Area. In the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) for example, VMS
data is being integrated with other data such as licensing for enhanced MCS
effectiveness.249 It is necessary that the IOTC encourage the submission of VMS reports
for these purposes.

4.5.3.3.2 Observer Programmes
Observer programmes in tuna fisheries are instrumental in providing
independent data on parameters important to the management of fisheries such as
composition and location of catches, type of gear used and interactions with protected
species.250 Observers on board fishing vessels generate scientific and compliance
fisheries data essential for effective fisheries management.251 Thus, RFMOs have
established observer programmes as an efficient and reliable method for data collection
for both target and non-target species.
States are encouraged to establish observer programmes for the purpose of
documentation and to promote compliance with conservation and management
measures.252 The LOSC provides the right for coastal States to place observers on board
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foreign vessels fishing in their EEZs.253 Similarly the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
requires the flag State to take measures requiring vessels flying its flag to verify the
catch of target and non-target species through such means as, inter alia, observer
programmes.254 Flag States are also obliged to implement national observer
programmes, to participate in subregional and regional observer programmes and to
permit access by observers from other States to carry out functions agreed under the
programmes.255 One of the mechanisms for verifying fisheries data is scientific observer
programmes to monitor catch, effort, catch composition (target and non-target) and
other details of fishing operations.256
Consistent with the requirements of the LOSC and UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
the IOTC has established a regional observer scheme.257 The scheme requires at least
5% of the number of operations/sets for each gear type by the fleet of each CPC while
fishing in the IOTC Area of 24 metres overall length and over, and under 24 metres if
they fish outside their EEZ be covered.258 In addition, observers aboard purse seiners
are required to monitor the catches at unloading to identify the composition of bigeye
catches. This requirement does not apply to CPCs with sampling programmes.259
The observer scheme has the dual role of collecting data and monitoring
compliance with IOTC conservation and management measures. Thus, the observer is
required, inter alia, to observe and estimate catches in order to identify catch
composition and monitor discards and by-catches and also record the gear types, mesh
size, and attachments employed by the master.260 The IOTC observer scheme is subject
to review and revision.261 This requirement is consistent with a recent report on best
practices of RFMOs which recognises the need for a review and assessment of the
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effectiveness of observer programmes.262 The Commission commits to support
developing States in training the observers.263
Resolution 10/04 of the IOTC stipulates the responsibilities of the CPC with
regards to the operations of observers which includes the primary responsibility to
obtain qualified observers who may be nationals or non-nationals of the flag State.264
The CPC must also ensure that observers execute their duties competently and in a safe
manner, and also provide them with food and accommodation.265 The vessels master
must ensure that all cooperation is extended to observers to enable them to carry out
their duties safely, including providing access, as required, to retained catch and catch
which is intended for discard.266 The resolution does not however stipulate the legal
status or the power of observers.
According to the recommendations for best practice regarding observer schemes,
there is a need for regional observer programmes adopted by RFMOs to make these
provisions considering the vulnerable position of observers (if different nationality and
language from the crew) and the length of time they spend on foreign fishing vessels.267
Concerning their legal status, observers may be associated with the flag State of the
vessel, the State of the contracting party placing the observer or the master of the vessel,
each subject to different international rules and duties.268 This shifting status may be an
impediment to observers’ work. There is therefore a need for the IOTC to establish the
rights and duties of observers and masters of vessels in order to ensure the effective
implementation of observer schemes. The IOTC Agreement does not provide for
observer programmes.
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4.5.3.3.3 Boarding and Inspection
The need for effective MCS programs with boarding and inspection regimes to
ensure compliance with conservation and management measures have been on the
international agenda on fisheries management for a long time.269 A number of
international legal and regulatory instruments have been promulgated in the last two
decades requiring the implementation of a high seas boarding and inspection regime in
an effort to address activities that undermine the fisheries conservation and management
measures adopted by States.270
Vessels inspections carried out in port or at sea examine documents, fishing gear
and catch on board.271 The LOSC in Article 73(1) provides the right for coastal States to
take such measures such as boarding and inspection in exercising its right in enforcing it
laws and regulations. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides for more definitive
requirements for a high seas boarding and inspection regime to be achieved through
RFMOs. In accordance with Article 20(6) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, flag States
may authorise the authorities of a coastal State to board and inspect a vessel on the high
sea that may have engaged in unauthorised fishing of [tuna stocks] within the coastal
State’s EEZ. More specifically, Article 21(1) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
provides the right for RFMO Member States to board and inspect fishing vessels of
another State Party regardless of whether it is a Member State of that RFMO. Moreover,
any organisation or arrangement that has not established boarding and inspection
procedures two years after the adoption of the Agreement, subsequent enforcement
action may be conducted according to Article 22 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.272
States’ rights to board and inspect fishing vessels are limited to the inspection of
vessels, licences, gear, equipment, records, facilities, fish and fish products and any
other documents necessary to verify compliance with the relevant conservation and
management measures.273 The inspecting State is required to notify the flag State of any
violation, if there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has engaged in any
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activity contrary to the conservation and management measures of an RFMO.274
Investigations will follow and if evidence so warrants, enforcement action will be taken
with respect to the vessel accordingly.275 Flag States are obligated to ensure that vessel
masters cooperate with and assist in the inspection of the vessel conducted.276
Contrary to the provisions of international fisheries law, the IOTC has not
established a boarding and inspection scheme. The result of the failure to implement
such a scheme as part of the conservation and management measures for tuna stocks in
the IOTC Area, is that it leaves a lacuna in the IOTC’s compliance and enforcement
capabilities. Consequently, this curtails the Commission’s ability to detect noncompliance by fishing vessels with its conservation and management measures. The
ability to detect non-compliance would enable the IOTC to gain better information for
stock assessment and to target compliance responses.277 There is a need for the IOTC to
establish a boarding and inspection scheme to enhance its ability to detect and respond
to infringements.

4.5.3.3.4 Regulating Transhipment
The regulation of transhipment has become an important tool in the fight against
IUU fishing and for collecting and verifying data.278 Laundering of tuna catches by IUU
vessels is carried out through transhipments at sea by transferring such catches to
reefers. By so doing, such vessels avoid being detected as they do not enter ports of
RFMO Member States. The regulation of transhipment therefore calls for international
cooperation among States. Thus, RFMOs have established schemes that restrict
transhipments.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement in Article 18(f) requires flag States to take
measures that require verification of the catch of target and non-target species through
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such means as supervision of transhipment. Further, it obliges flag States to regulate
transhipment on the high seas to ensure that the effectiveness of conservation and
management measures is not undermined.279 Additionally, it provides States the right to
adopt regulations empowering the relevant national authorities to prohibit landings and
transhipments where it has been established that the catch has been taken in a manner
which undermines the effectiveness of [RFMO] conservation and management
measures on the high seas.280 The verification of data may also be made from
transhipment reports.281
Consistent with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the IOTC has adopted
Resolution 08/02 ‘On Establishing a Programme for Transhipment by Large-scale
Fishing Vessels’ which restricts transhipments in the IOTC Area and establishes
conditions for at-sea transhipments such as flag States authorisation282 and regional
observer programme.283 The transhipment programme involves large scale tuna-longline
vessels and carrier vessels authorised to receive transhipments from these vessels at sea,
all maintained in the IOTC Record of Authorised vessels, and available in public
domain. Only large scale tuna vessels that participate in the IOTC regional observer
programme can authorise transhipments at sea. Such vessels will have obtained prior
approval from their flag State by notification at least 24 hours in advance.284 All other
transhipment activities of tuna and tuna-like species must take place in port.285 In-port
transhipment can only be effected after the relevant information has been submitted and
a 48 hours notice given to the port State authorities.286

4.5.3.3.5 Market- Related Measures
In order to avert the marketing of fish taken in contravention of the IOTC
measures, the Commission can monitor trade flows and landings through trade and
market-related measures. The IOTC has established a bigeye tuna statistical document
279
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scheme for frozen bigeye for the purpose of monitoring trade.287 Under this scheme
which aims to enhance the sustainability of bigeye, the IOTC can quantify bigeye
catches and identify IUU vessels.288 All bigeye imports by parties have to be
accompanied by a statistical document to be authenticated by the flag State together
with prior authorisation for at-sea or in-port transhipments.289 The trade data for bigeye
is envisaged to address issues of uncertainty with regards to bigeye tuna catch and also
to detect IUU fishing activities in the IOTC Area. For this scheme to be more effective,
it would be beneficial for the Commission to include other forms of bigeye (fresh) and
at all stages including processing, trading and marketing. This would enhance the trade
data for bigeye for monitoring purposes also considering the concerns about its fully
utilised status. Notwithstanding, CPCs have continually failed to comply with the
requirements of the IOTC for submission of reports on bigeye imports.
The IOTC has adopted Recommendation 03/05 ‘Concerning Trade Measures’
which requires CPCs who import tuna and tuna-like fish products or in whose ports
those products are landed to collect and examine import and landing data and submit
information on, inter alia, names and registration of vessels; the flag States; species and
areas of catch; and points of export. Market States can otherwise identify if the tuna
catches are legal from the IOTC record of authorised vessels.
The IOTC has established a compliance committee whose main function is to
review the compliance of CPCs with conservation and management measures and
advice the Commission appropriately.290 In spite of the measures adopted by the
Commission, non-compliance remains a significant problem. The substantive regulatory
gaps in the IOTC MCS measures, when coupled with non-compliance with the
conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission, undermine the
effectiveness of its conservation objectives. There is a need for the Commission to
strengthen its MCS measures and also to develop a scheme to deal with non-compliant
flag States (and vessels). Such a scheme should also promote compliance by Member
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States. Members need to be made more accountable and report the action they have
taken against non-compliant vessels.

4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the conservation and management measures that the
IOTC has adopted for the management of the tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean. It has
been shown that a number of IOTC’s conservation and management measures are not
consistent with the requirements of international fisheries instruments. This has
hampered the ability of the IOTC to deliver its mandate with respect to catch
limitations, fishing entities, boarding and inspection, and compliance.
It has also been shown that the levels of compliance with the IOTC
conservation and management measures are low and that many of the recommendations
of the IOTC are not being implemented. The status of stocks under the management of
the IOTC is also uncertain as the data is limited in quality and is not submitted in a
timely manner. The issue of penalties for Members of the IOTC has not yet been
addressed. Thus, many of the objectives of the IOTC have not been met.
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CHAPTER 5
LEGAL, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR FISHERIES IN KENYA
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 4 discussed the international and regional legal framework for
the management of tunas in the Indian Ocean. The succeeding chapters will now deal
with Kenya’s management and utilisation of tuna resources in its EEZ. Kenya’s efforts
in this regard must be seen in the context of the international and regional frameworks
previously analysed.
The long-term sustainability of Kenya’s tuna resources requires an effective
legal and institutional framework. This chapter reviews Kenya’s national laws and
policies pertaining to the development and management of fisheries. The chapter
examines Kenya’s regulatory framework in order to establish the arrangements it
provides for the development of tuna management strategies. An appropriate legal and
regulatory framework is fundamental for meeting Kenya’s tuna conservation and
management obligations.
This chapter is in three main parts. The first part discusses Kenya’s status with
respect to its ratification of the relevant international and regional fisheries instruments.
The implementation of Kenya’s international and regional obligations in respect of tuna
is discussed in chapter 6. The second part identifies and reviews Kenya’s national laws
and policies related to fisheries and in particular tuna fisheries management. It also
discusses the legal and policy constraints to the management of Kenya’s tuna fisheries
and identifies some examples of current State legislative practices as a reference point
for Kenya. The third part examines Kenya’s national development policies and other
fisheries sector plans in order to establish the extent to which the fisheries sector has
been included in Kenya’s national development strategies. It is argued that, failure to
fully integrate fisheries into the development discourse has marginalised it.
Consequently, the potential of Kenya’s tuna fishery has not been fully realised. This has
impacted the development of an appropriate legal and policy framework for national
tuna management in Kenya.
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5.2 Legal, Policy and Regulatory Framework for Fisheries in Kenya
The sustainable utilisation of Kenya’s tuna resources requires a supportive legal
regime. The development, utilisation, conservation and management of Kenya’s
fisheries resources are governed by the Fisheries Act 1989,1 and the Environmental
Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA-1999).2 Also important for fisheries
management is the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy.3 The Fisheries Act 1989
creates the basic framework for the management of Kenyan fisheries. The
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA-1999) does not deal
directly with fisheries management but is relevant in addressing issues of the
sustainable utilisation of marine fisheries resources. The National Oceans and Fisheries
Policy was developed out of the need of an integrated ocean management policy which
could guide the use and management of ocean space and the resources therein.
Other relevant policies and plans that provide strategies for the development of
fisheries include the National Development Plans, District Focus for Rural
Development Policy (1985), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-2001), and
the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation (20032007).4 The following sections discuss the fisheries Jurisdiction laws of Kenya, the
environmental laws that are related to fisheries management, national policies and
development plans that constitute Kenya’s fisheries management framework.

5.2.1 International and Regional Fisheries Instruments
The legal basis for implementing national measures for the sustainable
management of tuna resources is derived from international and national laws. Kenya
has ratified and acceded to international and regional instruments relevant for the
conservation and management of tuna. The most significant international instruments in
this regard are the LOSC, and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.5 Kenya has also

1

Laws of Kenya, The Fisheries Act, Chapter 378 of the laws of Kenya, Act No. 5 of 1989 which came
into effect on 25th August, 1989 (revised edition 1991). Hereinafter the Fisheries Act 1989.
2

Republic of Kenya, the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, 1999. Act No. 8 of 1999
which came into effect on 14th January 2000, hereinafter EMCA-1999.
3

Republic of Kenya, National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, 2008.

4

Republic of Kenya, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007.

5

UN, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
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committed to implement the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.6 Because
of its national interest in the development of the tuna industry, and in recognition of the
need for the international management of tuna fisheries, Kenya is also a member of the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).7 As a party to these international instruments
and having ratified and acceded to regional fisheries agreements, Kenya is obliged to
exercise its rights and jurisdictions in the EEZ by adopting regulatory and management
measures for the conservation and management of tuna resources and by enacting
legislation and regulations that conform to the provisions of these instruments and
agreements.

5.2.2 The Fisheries Act 1989
The Fisheries Act 1989 is the principal legislative instrument governing fisheries
in ‘Kenya fishery waters’.8 The Fisheries Act provides the statutory framework for
regulating activities on marine and inland fisheries resources in Kenya. It provides for
the development, management, exploitation, utilization and conservation of Kenya’s
fisheries resources. The provisions set out in the Fisheries Act apply to [tuna] EEZ
fisheries as well. The Principal Act is divided into six parts and twenty-four sections.
The six parts of the Act provide for the administration of fisheries, registration of
fishing vessels, licensing, offences and enforcement, and general provisions such as
conducting of prosecutions, protection of marine mammals and specifications of the
Minister’s powers to make regulations.9
The Fisheries Act also includes subsidiary legislation under which two major
sets of Regulations have been formulated to guide its implementation. First, the
Fisheries (General) Regulations (Legal Notice 34) of 1991 have been enacted under
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into
force 11 December 2001). Hereinafter referred to as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
6

Kenya has been a participant in the relevant meetings concerning the formulation of the Code of
Conduct, including the Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Responsible
Fisheries held in Rome 10-11 March 1999.
7

Kenya became a member of the IOTC in 2004. See, FAO, Review of the World Marine Capture
Fisheries Management: Indian Ocean, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 488 (FAO, 2006).
8

‘Kenya fishery waters’ means the inland waters and the waters of the maritime zones described in the
Maritime Zones Act 1989, and for the purposes of the Fisheries Act 1989 excludes government fish ponds
and fish farms and any private fish ponds or fish farms not established for commercial purposes. See the
Fisheries Act, 1989, Part I.
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Section 14(1) of the Fisheries Act which empowers the Minister to make regulations
requiring a license for any fishery activities. These Regulations are concerned with
issues regarding local fishermen including, inter alia, registration of fisheries vessels,
licensing of fishermen and enforcement.10 They are set out in twelve parts and sixtynine sections and also contain four Schedules made up of license application forms,
categories of license and permit fees, designated fish landing sites and fish
measurements respectively.
Second, the Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations (Legal Notice 35) of
1991 have been enacted under Section 23 of the Fisheries Act 1989. Under this Section
(23) of the Fisheries Act, the Minister is empowered to make Regulations presenting the
conditions to be fulfilled by foreign participation in fisheries, including conditions of
licensing foreign fishing vessels and fees payable thereof.11 The Minister may also
make Regulations to, inter alia, regulate fish handling, storage and processing;
inspection of fish products; management and control of fishing ports; and provide for
registration of private marks for fishing gear.12 The Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft)
Regulations which are set out in five parts and forty-seven sections regulate the
activities of foreign fishing vessels. In particular, the Regulations provide for the
licensing and control of the activities of such vessels in Kenya Fishery Waters, marine
fisheries research, and enforcement.13 The two Schedules which are part of these
Regulations provide a template of the application form for a foreign fishing license and
fee levels. The Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations address matters of [tuna]
fishing vessels operations in the EEZ.

5.2.3 Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999 is a framework
law providing for the establishment of an appropriate legal and institutional framework
for the management of the environment and related matters in Kenya.14 It provides for
improved legal and administrative coordination of the diverse sectoral initiatives to
10

The Fisheries (General) Regulations, Part I-Part XII.

11

The Fisheries Act 1989, Section 23(2)(a) and (b).
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The Fisheries Act 1989, Section 23(2)(d, e, f and i).
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The Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations Part I-Part V.

14

The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999.
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improve the national capacity for the management of the environment.15 For the purpose
of this thesis, the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act provides for the
protection of the coastal zone and the resources therein. In connection with this, the Act
empowers the Minister to issue by Gazette notice, general and specific orders,
regulations or standards for the management of coastal zones which may include
management, protection or conservation measures in respect of the harvesting of aquatic
living resources to ensure optimum sustainable yield,16 and special guidelines for access
to and exploitation of living and non-living resources in the continental shelf, territorial
sea and EEZ.17

5.2.4 The National Oceans and Fisheries Policy 2008
The development of the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy 2008 (Appendix I
to the thesis) is a watershed in Kenya’s fisheries policy development. The policy was
formulated with a view to ensuring the inclusion of the fisheries sector in the realization
of economic growth of the country. The National Oceans and Fisheries policy thus
strives to achieve coherence with the current economic development policy in order to
enhance development of the fisheries sector. It provides general policy guidelines on the
sustainable utilization and production of Kenya’s fisheries in general. It states the
objectives of the fisheries sector and also outlines the course of action for the
management of fisheries.
The overall objective of the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy 2008 is ‘to
enhance the fisheries sector’s contribution to wealth creation, increased employment for
the youth and women, food security, and revenue generation through effective private,
public and community partnerships’.18 Specific objectives of the policy include; earning
maximum foreign exchange; increasing the contribution of the fisheries sector to the
national wealth; and developing [tuna] fisheries.19 The policy acknowledges the need
for local communities to benefit from [tuna] fisheries and recognises that the current
licensing system for tuna fishing vessels operating in Kenya’s EEZ does not encourage
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National Environment Management Authority, http://www.nema.go.ke/ (accessed 27 March 2009).
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The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999, Part V, Section 42(3)(g).

17

The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999, Part V, Section 42(3)(h).
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The National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, 2008, Chapter 3 (3.2.1).
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The National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, 2008, Chapter 3 (3.3).
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or ensure sustainable utilisation of the [tuna] stocks. Hence, the benefits from such
stocks have not been realised.20 The policy promotes modern fisheries management and
conservation principles such as, the ecosystems and precautionary approaches to
fisheries management.21 It also commits the Kenyan government to provide a proper
legal and institutional framework for the ocean exploration and development.22
The National Oceans and Fisheries Policy also makes general statements
concerning monitoring, control and surveillance as well as flag State responsibility.
Regarding flag States responsibility, the policy states that vessels flying the Kenyan flag
will adhere to international laws and management regulations.23 Concerning regional
and international agreements and cooperation, the policy affirms the continued
participation of DWFNs in Kenya’s [tuna] fishery and commits that such participation
shall take into account the state of the stock and economic returns.24

5.2.5 Other Relevant National Legislation
The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act of 1976 (amended 1989)
provides for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The World
Conservation Union (IUCN) has adopted the following definition of an MPA which is
the most widely used:
any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water
and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been
reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed
environment.25
MPAs are instrumental in the conservation of marine resources and have been
established globally to maintain essential ecological processes and life support systems;
to preserve genetic diversity and to ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and
ecosystems.26
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Kenya has established a system of marine protected areas (MPAs) encompassing
important marine habitats designated to protect the ecological integrity of its marine
ecosystems.27 The MPAs include core areas designated as parks, that are totally
protected and reserves which act as buffer zones, in which limited human interaction
and exploitation are allowed.28 Thus, the marine parks are embedded in larger reserves
where ‘traditional’ extraction of resources is permitted.29 The IUCN has categorised
protected areas according to the objectives for which they have been set up. Based on
this categorisation, Kenya’s marine parks fall under Category II (ecosystem protection
and recreation), while the reserves belong to Category VI (sustainable use of natural
ecosystems) respectively.30
The protection of MPAs in Kenya has led to a significant improvement of the
coral reef habitat, where coral cover has increased over the years from 10 to ~40% at
some sites.31 Fish biomass and fish sizes have also increased especially in the marine
parks where no fishing activities are permitted compared to the marine reserves where
some limited fishing is allowed.32 Coral reefs are used extensively as areas for catching
the bait used in the tuna fishery.33 More importantly and relevant to the present thesis, is
the spawning aggregation of tuna in the reefs and the dispersal of their larvae into near
oceanic waters which is very significant for their productivity and sustainability. Tuna
larvae are known to concentrate near islands and reefs.34 Kenyan MPAs are located
predominantly in reef areas and are therefore most significant for the protection of these
life stages of tuna which are very vulnerable.
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5.3 Institutional Arrangements for Fisheries Management
The Fisheries Act 1989 is implemented by the Ministry of Fisheries
Development which was set up in 2008.35 The Ministry includes two technical
departments, namely, the Department of Fisheries and the Kenya Marine and Fisheries
Research Institute (KMFRI).36 The Fisheries Department has management and
conservation responsibilities for marine and inland fisheries as a result of the legislative
provisions contained in the Fisheries Act 1989. The mandate of the Fisheries
Department is to promote the development of both traditional and industrial fisheries,
fish culture and related industries.37 The Department may achieve this by providing
extension and training services; conducting research and surveys; promoting
arrangements for the orderly marketing of fish and providing infrastructure facilities.38
The Director of Fisheries is charged with the administration of the provisions of
the Fisheries Act, subject to the directions of the Minister.39 Thus, the Director may
regulate the development of fisheries40 and with the approval of the Minister, also
impose fisheries management measures for the proper management of any fishery.41
Responsibility for research into both marine and inland fisheries lies with the Kenya
Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI).
The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act of 1976 which is
implemented by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, establishes the Kenya Wildlife
Service which advices the government on the establishment of national parks, reserves
and other sanctuaries. The Kenya Wildlife Service also manages these designated areas.
Thus, the management of Kenya’s Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) falls under the
jurisdiction of the Kenya Wildlife Service. The enforcement in the MPAs is carried out
jointly by the Department of Fisheries and the Kenya Wildlife Service.
The EMCA-1999 is implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Mineral
Resources. The National Environmental Management Authority is the custodian of the
35

The Ministry of Fisheries Development was set up through the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 2008. See
Republic of Kenya, National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, 2008, Section 2.8.1.
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Ministry of Fisheries Development http://www.fisheries.go.ke/ (accessed 30 September 2010).
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EMCA -1999 and its role is to supervise and coordinate all matters relating to the
environment. The Authority is the principal instrument of government in the
implementation of all policies relating to the environment.42

5.4 Legal and Policy Constraints to the Management of Kenya’s Tuna Fisheries
As established above, the Fisheries Act 1989 is generic and applies broadly to
marine and inland fisheries. Although the Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations
are concerned with the operations of [tuna] fishing vessels in the EEZ, they do not
address the management of fisheries in this zone. Overall, the Fisheries Act has no
provisions designed to establish specific management strategies for the management of
Kenya’s tuna resources.
As discussed in chapter 2, the LOSC has conferred on Kenya sovereignty over
its tuna resources in the EEZ. The LOSC also imposes responsibility upon Kenya to
conserve, manage and utilise the tuna stocks under its jurisdiction.43 Consequently,
Kenya is under an obligation to establish the appropriate framework for the national
management of tuna stocks under its jurisdiction. It was also seen in chapter 2 that tuna
fisheries are categorised as highly migratory species under the LOSC,44 and that they
are also subject to international legal rules. The classification of tuna as highly
migratory species has management implications thereby requiring an enabling legal
framework for the formulation of the appropriate management arrangements. Such a
provision is necessary if Kenya’s tuna fisheries are to be managed in their full range as
required by the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
Given that the Fisheries Act 1989 is the primary Act governing the management
of fisheries in Kenya, it is imperative that it provides the fundamental statutory basis for
the implementation of management approaches that respond to the unique biological
characteristics of tuna. According to the FAO, national fisheries legislation may specify
details on the implementation of aspects of the policy considered to be particularly
important and should include reference to establishing fishery management plans and
the procedure for the planning process.45
42

National Environment Management Authority http://www.nema.go.ke/ (accessed 28 September 2010).
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Notably, Kenya’s Fisheries Act has remained in place since its enactment in
1989, with only a single revision in 1991. This suggests that the political support for
policy change may be weak. For Kenya to accommodate the changing circumstances
within the fisheries sector and the relevant requirements under international law for the
management of its tuna resources, it will be necessary for the national Fisheries Act to
be revised accordingly. Particularly, the Fisheries Act will need to be revised to reflect
good governance practice as mandated under international law.

5.3.1 State Legislative Practices
In practice, some States have successfully incorporated provisions in their
national fisheries legislation relating to the implementation of management and
development plans for designated fisheries. On the basis of this provision, such States
have developed specific management measures for tuna fisheries which have been
stipulated in national tuna management plans. In these tuna management plans, States
outline the principles of tuna management and implementation strategies. They may
also define their development aspirations. The formulation of management plans for
fisheries is consistent with the provision of the FAO Code of Conduct which encourages
long-term management objectives to be translated into management actions, formulated
as a fishery management plan or other management framework.46 The definition of a
fishery management plan has been given by FAO as follows:
a formal or informal arrangement between a fishery management authority
and interested parties which identifies the partners in the fishery and their
respective roles, details the agreed objectives for the fishery and specifies the
management rules and regulations which apply to it and provides other details
about the fishery which are relevant to the task of the management authority.47
Generally, policy statements are strengthened when they are legislated. The
global trend in fisheries legal frameworks is for fisheries legislation to set out principles
or policies that are used to guide the implementation of statutory management powers
and functions.48 To illustrate the manner in which fisheries legislation could provide a
46

FAO Code of Conduct, para. 7.3.3.

47

FAO, Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4: Fisheries Management (FAO, 1997),
Section 4(4.1).
48

FAO, Law and Sustainable Development since Rio –Legal Trends in Agriculture and Natural Resource
Management, FAO Legislative Study 73 (FAO, 2002).
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legal basis for the development of management strategies for designated fisheries like
tuna, this thesis draws from the current State practice, finding examples from some of
the Pacific Island States. The reason for drawing examples from the Pacific Island
States derives from the fact that the world’s most important industrial tuna fishery, by
value and volume, lies in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.49 As the land- based
resources of these small island States are limited, their tuna resources are of
fundamental economic importance. As a result, these States have made efforts to
establish management regimes that would enhance the economic returns from their tuna
fisheries. The Pacific Island States Members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA) have a major stake in this resource, as three quarters of catches are taken
from their EEZs.50
As seen in chapter 2(2.4.1), the FFA plays a facilitative and coordinating role
amongst its members whose objective is to manage their tuna resources sustainably, in
order to meet their fisheries development aspirations. The economic returns from tuna
fisheries constitute a critical segment of many Pacific small island developing States’
economies.51 For this reason, the FFA Member States have developed a Regional Tuna
Management and Development Strategy as “an important backbone for the region” in
order to maintain regional solidarity, uphold existing regional and national
arrangements and implement appropriate conservation and management measures.52
Under current State legislative practice, many of the Pacific Island States have
included in their fisheries legislation a provision for the implementation of management
and development plans. The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1996 of
Niue for example, includes a provision for fisheries management and development.
Under this provision, the Cabinet may, by notice in the Gazette declare a fishery as
“designated” if it thinks it is in national interest to ensure the fishery’s effective
conservation or its efficient use.53 This provision also includes an element for the
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preparation and implementation of management and development plans.54 According to
the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1996 of Niue, the Director may
direct a Fisheries Officer to prepare and implement a management and development
plan for a designated fishery.55 Such a plan identifies the fishery to which it relates; sets
out the objectives to be achieved; specifies the management measures to be adopted to
achieve those objectives; the protection to be given to the habitat of the fishery; limits
within which the fishery may be exploited; licensing requirements; and the protection to
be given to any other designated fishery.56
Similarly, according to the Fisheries Management Act 1998 of Papua New
Guinea, the Managing Director may, and where the Minister requires so, shall cause to
be drawn up a Fishery Management Plan in respect of any fishery resource in the
fisheries waters.57 The fisheries plan identifies the fishery and its characteristics,
including its current state of exploitation; specifies the objectives to be achieved in the
management of the fishery; identifies any adverse environmental effects of the
operation of fishing activities in the fishery, and identify any customary fishing rights or
practices where appropriate.58 Papua New Guinea is one of the most significant
participants in regional tuna fisheries.59 Other Pacific Island States with similar
provisions include, inter alia, Solomon Islands,60 Nauru,61 Vanuatu62 and Tonga.63
Fishery management plans are to be kept under review and amended accordingly.

5.3.2 National Tuna Management Plans
The adoption of national tuna management and development plans in most of
the Pacific Island States derives from the provision of their fisheries legislation. Barclay
asserts that the reliability of tuna management plans depends on their legitimacy, and
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that such plans should have legislative force.64 The current tuna management plans of
most of the Pacific Island States for example, have been developed through wide
consultation and are therefore considered holistic and complete with respect to
stakeholders’ needs.65 Although the content of national tuna management plans may
vary from State to State, their basic objective is to set out rules and procedures guiding
the management and development of tuna fisheries. In the case of the Pacific Island
States, these plans also respond to the conservation obligations of the Convention on
Conservation and Management of highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Pacific Ocean.66 Such plans require frequent evaluation and revision in order to cope
with the dynamic nature of the tuna fishery. Examples of the national tuna management
plans for Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea are further discussed.

5.3.2.1 The Tuna Management Plan of Vanuatu
The national tuna management plan of Vanuatu (a national policy for the
management of Vanuatu tuna fisheries) has been developed in accordance with Part 2,
Section 3 of the Fisheries Act, No. 55 of 2005. It is made up of five sections providing
the policy and administrative framework for tuna management; strategies for the
conservation and management of tuna, and for local tuna fishery development; and
schedules specifying closed areas, limits on license numbers, total allowable catch and
fees.67
The specific purpose of the Vanuatu national tuna management plan is to; (a)
provide clear objectives and direction for managing tuna resources; (b) provide
achievable, measurable goals and principles to direct management towards the overall
objectives; (c) establish clear transparent rules for licensing, monitoring and regulating
tuna fishing activities, and (d) establish an administrative framework for ensuring the
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implementation of the plan and mechanisms for updating the it accordingly.68 The tuna
management plan also contains objectives which include; (a) ensuring that the
exploitation of the tuna resources is compatible with sustainability throughout their
range; (b) the harvest is taken in a manner that maximises long-term economic and
social benefits by Vanuatu citizens; (c) contribute to food security, and (d) meet the
relevant regional and international responsibilities.69 A summary of strategies developed
to implement the plan’s goals is also provided.

5.3.2.2 The Tuna Management Plan of Papua New Guinea
A second example is the national tuna management plan for Papua New Guinea.
Similar to the Vanuatu management plan, the broad objective of the national tuna
management plan for Papua New Guinea is to give effect to the fisheries management
principles contained in the Fisheries Management Act.70 However, the PNG plan places
more emphasis on maximising Papua New Guinea participation through the wise
development of its tuna resources and it includes a domestication policy in this regard.71
This aspiration is also reflected by the management strategies developed for the tuna
fishery, which are to encourage and facilitate sustainable development of Papua New
Guinea domestic tuna industry;72 develop and apply criteria for licensing which give
preference to Papua New Guinea operators;73 and support fiscal and development
incentives in the domestic tuna industry.74 Papua New Guinea’s domestication
aspirations are also reflected in the allocation of licenses.75 The principle objective of
the Papua New Guinea national tuna management plan in this respect is; to promote an
increased rate of participation by Papua New Guineans in the tuna industry.76
Tuna management plans do not only improve transparency and provide policy
directions which can be relied upon, but they also provide a valuable guide for policy
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improvement for the sustainable development and management of tuna resources.77 In
the light of current State practice, it can be concluded that tuna management plans are
becoming significant as tools for adopting and implementing management measures
that may result in sustainable tuna fisheries. However, Kenya’s fisheries legislation is
devoid of any measures or tools to aid the development and implementation of a
management plan pertaining to its tuna resources. This gap in the fisheries legislation
represents a hindrance to the sustainable management and development of tuna
fisheries.
As the fisheries Act 1989 is the key legislation governing the management of
fisheries in Kenya, such measures will need to be enshrined in this legislation in order
to fulfil Kenya’s social and economic objectives with respect to its tuna resources. It is
imperative that a legislative basis for the effective management of Kenya’s tuna
resources be created if Kenya is to utilise these resources sustainably as required under
international law. Such a provision will enable the establishment of appropriate
principles for managing tuna. Kenya can articulate its legislative obligations through
policies which can be established for the conservation and management of its tuna
resources. Such obligations can be enacted through national tuna management plans and
arrangements which in turn can be effected by the Department of Fisheries. Thus, a tuna
management plan would enable the formulation of an implementation strategy for the
appropriate tuna management principles. Moreover, Kenya’s fisheries legislation needs
to provide adequate mechanisms for implementing the recently developed National
Oceans and Fisheries Policy in relation to tuna.

5.4 National Development Policies and other Fisheries Sector Plans
The Department of Fisheries recognises that since Kenya gained independence
in 1963, the fisheries sector, and particularly the marine fisheries have not been
prioritised by the State for development.78 This factor is also recognised by policy
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makers and other institutions including KMFRI.79 It can be safely assumed that this is
one of the factors that have contributed to the inadequacy of Kenya’s fisheries
legislation in providing for the development of management strategies for its tuna
resources. Kenya’s national development policies influence the processes which
contribute to the development of policy arrangements in the fisheries sector. It thus
becomes necessary to examine the trend in Kenya’s national development planning in
order to establish the extent to which fisheries has been integrated into its development
discourse, and the effect this has had on the fisheries sector as a whole, and
consequently the tuna fisheries.
National development plans normally reflect the national aspirations of States.
Such plans identify, prioritise and set out the national development concerns of States,
from which strategies are developed to fulfil set goals. National development plans are
significant as they represent nationally agreed strategies for promoting different
government sectors and they identify the direction of the government in this regard. In
which case, national development policies that are relevant to fisheries reflect the
national interest in the planning and development of a fishery. Such policies have a
significant role in facilitating the development of the fishery.
The sections that follow examine the extent to which the fisheries sector has
been included in Kenya’s principal policy and strategy formulation processes which
include the national development plans, the District Focus for Rural Development
policy (DFRD), Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and the Economic Recovery
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS). It is concluded that the interests
of the fisheries sector in Kenya have generally not been well articulated in the national
policy formulation processes. Consequently, the development of an appropriate
framework for the management of tuna fisheries has not been achieved, and the industry
has not been prioritised as a potential income source.

5.4.1 National Development Plans
Inclusion of tuna fisheries in national development discourses is one way of
articulating the interests of the fisheries sector in the development of Kenya’s tuna
fishery. It is argued that ‘the mainstreaming of fisheries into national development plans
79
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and/or PRSPs can prevent both the economic marginalization of the sector and reduce
the likelihood that policies prejudicial to the sector and its stakeholders are adopted’.80
Thus, it can be assumed that by incorporating Kenya’s tuna fisheries into national
development policies and other relevant sectoral development, the potential of tuna
fisheries’ contribution to the national economy could be realised. In addition, this would
stimulate the enactment of enabling legislation and the formulation of appropriate
policies for the sustainable management of tuna fisheries in Kenya.

5.4.1.1 Long-term Development Policies
Kenya has undertaken the development of macro-economic policies since
independence in 1963. Its development agenda for economic growth has been outlined
broadly in five-year national development plans. In addition, two long term policies
have been used to guide Kenyan national planning and investment, namely, Sessional
Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya,
and Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth. The
publication of Sessional paper No. 1 in 1986 brought about a major review of the
macro-economic policy, with emphasis upon renewed, rapid, economic growth.81 The
rapid economic growth was envisaged to be achieved through a process of trade
liberalization.
The Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 which was the principal document that
provided guidelines for economic policy during this period, did not directly refer to the
role of the fishing sector, but it contained concerns related to agriculture, with which
fisheries has always been closely related.82 It emphasised the role of agriculture as the
leading sector in stimulating economic growth but did not make any significant policy
statements regarding fisheries. In this document fish is mentioned only in relation to
beef and other meats.83 This highlights the lack of consideration of the potential of the
fisheries sector in contributing to economic growth right from the early stages of the
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development of national policy in Kenya. It also implies that the contribution of
fisheries to national economic development must be deemed significant in order for
adequate policies to be formulated for fisheries management and for the development of
the fisheries sector. This aspect is discussed further in the following sections by
examining the extent to which fisheries has been integrated into Kenya’s national
development processes. First, the national development plans that have been established
since Kenya gained independence in 1963 will be discussed. These plans have been
organised chronologically in four phases for the period 1964 to 2008, in ten-year time
frames. Second, the relevant development policies, national development strategies and
fisheries sector plans will be discussed.

5.4.1.2 Phase 1: The Period 1964 to 1974
From Kenya’s first national development plan, emphasis has been put on the
yield of its inland lakes, particularly Lake Victoria which is the second largest lake in
the world and which also accounts for more than 90% of the total fish production in
Kenya.84 The activities proposed in this development plan include; shore preservation
and storage facilities serving fish production areas; harbor and landing beach
improvements, and development of the deep sea fishery including a cannery and
industrial vessels. These were the fisheries related themes that became recurrent in
Kenya’s development plans, and which were never actualised as per the aspirations of
the Department of Fisheries.85
The development plan of 1970 to 1974 recognised and emphasized the role of
fish as a source of protein and proposed major investments in industrial vessels for
harvesting the offshore tuna resources.86 Considering the financial implications of such
investments, it is safe to assume that they were to be achieved through private
investments and joint ventures. In the national development plans that were established
during this phase, the fish production target was set at 55,000tonnes, up from the 1968
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target of 30,000tonnes (which was never achieved) for both marine and fresh water
fisheries.87

5.4.1.3 Phase 2: The Period 1974 to 1983
During this development phase, a fresh target of 35,000tonnes (27,000tonnes for
inland fisheries and 8,000tonnes for marine fisheries) was set under the 1974-1978
national development plan.88 Out of a total catch of 41,260tonnes in 1976, marine
landings accounted for 4,000tonnes.89 Once again, the set target of 55,000t of the
previous plan was not achieved. The failure to achieve the target was attributed to
overfishing and siltation of the various inland lakes. However, during this phase both
inland and marine fisheries achieved and surpassed the targets that had been set, owing
to the introduction of new species and shrimp trawling respectfully.90

5.4.1.4 Phase 3: The Period 1984 to 1993
The development plans during this phase were very brief in their mention of the
fisheries sector. The 1984-88 plan made proposals for the establishment of a fisheries
development authority and the construction of a cannery at the port city of Mombasa.91
Although the sixth plan of 1989-93 referred to the promise of high potential from
Kenya’s [tuna] EEZ resources, it did not propose any strategy for the development of
these fisheries. As none of these documents referred to the proposals of previous plans,
it is presumed that the projects and proposals were either not implemented through lack
of funds or change of policy, or failed to live up to expectations.92

5.4.1.5 Phase 4: The Period 1997 to 2008
The national development plan of 1997-2001 confirms that Kenya’s offshore
fisheries which include the EEZ resources, have a potential of up to 200,000t in tuna
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and tuna-like species, and that the full potential of the EEZ is yet to be exploited.93 The
plan lists one of the activities to be undertaken by the government during this period as,
‘Indian Ocean coastal zone management programmes’.94 It is not clear what such
programmes would entail.
Under the 2002-2008 national development plan fisheries resources are
associated with and discussed under natural resource management. The key objectives
for the fisheries and fisheries sector policy priorities are listed as; (a) management,
conservation, control and utilisation of fishery resources; (b) promotion of aquaculture
development; (c) management and control of fish quality and promotion of fish
marketing systems for food security; (d) prepare fisheries master plan.95 Regarding the
[tuna] EEZ resources the plan proposes to strengthen monitoring, surveillance and
control in this area.

5.4.1.6 Weaknesses of the National Development Plans
An examination of the fisheries related national development plans since
Kenya’s independence in 1963 reveals various weaknesses. The main weakness of the
national development plans is that, they have not been well founded over a period of
several decades. As a result, the policy statements stated in these plans concerning the
fisheries sector do not appear to have clear objectives regarding the management of
fisheries and the development of the fisheries sector as a whole. In addition, although
some of the policy statements appear appropriate, they are not supported by any
measures or strategies to facilitate their implementation. Most of these statements are
general and in some instances, they are vague.
For example, one of the activities proposed to be undertaken in the 1997-2001
development plan is “Indian Ocean coastal zone management programmes”. It is not
clear what such programmes entail since this statement is not supported by any action
plan. Additionally, despite making reference to the [tuna] EEZ fisheries and to the high
potential of Kenya’s EEZ in a couple of the development plans, no strategy has been
developed towards the management and development of tuna fisheries to date. The tuna
93
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fisheries related policy objectives stipulated in the national plans have also not been
fully implemented. The failure by the government to implement these objectives can be
related to the lack of policy implementation guidance, among other things.
Another weakness relates to the absence of a monitoring framework to ensure
the full realisation of Kenya’s aspirations for the development of its tuna fisheries. The
challenge is further complicated by the fact that, the subsequent national development
plans do not even make reference to the previous ones. Not only do these plans fail to
reflect the outputs of the previous plans, but they also do not build on each other. This
implies that the policy process has not been appropriately informed by past experiences,
making it difficult for any adjustments or improvement to be made due to lack of
appropriate feedback. As a result, there is no continuity in the implementation of the
fisheries objectives stated in the national development plans. It thus becomes difficult to
determine whether the management goals have been adopted or if the objectives of the
national development plans have been realised. For example, with no reference to past
development plans, it becomes difficult to establish why tuna fisheries have not been
developed despite the underlying potential.
Another problem of the national development plans relates to the manner in
which issues regarding fisheries, particularly marine capture fisheries have been
addressed. As a whole, fisheries management issues have not been satisfactorily
addressed in the framework of Kenya’s national development plans. Some of the plans
have a single sentence addressing the fisheries sector and in most cases these statements
address inland fisheries. Similarly, fisheries sustainability concerns have not even been
reflected in the national development plans which have dwelt more on development
issues. For example, when tuna fisheries are mentioned in the first national development
plan of 1966-70, the policy statement proposes the development of deep sea fisheries
and a tuna cannery. Similarly, the second plan of 1970-74 proposed investment in
industrial vessels directed towards harvesting of tuna resources. There is no mention of
how such resources are to be managed.
An additional problem is that, the planning exercises appear to have become a
routine that has achieved few results. The same themes are repeated from one
development plan to the next, most of which have not been implemented. For these
reasons, it can be seen that the national development plans did not provide a good basis
for the management and development of Kenya’s tuna resources. Consequently, the
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legislation also fell short of providing appropriate guidelines. Considering the fish catch
projection targets that have been made in the first two phases, the national development
plans reflect the difficulty that the Department of Fisheries has had in determining the
economic potential of fisheries in general.96 There is thus a reason to conclude that the
fisheries sector as a whole has been neglected in Kenya’s national development
priorities. As a result, the fisheries sector has not enjoyed the priority it should,
particularly with regards to financial allocation. This conclusion is consistent with a
recent a study on the “implementation of a management plan for Lake Victoria” which
confirms that the fisheries sector in Kenya has yet to reach its full potential, and that
compared to other States which have developed a vibrant fisheries sector it is apparent
that much remains to be done to dynamise Kenya’s fisheries sector.97
To rectify the above mentioned shortcomings, it is necessary for Kenya to make
the fisheries sector an integral part of the national development plans. Integrating
fisheries into the national development plans will provide a basis for policy
development with respect to the management of tuna. The challenge that Kenya faces in
integrating the fisheries sector into its national development plans has its roots in the
colonial legacy. This challenge lies with the neglect of capture fisheries during the
period of British colonial rule. During this period, the importance of capture fisheries
was relegated to the periphery of the national interests.98 Capture fisheries were not
regarded as important because they only served as a supplementary source of food
supply to Kenyan nationals.99
Aside from pearls, mother-of pearl, beche-de-mer and ambergris, the other
fisheries of interest was the trout fishery. The colonial government therefore enacted the
appropriate legislation; the Trout Ordinance 1948.100 Tuna and other marine fish were
not the preferred species. Whilst the development of capture fisheries was suppressed
during the period of colonial rule, industrial and commercial development of tuna
fisheries have resulted in the increased exploitation of Kenya’s tuna fisheries today.
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These developments call for the necessary policy and legal backing to address the
management needs of the tuna fisheries.
Aside from the national development plans, the management and development
of tuna fisheries in Kenya has been influenced by other major policy documents. These
documents are discussed in the following section.

5.4.2 District Focus for Rural Development Policy (1985)
One of the most significant national development policies in Kenya was the
District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), whose overall objective was to devolve
planning to the district level by establishing a decentralization system of governance.
Such a system aimed to improve governance and reduce poverty. The DFRD was a
result of the 1984-1988 national development plan whose theme was: “mobilise
domestic resources for equitable development”.101 The DFRD strategy which was
initiated by the government of Kenya in 1983 was to decentralise the planning,
management and implementation of district-specific projects from the central
government closer to the people affected.102 This was because the districts were the
main stratum of “local” government in the rural areas after the provincial governments
were dismantled in the 1960s.103 The districts are large units and they are remote from,
and not necessarily accountable to ordinary citizens, and their powers are subject to veto
by central government.104 By proposing the establishment of decentralised mechanisms
for rural development, the objective of the DFRD was to develop rural Kenya by
encouraging broader participation of local communities in order to improve problem
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identification, mobilization of resources and to enhance utilization of local resources
and to develop Kenya equitably.105 Thus the system was viewed as:
The ultimate objective of decentralization is to transform people’s lives and
eradicate poverty by devolving political, administrative, and financial powers to the
people so that they can effectively control their own destiny and thus render the whole
process sustainable.106
The DFRD required the management of all sectors including fisheries to be
devolved to the district. Under District Focus, the Department of Fisheries in
consultation with members of the District Development Committees (DDC) were
required to identify fisheries development needs at the district level, design
development projects and implement them subject to the approval of the DDC
review.107 Although the tuna fishing activities of DWFNs had already commenced in
the 1980s, no specific programmes were initiated for the management and development
of tuna fisheries. Furthermore, there were various weaknesses of the DFRD. Although
the strategy had its achievements, it failed to deliver the appropriate training for local
people; funds were inadequate and were not disbursed from the central government to
the districts in a timely manner; the mechanisms for reviewing the strategy were not
incorporated and there was no involvement of the local people in planning and
implementation of projects.108 The DFRD therefore failed in its role as a
decentralisation and participatory planning strategy.

5.4.3 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2001-2004
The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was established by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a low-interest lending facility for low-income States in
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1999.109 Since then, the IMF and World Bank require that, prior to funds being released,
respective States subscribing to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility have to
prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).110 The PRSP is a framework for
national economic policy and development assistance to the State. It describes the
macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs that the State will pursue
over five years to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing
needs and the associated sources of financing.111
PRSPs are prepared through a participatory process that involves all
stakeholders, and they are reviewed accordingly.112 PRSPs present an opportunity for
the interests of individual government sectors to be advanced since they outline the
development priorities of States’ governments.113 The interests of the fisheries sector
may therefore be articulated in such a policy document. However, Kenya’s PRSP does
not reflect such priority with respect to the fisheries sector. Instead, the fisheries sector
is dealt with in connection with the strategies for the development of agriculture,
livestock and environment. It is stated that:
Fresh water and marine fisheries have significant growth potential in
improving the livelihood of communities in western and coastal regions of
Kenya, and they are a source of foreign exchange earning. The government is
committed to developing an enabling environment to ensure sustainability in
fisheries development and management. A fisheries policy and master plan is
currently under development.114
Although the policy makes a general statement concerning the potential contribution of
coastal fisheries as a source of foreign exchange earning, the interests of the sector are
not adequately captured and the fisheries sector is still overshadowed under the
agricultural sector.
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It is argued that the significance of a sector determines its inclusion into the
country’s PRSP and mainstreaming into national policy.115 This particularly holds true
for a sector that contributes significantly to the economic growth of a State. This is
largely true of the agricultural sector in Kenya as will be discussed in the following
section. Agriculture is considered important to the growth process of many developing
States because of its capability to enhance export earnings and also as a key contributing
sector to domestic employment and consumption.116 As a result, all PRSPs of such
States recognise the role that agriculture can play in economic growth,117 and thus
promote the interests of the sector.
The fisheries sector on the other hand, may not be the principal motor of growth
in many developing States like Kenya, as it might not contribute significantly to the
national economy. However, the fisheries sector could play an important role in
maintaining or enhancing growth rates over time through continued or [sustained]
increased stock exploitation, and improvements in value-added within the sector.118 For
fisheries to contribute effectively to economic growth, the management strategies for
the development of the fisheries sector need to be promoted and implemented within the
framework of a State’s major national development policies such as the PRSP.
Cunningham et al point out that, well managed fish resources could make an important
renewable contribution to economic growth. However, weak fisheries policy
development processes have resulted in many States viewing their fisheries as a
problem sector making a low (and declining) percentage contribution to the GDP.119

5.4.3.1 Economic Contribution of the Fisheries Sector to National Economy
Ibarra et al argue that, the fisheries sector can have a particularly important role
to play in the national development process when fisheries contributes substantially (or
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could have the potential) to underlying growth processes.120 The implication is that the
fisheries sector is more likely to be included into the national policy formulation process
if it makes a considerable contribution to the national economy, thereby having the
potential to promote economic growth. However, if the contribution of fisheries to the
national economy of a State is not deemed significant, it is unlikely that the sector will
be included in the State’s national development policies. This thesis argues that the
fisheries sector has not been prioritised for development in Kenya’s national policies
based on its economic contribution.
It was established earlier in the chapter that Kenya’s fisheries sector has tended
to be associated with agriculture. Not only has this association failed to adequately
prioritise the interests of the fisheries sector, but it has also resulted in the role of the
sector and the Department of Fisheries becoming overshadowed. Consequently, the
Department of Fisheries has ended up playing a very marginal role which is not
dynamic enough to steer development of the fisheries sector.121 Kenya’s major policy
documents identify the agricultural sector as the backbone of the national economy and
consider agriculture as one of the most important sectors in creating employment and
reducing poverty.122 The reason for this consideration is based on the contribution of
agriculture to the national economy. The agricultural sector which contributes about
24% of GDP and provides about 70% of total employment in Kenya is also seen as key
to Kenya’s food security.123 The sector contributes 45% of government revenue, while
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providing for most of the country’s food requirements and therefore directly influencing
overall economic performance through its contribution to GDP.124
Fisheries on the other hand accounted for 0.4% of GDP in 2007 which is
minimal compared to the agricultural sector.125 Thus, it may be concluded that as a
sector, fisheries has not been prioritised in the national policy formulation process on
the basis of its economic contribution. Consequently, the fisheries sector has not been
prioritised as one of the potential sectors that are significant in promoting Kenya’s
economic growth. This may be one of the reasons why fisheries, particularly marine
fisheries, have not been given sufficient attention as a priority sector for development in
Kenya’s PRSP.126
It was established in chapter 1(1.3) that Kenya derives financial benefits from
the tuna resources in its EEZ through license fees remitted by DWFNs and from tuna
loin exports. DWFNs harvest as much as 60,000 tonnes of tuna annually from the
seasonal migration of tuna through Kenya’s EEZ. The tuna processing in Kenya was
initiated in 1996 with modest exports of 500-1000 tonnes of tuna loins to Italy which
increased to 9,000 tonnes in exports to the EU generally by 2005.127 The Kenyan
exports represented 12% of the EU import market of pre-cooked tuna loins.128
The importance of fisheries to the economy of States can be measured in various
ways including, inter alia, its contribution to GDP, generation of resources rents, export
earnings, license fee receipts, and contribution to food security.129 The export of tuna
loins from Kenya to the EU generates foreign exchange and is an indication that the
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tuna fishery can contribute to Kenya’s national development process through exports.130
At the national level, tuna canning provides employment to Kenyan nationals.
Furthermore, the main tuna fishing grounds for purse seiners are to be found to the east
and northeast of Kenya’s EEZ and in the Mozambique Channel,131 while the main tuna
fishing ground for longliners are in the same location in relation to Kenya’s EEZ.132 The
proximity of Kenya’s EEZ to these tuna rich waters provides the potential for
development of its tuna fisheries.
Although Kenya aspires to develop its tuna fisheries, it will be necessary to
evaluate the economic contribution of the marine capture fisheries as a whole, and
particularly tuna fisheries, to the national economy if the fisheries sector is to attract the
aspired government support, including cooperation from other sectors. For its tuna
fisheries to make a significant economic contribution, Kenya will not only need to
establish an effective policy development process for further development of tuna
fisheries, but also to develop an effective management regime. The Department of
Fisheries on the other hand, will need to attract the necessary political support and
provide legal backing of the sectoral policies.

5.4.3.2 Administrative Weaknesses
The role of institutions for success in fisheries management is important.133
Aside from the role of policy development processes, adequate legislation and political
support, another fundamental aspect underpinning the management and development of
tuna fisheries in Kenya is the nature of the institution mandated to manage the fisheries
sector. As earlier stated, this role is taken up by the Department of Fisheries. Usually,
the importance and independence of such an institution depends on the perceived
importance of fisheries to the national economy.134 In most developing States, it is usual
to subordinate fisheries within a department of agriculture or natural resources
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development,135 as in the case of Kenya discussed above. The low status of fisheries
ministries (or departments) has often been cited as a root cause for their generally poor
administrative performance.136
This is true of Kenya’s Department of Fisheries. Over the years, the Department
of Fisheries has been moved from one government ministry to another.137 Not only has
this movement immensely destabilised the operations and effectiveness of the
Department of Fisheries, but it also demonstrates the low priority accorded to the
fisheries sector as a whole. This has been coupled with low priority of the sector in
terms of funding allocation and with no coherent development plan,138 making it
difficult for the Department of Fisheries to carry out its objectives of food production
and fisheries management and development since it was not the core business of that
particular ministry. These issues have adversely affected the growth and development of
Kenya’s fisheries sector of which the tuna fisheries are a part.
The changing political regimes in Kenya over the last decade have had an effect
in shaping its fisheries policies. Kenya has undergone major political changes since the
advent of multiparty politics in 1991. Among these changes was the amendment of the
constitution in 2008, to establish a coalition government and the position of Prime
Minister.139 As a result, changes have occurred considerably, not only in the focus of the
national development policies and fisheries sector plans, but also in the administration
of fisheries. As noted in chapter 5.2.4 and the following sections, Kenya has articulated
fisheries policy and development plans to reflect its aspirations in the development of
tuna fisheries through the establishment of, among others, the National Oceans Policy
which promotes modern principles of fisheries management such as ecosystem
management and the precautionary approach. In addition, various development polices
135
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and fisheries strategic plans which clearly reflect Kenya’s aspirations for the
management and development of tuna fisheries have been established. An examination
of these plans follows.

5.4.4 The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation
(ERS)
In 2002 there was a major change of Government in Kenya and also in the
objectives of Kenya’s national development policies. The Interim Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper was replaced by the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and
Employment Creation (ERS).140 The ERS is a development policy which aims to restore
the economy and create employment. The ERS identifies sustainable management of the
natural commons as one of its priority areas, recognises the fisheries sector as a foreign
exchange earner and acknowledges the role played by marine fisheries in improving the
livelihoods of communities of the coastal regions of Kenya.141
The Kenyan government commits to entering into agreements to promote closer
regional cooperation in the management and regulation of transboundary fisheries
resources. It can be assumed that tuna fisheries are included in this category of fisheries
resources owing to their status as highly migratory species. The government also
commits to developing an enabling environment to ensure sustainability in fisheries
development and management,142 a slight improvement from the strategies outlined in
the PRSP.

5.4.4.1 Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture 2004-2014
The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS)
emphasized the revitalization of agriculture as the engine of growth for Kenya’s
economy.143 The development of the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture which hinges
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upon both the ERS and the PRSP is consistent with the ERS in this respect. This
strategy was formulated at the stage when the Department of Fisheries was moved to
the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development in 2003, to create an enabling
framework for the sustainable development of the both agriculture and the fisheries
sector. The policy is aimed at developing agriculture into a profitable economic activity
that can attract private sector investment and provide employment.144
The significance of this strategy for tuna fisheries is that, it is a policy document
from which a comprehensive strategic plan specifically for Kenya’s fisheries has been
developed, even though the fishery sector was still submerged in the Ministry of
livestock and Fisheries Development at this stage. The strategy identifies the lack of
capital and equipment as the main constraints that inhibit Kenya’s participation in [tuna]
fishing. It also emphasises the need to utilise [tuna] resources and recommends that
Kenya’s capacity for surveillance ought to be increased.145 It is pointed out in the
strategy that, the utilisation of [tuna] resources can only be achieved through concerted
efforts to lobby for the implementation and translation of the relevant provisions of the
LOSC into national policy and legislation.146 This is the first time that a development
policy in the fisheries sector has acknowledged the role of international law in the
management and development of tuna fisheries. It is also noted that one of the strategies
for improving delivery of support services, is to develop the potential of the fishing
industry fully. The strategy prioritises the development of measures for licensing of
fishing vessels to operate in the EEZ as the most appropriate intervention for achieving
the development of the fishing industry.147

5.4.4.2 Fisheries Strategic Plan for Kenya 2006-2011
The formulation of the National Strategic Plan for Rapid Development of the
Fishing Industry is a major achievement for the fisheries sector following the formation
of the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development and the development of the
Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture. This policy document which is also consistent
144

FAO, Kenya: National Medium –Term Investment Programme, 2004: New Partnership for Africa’s
development-Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. http://www.fao.org (accessed
20 January 2010).
145

Republic of Kenya, Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture 2004-2014 (2004) 8.

146

Ibid 41.

147

Ibid 102.

198

with the ERS articulates the mandate, vision, mission, core values, core functions,
policy priorities and organizational structure of Kenya’s Department of Fisheries for the
period 2006 to 2011.148 The mandate of the strategy is derived from the Fisheries Act
1989 and the Maritime Zones Act 1989.149 The strategy has a vision; ‘to have a dynamic
fishery industry with a potential to contribute towards food security, employment and
generate wealth among fishers’.150 Its mission is ‘to facilitate sustainable management
and development of the fishery resources and products for socio-economic development
in an ecologically viable environment’.151
The document sets out the strategic issues that need to be addressed in the
fisheries sector including weak policy and legal framework; poor access to markets; low
productivity; weak monitoring and evaluation framework; inadequate information
technology; weak institutional capacity and corruption.152 Regarding weak policy and
legal framework, it is recognised that lack of a comprehensive national fisheries policy
in the past, has reduced the effectiveness of management and research, discouraged
investment in the sector and constrained growth. In addition, the need to revise Kenya’s
Fisheries Act is pointed out.153
The strategy provides a budget for funding the implementation of its objectives
and emphasizes the need for resource mobilization to fund all the proposed activities.154
It promotes private-sector investment in the fisheries sector for the development of
infrastructure, promotion of the development of value added activities and industries,
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and the establishment of cold storage facilities for fisheries.155 An organisational
structure and monitoring framework form part of this strategy.
Unlike the development plans and policies that were established in the 1960s,
the fisheries management strategies that have been formulated in Kenya in the last
decade have changed noticeably in their approach. These strategies appear to be more
focused with respect to the objectives of the marine capture fisheries sector concerning
the management and development of tuna fisheries. The strategies also acknowledge the
potential for tuna fisheries to contribute to Kenya’s economy and for food security. The
Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture for example, recognises that the management of
tuna fisheries is subject to international legal rules, and emphasises the need to lobby for
the implementation and translation of the relevant provisions of the LOSC into national
policy and legislation in order for tuna fisheries to be utilised sustainably. Both the
Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture and the Fisheries Strategic Plan for Kenya
consider sustainability and ecological soundness as vital for the preservation of
ecosystem integrity which is fundamental to the management of tuna fisheries. In as
much as these fisheries objectives have been articulated in these management strategies,
their effectiveness can only be assessed through implementation.

5.4.4.3 Developments in the Fisheries Sector
In addition to the developments of the more recent national development
strategies and fisheries specific plans, there have been other positive achievements in
Kenya’s fisheries sector as a result of the current political changes. Most significant, is
the establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries Development which was set up in
2008.156 This can be viewed as a real turning point for fisheries management in Kenya.
The establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries Development presents an opportunity for
the sector to assert itself. It can be assumed that the establishment of a ministry fully
devoted to the management and development of fisheries will facilitate the
identification and implementation of strategies that promote the management and
sustainable utilisation of Kenya’s tuna resources. This may for example, catalyse the
implementation of the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy which has clearly stated
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the objectives concerning the management and sustainable development of Kenya’s
tuna fisheries, and other related strategies within the sector.
However, as a newly established government ministry the financial and
institutional capacity required to achieve its goals are quite substantial considering that
the operations of the Department of Fisheries have been hampered by insufficient funds
in the past as previously discussed. The changes required within the fisheries sector, and
particularly for the management of tuna fisheries, may therefore not be effected
immediately. It will take time and political commitment to bring about the institutional
changes required for the effective implementation of the objectives of the fisheries
sectoral plans. Nonetheless, the Ministry’s efforts will need to be supported by an
adequate and appropriate legislation in order to bring tuna into an effective management
framework.
The extent to which government policy-makers recognise the value of fisheries
is fundamental to fisheries management performance.157 There remains a need for the
Ministry to establish the economic evaluation of the contribution of fisheries as a whole
to national economic growth so as to attract government support and sufficient
budgetary allocations. This will also enable the sector to be adequately prioritised
within national development policies. It will also be necessary for Kenya to reflect the
value of tuna fisheries in economic policies such as the ERS and national development
plans in order for government decisions to take account of the economic benefits that
tuna fisheries can provide. There is a need for Kenya to ensure the implementation of
the national strategies it develops which are aimed at the management and development
of tuna fisheries. Kenya needs to articulate the issues it has prioritised in this respect, in
its national fisheries legislation and to implement them accordingly.

5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the framework for managing fisheries in Kenya has been
examined. The chapter demonstrated that Kenya’s fisheries laws and regulations fail to
provide the legal basis for the establishment of appropriate management arrangements
for tuna fisheries. However, the formulation of the National Oceans and Fisheries
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Policy is an immense contribution to the management of tuna fisheries in Kenya, and it
reflects Kenya’s efforts to provide guidance for managing and developing its tuna
resources in the EEZ in a more responsible and sustainable manner. While this initiative
is commendable, Kenya still has to make efforts to put it into effect in order to fulfil its
aspirations to develop its tuna fisheries. Thus, the effectiveness of the National Oceans
and Fisheries Policy rests ultimately on the ability of the government to provide the
enabling legislation.
It is also seen that, the development of fisheries has generally not been well
articulated in the government strategies, and that Kenya has not adequately considered
the marine capture fisheries sector in national policy development. Kenya’s
development interests in fisheries have focused on the inland freshwater capture
fisheries while the marine capture fisheries sector has had no considerable influence in
Kenya’s national development processes. This situation may be attributed to a number
of factors. There is evidence to suggest that marine capture fisheries are not a critical
component of Kenya’s economy. This chapter argued that, if the economic valuation of
tuna fisheries is not deemed significant, then its contribution to the national economy is
assumed inconsequential. As a result, tuna fisheries have not been prioritised for
development. This has been a contributing factor to the inadequacies reflected in
Kenya’s fisheries legislation regarding the management of its tuna resources.
Additionally, the substantial financial investment required to develop [tuna] marine
fisheries will require the active participation of the private sector as proposed in the
fisheries policy and the fisheries strategic plan for Kenya.
The management and sustainable development of tuna fisheries in Kenya is
underpinned by an effective fisheries legislative framework. The following chapter
analyses the national implementation of Kenya’s international and regional obligations
for the management of tuna fisheries.
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CHAPTER 6
KENYA’S NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
REGIONAL OBLIGATIONS ON TUNA MANAGEMENT

6.1 Introduction
Kenya committed to the conservation and sustainable utilisation of the marine
resources under its national jurisdiction by extending its maritime jurisdiction as a result
of the adoption of the LOSC in 1982. Consequently, Kenya has a duty to conserve,
manage and sustainably utilise the tuna resources in its EEZ.1 Kenya is also under a
duty to cooperate with other States participating in tuna fisheries in the region in
seeking to adopt conservation and management measures for tuna fisheries in its EEZ
and beyond.2 Such cooperation is to be achieved through the IOTC. As a member of the
IOTC, Kenya is not only required to participate in its work, but also to comply with, and
implement the tuna conservation and management measures adopted by the IOTC
which are binding on Kenya.
Kenya’s legal and policy framework is instrumental in providing a basis for the
implementation of effective conservation and management measures necessary to
promote the long-term conservation and sustainable utilisation of tuna resources in its
EEZ. Kenya might move towards that goal by responding to its international and
regional obligations.
This chapter analyses Kenya’s legal and policy framework relative to the
management and conservation of the tuna resources in Kenya’s jurisdiction, as well as
the fisheries management practices in order to determine the scope of compliance with
international obligations. The chapter also provides legal and policy recommendations
which could enhance Kenya’s governance framework by improving the application of
the measures that Kenya has adopted for the conservation and management of tunas.
These measures which are derived from the set of criteria formulated in chapters 2 and 4
include the determination of total allowable catch (TAC), data contribution and sharing,
and compliance and enforcement and their implementation in respect to tuna
conservation.
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LOSC, Arts. 61 & 62; UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 5, 6 & 7.

2

LOSC, Arts. 63, 64, 117 and 118; UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 8.
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This chapter finds that, although Kenya is a State Party to the LOSC and the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement, it has not fully implemented these instruments. Similarly,
Kenya has not fully implemented the tuna conservation and management measures
adopted by the IOTC.

6.2 Species Conservation
As shown in chapter 2(2.4.1) and 4(4.2.1), the legal rules provided by the LOSC
and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement obligate Kenya to ensure through proper
conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the tuna resources
under its jurisdiction are not endangered by over-exploitation.3 Kenya is also required to
utilise such resources optimally without prejudice to their conservation,4 and to take into
consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent on tunas.5 Kenya may
also implement the principles of the FAO Code of Conduct regarding responsible
fisheries.
The IOTC has also adopted tuna conservation measures that are binding on
Kenya in this regard. Concerning tuna (target species), the IOTC has adopted measures
in respect of fishing capacity, fishing effort, and setting catch limitations. The nontarget species for which IOTC has adopted measures include marine turtles, seabirds
and sharks. Other measures directed at the conservation and management of tuna
include data contribution and sharing, and compliance and enforcement.

6.2.1 Conservation of Target Species
The objective of the Fisheries Act 1989 is “to provide for the development,
management, exploitation, utilisation and conservation of fisheries and for connected
purposes”.6 This statement can be viewed as a reaffirmation to a general commitment to
the conservation of fisheries resources including tuna. The following subsections
discuss and analyse Kenya’s implementation of the conservation and management
measures adopted by IOTC for tuna with a view to determining their consistency with
the international and regional requirements.
3
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6.2.1.1 Management of Fishing Capacity and Fishing Effort
Cunningham and Greboval define management of fishing capacity as “the
implementation of a range of policies and technical measures aimed at ensuring a
desired balance between fishing inputs and production from capture fisheries”.7 Hence,
at the national level, capacity management may be defined as the attempt of a State to
harmonise the harvesting potential of its fleet with the desired level of output from its
fisheries.8 The IOTC requires Kenya to notify to the IOTC Secretariat, the lists of
vessels, by gear type, over 24 meters overall length and over, and under 24 meters if it
fished outside the EEZ.9 It was seen in chapter 1 that Kenya has only two vessels
flagged to it operating in the EEZ.
The FAO Code of Conduct addresses the issue of excess fishing capacity and
states that; “States should prevent overfishing and excess fishing capacity and should
implement management measures to ensure that fishing effort is commensurate with the
productive capacity of the fishery resources and their sustainable utilisation”.10 To
manage fishing capacity in compliance with the FAO Code of Conduct, the FAO has
developed a voluntary International Plan of Action (IPOA). The IOTC recognises the
objectives and principles of the FAO International Plan of Action for the Management
of Fishing Capacity.11 As Kenya has committed to implement the FAO Code of
Conduct,12 and is a contracting Party to the IOTC, Kenya may implement the provisions
of the FAO Code of Conduct in respect of fishing capacity for its tuna fishery.
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Technical Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 409 (FAO, 2001).
8

Yu Huiguo and Yunjun Yu, ‘Fishing Capacity Management in China: Theoretic and Practical
Perspectives’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 351, 351.
9

IOTC, Resolution 09/02, ‘On the Implementation of a Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting
Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties’, para 1.
10
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commensurate with sustainable use of fishery resources as a means of ensuring the effectiveness of
conservation and management measures. In addition, Article 7(7.6.3) States that; “where excess fishing
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sustainable use of fisheries resources….Such measures should include monitoring the capacity of fishing
fleets”.
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Cooperating non-Contracting Parties’; IOTC, Resolution 09/02, ‘On the Implementation of a Limitation
of Fishing Capacity of Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties’.
12

Kenya has been a participant in the relevant meetings concerning the formulation of the Code of
Conduct, including the Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Responsible
Fisheries held in Rome 10-11 March 1999.

205

Fishing capacity is directly related with the terms of access to a fishery. For this
reason, it is necessary to analyse the prevailing access conditions to the fishery in order
to design adequate policies for the management of fishing capacity.13 Capacity
management measures can be categorised into two major groups, namely input controls
and output controls.14 Input controls aim to contain or reduce the level of harvesting
capacity by limiting or reducing the level of inputs deployed to the fishery and may
include; licensing limitations, gear control and restrictions on fishing activity levels.15
Output controls are concerned with limiting the quantity of fish that may be landed and
may include catch quotas or size limits.16
As previously discussed in chapter 5 (5.5.3.1), foreign access to tuna resources
in Kenya’s EEZ is regulated by direct licensing of foreign fishing vessels. Such vessels
in Kenya are required to obtain a fishing vessel license before they participate in any
fishing operations in Kenya fishery waters.17 This is one of the measures in restriction to
the capacity of fleets operating in Kenya’s EEZ. Although Kenya regulates its tuna
fishery through a licensing system, the licenses for foreign vessels are not based on any
parameters (e.g. catch, stock status or vessels size),18 and the level of fishing by the
foreign fleets is unclear.19 License limitations can be used to limit the numbers and size
of vessels that can participate in a fishery.
In Kenya, a tuna fishing licence is granted to all foreign fishing vessels whose
owners submit a request to the Director of Fisheries,20 even though the status of the tuna
stocks is unclear.21 According to the data submitted from the foreign fishing vessels an
13
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Technical Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 409 (FAO, 2004) 2.
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(FAO, 2003) 5.

15
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Perspectives’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 351, 352.
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Johnson Kariuki, ‘Country Review: Kenya’ in ‘Review of the State of World Marine Capture Fisheries
Management: Indian Ocean’, FAO Technical Paper 489 (FAO, 2005).

19

MRAG,
Control
of
Foreign
Fisheries
Policy
Brief:
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/agrotech/ (accessed 7 February 2011).

Kenya

20

(2006).

Johnson Kariuki, Former Assistant Director of Fisheries, Personal communication 12 March 2007.
Many of the foreign fishing vessels are known to be operating in Kenya illegally. See also, Fishery
Country Profile of Kenya at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ (accessed 12 February 2011).

21

Colin Barnes, Business Plan for a National Fisheries Development Institution in Kenya (2005).

206

average of eighty tons of tuna is taken from Kenya’s EEZ annually.22 Although the
fisheries Act requires the Director to specify the period of validity of the foreign fishing
vessel license,23 some of the licenses granted to foreign fishing vessels lack the vital
information for determining the duration of validity.24 The duration of a license is
fundamental in controlling of access to the fishery, and thereby limiting fishing
capacity. The lack of consideration of these conditions may be based on the fact that
licensing of foreign fishing vessels is considered more as a revenue raising tool as
opposed to limiting fishing capacity. The absence of regulatory provisions on such
specific conditions upon which foreign fishing licenses may be issued augments the
difficulty of monitoring the fishing capacity.

6.2.1.1.2 Implementing the International Plan of Action on Fishing Capacity
License limitation alone is not adequate to reduce capacity in Kenya’s EEZ, and
other mechanisms are required to control the rate of increase in capacity.25 In order to
achieve an efficient management of fishing capacity, Kenya may implement the
International Plan of Action on fishing capacity (IPOA-Capacity),26 by developing a
national plan of action (NPOA) to manage fishing capacity. The main objective of the
IPOA-Capacity is for States and regional fisheries organisations to achieve an efficient,
equitable and transparent management of fishing capacity.27 There are two major
actions that Kenya needs to undertake in order to achieve the objectives of the IPOACapacity.
First, Kenya needs to conduct a preliminary assessment of the capacity situation
in its tuna fisheries and the fishing fleets operating in its EEZ, in order to identify the
issues that require management.28 Through such an assessment, Kenya may be able to
identify aspects of the fleets or the tuna fishery where fishing capacity may pose a threat
22

Data and Statistics http://www.iotc.org/ (accessed 22 February 2010).

23
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24
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25
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Marine Capture Fisheries, Rome, 15-18 October 2002.
26
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to the sustainability of its tuna resources. For an assessment exercise to be carried out
effectively, appropriate data on the fishing fleets (e.g. national record of fishing vessels)
and the tuna fishery (e.g. catch and effort data) will be needed. Kenya may need to
prepare immediate actions if the assessments find that the tuna fisheries require urgent
measures.29 Kenya needs to cooperate through the IOTC (regional) and collaborate with
the FAO (international) in similar preliminary assessments of fishing capacity.30
Secondly, Kenya will need to develop and implement a National Plan of Action to
effectively manage fishing capacity in its tuna fishery.31 It is necessary to monitor the
fishing capacity systematically and accurately, in order to identify any imbalances
between capacity and the tuna resources.32 Fishing capacity ought to be balanced with
the available tuna resources. The NPOA is to be monitored and reviewed every four
years in order to enhance its effectiveness.33 Kenya is also required to report to the FAO
on assessment, development and implementation of the NPOA for the management of
fishing capacity biennially.34

6.2.1.1.3 Implementing Total Allowable Catch
Licence limitation may also be complemented with TACs. As demonstrated in
chapter 2(2.4.1), one of the conservation and management obligations under the LOSC
for Kenya to manage the tuna resources in its EEZ, is the determination of the total
allowable catch (TAC).35 The IOTC has not adopted measures regarding quotas or
TAC. However, The TAC is a vital tool employed to limit the commercial exploitation
of fish stocks and may be instrumental in complementing Kenya’s license limitation
efforts in respect of fishing capacity in the tuna fishery. As previously discussed
licenses for foreign fishing vessels in Kenya are not based on any parameters. Thus,
there are no tuna catch limits imposed on these vessels.
Currently, the Fisheries Act does not specifically provide for the determination
of the TAC for the tuna resources within the Kenyan EEZ. However, the Fisheries Act
29
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inherently alludes to the existence of a TAC under section 12(2(a) & (b)) which is
concerned with the licensing of foreign fishing vessels. According to the Fisheries Act,
“the Director may issue a foreign fishing vessel license if he has determined that there
are fishery resources surplus to the Kenya fishing industry which may be harvested
under license;36 and he has determined the quantity of the surplus that may be harvested
and indicates the quantity as a condition of the license”.37 The Fisheries Act further
states that; the Director may grant a license to the owner of a foreign vessel in respect of
which an application has been made if the Director has made findings required by
section 12(2) of the Act.38 The fact that the Director refers to the quantity of the surplus
that a foreign fishing vessel could harvest as a condition of the license presumes that a
harvest level (an allowable catch) has been determined beforehand.
The Fisheries Act further refers to the allowable catch in connection with its
requirement for fishing States to submit a fishing plan. In this respect, the Fisheries Act
states that; “the diplomatic representatives of any State in respect of which the Director
has made an apportionment of the allowable catch for a foreign fishing craft under
section 12(2) of the Act in respect of any fishery in the exclusive economic zone may
from time to time submit to the Director a fishing plan that complies with this
regulation”.39 Additionally, the Fisheries Act requires the fishing plan to outline the
proposals for taking from the Kenyan fishery waters the State’s apportionment,
including an exact number of fishing crafts from that State that will be engaged in
fishing activities in the EEZ.40 The implication of this provision is that, the size of the
fishing fleet licensed to fish in the EEZ will be commensurate with the level of the
apportioned share of the allowable catch.
Another provision of the Fisheries Act which suggests the existence of a TAC is
concerned with quotas. Under Section 33 of the Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft)
Regulations, the diplomatic representative of a fishing State to which an apportionment
has been made is required to notify the Director once the fishing vessels of that State
have fully harvested their allocation of the allowable catch in respect of any fishery in

36
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the EEZ as has been apportioned to the fishing vessels of his State.41 The Fisheries
(Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations further qualify the above provision by adding that
it applies also to specifications limiting the amount of catch and fishing methods in
certain areas.42 Although reference is made to an allowable catch, there is no express
provision under the wording of the current Fisheries Act imposing any catch limits or a
total allowable catch. There are no records either, to indicate that the determination of
TACs takes place in practise.43 To fulfil its international obligation regarding the
determination of TAC, Kenya will need to address this gap in its fisheries legislation.
Kenya could enact legislation or promulgate regulations that provide for the
requirement to determine a TAC for vessels operating in its EEZ. Such a provision
could empower the Minister to determine the allowable catch for designated fisheries
such as tuna. The Fisheries legislation of some States, for example New Zealand has
specific provisions concerning TACs.44 The New Zealand Fisheries Act, empowers the
Minister to set the TAC, and identifies the criteria that should be taken into
consideration when determining the TAC.45 Similarly, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive
Economic Zone Act of Niue, also requires the Cabinet to determine the total allowable
catch by apportioning the catch between Niue fishing vessels and foreign fishing
vessels.46 By determining the TAC and the harvesting capacity, Kenya would be able to
establish the existence of a surplus and consequently allocate the surplus to other States
as required by the LOSC.47
As the Director of Fisheries has the power to impose the conditions of a fishing
license,48 catch and size limits for specific tuna species and gears could be conditions of
the licence. Capacity limits could be made more effective if they are combined with
catch limits. By combining capacity limits with catch limits, this would not only reflect
a limit on the number of vessels that are able to operate in Kenya’s EEZ, but also limit
41
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the catch that they can take. Concerning fishing effort, Kenya is required to ensure that
the efforts of vessels of non-Members of the IOTC harvesting bigeye in its EEZ are
reduced to 1999 levels. At present, Kenya has not met this obligation as it has no
regulations on any of the tuna species.

6.2.1.2 Setting Catch Limits
The IOTC requires Kenya to regulate the catch of bigeye by vessels of CPCs
operating in its EEZ to the levels of catch reported by the Scientific Committee.49
Further, Kenya is required to impose an annual bigeye catch limit of 35,000 tonnes on
Taiwanese vessels operating in its EEZ.50
Kenya has no provisions on tuna catch limits whatsoever. It may be that such
limitations are given as a condition of the licence.

6.2.2 Conservation of Non-Target Species in Tuna Fisheries
As previously discussed in chapter 4 (4.2.1.2), fisheries targeting tuna can result
in the incidental catch and mortality of non-target species caught as bycatch, thereby
having significant ecological and economic implications.51 In chapter 2(2.2), it was seen
that tunas display a strong schooling behaviour at different life stages, during spawning
and also when foraging.52 Such schools which are made up of different species of tuna,
other fishes, marine mammals and birds usually aggregate as multispecies groups,
although tunas are usually the most abundant.53 Other species that associate with tunas,
may not necessarily be members of multispecies aggregations, but they may be
members of the flotsam community or tuna forage.54 These species that either associate
or depend on tuna make up part of the non-target species that may be captured in tuna
49
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50
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fisheries. The relationships in these associations may be predators and prey of tunas or
competitors feeding on the same prey.55
As tuna fisheries involve various gear types, the non-target species associated
with these gears also vary.56 Most purse seine fisheries target yellowfin and skipjack
tunas. The species that are associated with purse seine fisheries include whales which
have some common prey with tunas, such as the flat-head, and birds which usually
escape or avoid the nets.57 Some species dependent on tuna include seabirds and sharks
which prey on young yellowfin.58 Purse seine bycatch in free swimming schools of tuna
and those associated with Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) includes dolphins; sharks;
whales; whale sharks; turtles; other fish species like barracuda, rainbow runner and
triggerfish; and rays.59 The most diverse composition of bycatch in purse seine fisheries
is taken from tuna schools associated with FADs. In longline fisheries for swordfish,
bluefin, southern bluefin and bigeye,60 various non-target fish such as rays, lancetfish,
barracuda and black oil fish; and shark species are caught.61 There may also be
interactions with seabirds such as shearwaters and albatrosses, marine turtles and marine
mammals.62
The conservation of non-target species is an international legal requirement for
EEZ fisheries management. It is a requirement of the LOSC for coastal States to take
into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested
species63 so that their viability is not threatened. It is thus an international legal
requirement for Kenya to adopt conservation and management measures for species
55
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belonging to the same ecosystem or associated or dependent upon tuna stocks.64 These
provisions under international law reflect ecosystem concerns and the need to take into
account the incidence of bycatch and incidental catch in tuna fisheries. For this reason,
fisheries habitats also need to be protected. Not only are the ecosystem concerns
directed at bycatch and discards but also at the degradation of habitats. In accordance
with the management measures of the IOTC, Kenya is under an obligation to adopt
measures in respect of turtles,65 seabirds,66 and sharks.67

6.2.2.1 Marine Turtles
In respect to turtles, Kenya is required to implement appropriate measures
relating to turtles in accordance with the FAO Guidelines to Reduce Sea Turtle
Mortality in Fishing Operations.68 Such measures include sea turtle avoidance methods
through modification of fishing methods and gears in order to reduce sea turtle
interactions in longline and purse seine fisheries.69 The methods employed in longline
fisheries include the use of circle hooks; using fish rather than squid for bait; and setting
hooks deeper than turtle abundant depths (40-100m).70 For purse seine fisheries, turtles
need to be avoided and where they have been entangled, attempts should be made for
their release. Aside from the sea turtle avoidance measures for each of the fishing gears,
operators of tuna fishing vessels are required to maintain a record of incidents involving
marine turtles in their logbooks. Such records include species, location of capture,
conditions, action taken on board and location of release.71 Kenya is also encouraged to
collaborate with the Indian Ocean- South East Asian Marine Turtle Memorandum of
Understanding (IOSEA-MoU),72 and particularly to take into account the IOSEA MoU
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including the provisions of the conservation and management plan in the
implementation of bycatch mitigation measures for marine turtles.73
The Fisheries Act has declared the maritime zones of Kenya a turtle sanctuary.74
It states that no person shall kill any turtle; chase any turtle with intent to kill; take any
turtle alive or dead, including any turtle stranded on land; or harass any turtle so as to
disturb its behaviour or breeding habits.75 The Fisheries Act also requires any turtle
caught or taken unavoidably during fishing to be released immediately into the waters
whether it is alive or dead.76 This requirement is consistent with the IOTC requirement
for bycaught turtles to be released. However, Kenya also needs to provide for the
resuscitation of bycaught turtles as required by the IOTC.77Any person found in
contravention with the regulation on marine turtles is guilty of an offense and is liable to
a fine not exceeding twenty thousand shillings (US$ 248) or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years or both.78
Clearly, the fine imposed on offenders for breach of this provision is very
minimal and has not been adjusted since the law was enacted. The penalty imposed for
such an offence does not reflect the seriousness of the offence, and neither does it
provide an effective deterrent. Further, the enforcement of fisheries legislation in Kenya
is known to be poor, and punishments are very rarely carried out.79 In most cases
culprits are even released without charges.80 Kenya needs to consider the amendment of
the law and the penalties imposed for their violation in order to reflect the importance it
has placed on the conservation of marine turtles.
Kenya has not implemented measures in accordance with the FAO guidelines to
Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in Fishing Operations in respect of tuna fisheries.
South-East Asian region, as well other States concerned to collaborate to conserve and replenish depleted
marine
turtle
populations
for
which
they
share
responsibility.
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However, Kenya is implementing some best practice approaches to minimise threats to
sea turtles through an inclusive national sea turtle conservation programme. This
programme was initiated in 1993 through the Kenya Sea Turtle Conservation
Committee (KESCOM).81 The conservation activities undertaken through KESCOM
include research, increasing public awareness and enhancing public participation in
order to minimise capture of marine turtles at sea by artisanal fishers in gill nets and
their incidental capture by shrimp trawlers.82 As required by the IOTC, Kenya is also a
signatory of the IOSEA-MoU, which is a regional initiative concluded under the
auspices of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of wild
Animals.83 Hence, the best practice approaches that Kenya is implementing in respect of
sea turtles respond to the objective of the ISOEA-MoU to protect, conserve, replenish
and recover marine turtles and their habitats, based on the best scientific evidence taking
into account the environmental, socio-economic and cultural characteristics.84
Although Kenya’s marine turtle conservation and mitigation efforts are not
directed at tuna fisheries, they contribute to the recovery of the marine turtle population
and could provide a foundation for the development of the appropriate mitigation
measures for purse seine and longline fisheries. It is observed that there is a general lack
of detailed information on the magnitude of sea turtle/fisheries interaction, particularly
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in the EEZ.85 Thus the threat to sea turtles from tuna fisheries has not been addressed at
all. It is essential that Kenya identify the magnitude of sea turtle bycatch in tuna
fisheries and the impact of the longline and purse seine fisheries on sea turtles as it is
known that five species of sea turtles occur in Kenyan waters.86 Information on sea
turtle/fisheries interactions may be gathered through the collection of fishery data and
from the fishers themselves. Such an information base is necessary for developing the
appropriate mitigation measures to reduce the impacts on sea turtles in tuna fisheries.
In addition to the provisions of the Fisheries Act, Kenya needs to adopt
mitigation measures as prescribed by the FAO Guidelines. Such mitigation measures
need to provide in detail, the requirements for sea turtle bycatch mitigation for specific
gears including the handling and release techniques and procedures. In respect to
longlines for example, de-hooking devices and line-cutters are being employed by some
States to release sea turtles.87 Kenya could make it a requirement for such equipment to
be carried on board fishing vessels and used by tuna fishing fleets. It will also be
necessary for Kenya to have provisions on the various methods that can be used to
avoid catching turtles in tuna fisheries. For example in longline fisheries, the use of
circle hooks, and using fish as bait instead of squid.88 Another requirement would be for
data on various aspects of sea turtles to be submitted by fishers.
Kenya may develop a marine turtle mitigation plan in which actions can be
identified and strategies outlined for reducing turtle mortality in tuna fisheries. Such a
plan should include training of personnel and fishers alike to raise awareness on
procedures and the effective use of devices employed in respect of the mitigation
measures. Not only should such regulations be developed but they would also need to
be publicised and enforced if the incidental capture of sea turtles is to be effective.
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6.2.2.2 Seabirds
Aside from marine turtles, Kenya is required by the IOTC to implement the
International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds in Longline
Fisheries (IPOA-Seabirds).89 In this regard, Kenya is required to develop a National
Plan of Action (NPOA) for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds in Longline
Fisheries and to employ effective mitigation measures aimed at reducing levels of
seabird bycatch.90 The IPOA-Seabirds is voluntary and has been elaborated within the
framework of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. It applies to States
in the waters of which longline fisheries are being conducted by their own or foreign
vessels and to States that conduct longline fisheries on the high seas and in the EEZs of
other States. Its objective is to reduce the incidental catch of seabirds where it occurs.91
It has been observed that the greatest threat to most seabirds is through being
caught as bycatch in longline fisheries.92 Seabirds get hooked or entangled and drowned
when they attack baited longline hooks.93 Seabirds may also be attracted to vessels
discarding offal which sinks close to the mainline, drawing them close to baited hooks
as they attempt to dive for the offal.94 The most threatened seabirds include species of
albatross and petrels.95 Longline fisheries are known to cause mortality in albatross and
petrels worldwide.96 These two species of seabirds are particularly vulnerable to
89
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increased adult mortality as they are long-lived, and have low reproductive rates.97 It is
not consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable management for fisheries
to take seabirds in large numbers.98 Further, incidental seabird bycatch in longlining
reduces gear efficiency and profitability through the loss of bait.99 The IOTC Area
includes 21% of the breeding distribution of albatrosses. Albatrosses breeding in the
Southern Indian Ocean spend 70-100% of their foraging time within areas overlapping
with IOTC longline fishing effort.100 This makes IOTC one of the most important
RFMOs for albatross distribution.101
At present, Kenya has not met the regional requirements for seabirds, as there
are no measures in place for protecting seabirds in the tuna longline fishery. Further,
there is no information on the bycatch of seabirds for Kenya.102 It is however believed
that, the occurrence of albatross and petrels could be possible in Kenyan waters since
these species occur in the southern Indian Ocean, and that they may be threatened by
longline fishing.103 There are several Taiwanese and Chinese longliners operating in the
Kenyan EEZ.104
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The IPOA-Seabirds enumerates the activities that Kenya is required to undertake
in implementing it. First, Kenya is required to carry out an assessment of the longline
fishery in order to determine the existence, extent and nature of incidental catch of
seabirds.105 Such an assessment may include, inter alia, the analysis of data concerning
fishing fleets (numbers of vessels by size) and fishing techniques (demersal, pelagic,
methods); fishing areas; fishing effort; status of birds in the area; total annual catch of
seabirds; and incidental catch of seabirds monitoring.106 The assessment may also
provide a statement of conclusions and decisions that would assist in developing and
implementing the NPOA-Seabirds.107
Secondly, a National Plan of Action for Reducing the Incidental Catch of
Seabirds (NPOA-Seabirds) should be adopted based on the findings of the
assessment.108 The NPOA may contain the following elements; the NPOA should
prescribe appropriate mitigation methods.109 Such methods should reflect the specific
needs of Kenya’s longline fishery. It may be necessary to combine a number of
mitigation measures in order to make them more effective in meeting the ecological
needs as well as the needs of the fishing industry. The fishing industry for example,
needs to minimise the time spent sorting and damage to their gears. Kenya may adopt
mitigation measures that have been developed to reduce the incidental capture of
seabirds that are already in use. These include increasing the sink weight of bait, bird
scaring lines, and reducing visibility of bait (e.g. night setting).110 The NPOA should
also include plans for research and development aimed at developing the appropriate
devices for seabird deterrence; continuous improvement of technology; and monitoring
and evaluation of the measures.111 In addition the NPOA should include an education
and awareness programme for various individuals and groups including fishers,
managers and conservationists.112 Finally, it will be necessary to incorporate a data
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collection element to collect data on seabird incidental catches and for determining the
performance of the mitigation measures.113
It will be necessary for Kenya’s legislation to provide for the protection of
seabirds, and for Kenya to make it an obligation for tuna vessels fishing in its EEZ to
observe the requirements of the NPOA by amending the Fisheries Act accordingly.
Under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999 of Australia, for example,
the incidental catch of seabirds during oceanic longline fishing operations has been
listed as a key threatening process, and a Threat Abatement Plan for the Incidental
Catch (bycatch) of Seabirds has been established to manage the threat.114 The Threat
Abatement Plan is fulfilling the role of NPOA-Seabirds,115 and aims to significantly
reduce the seabird bycatch to sustainable levels,116 and ultimately achieve a zero catch
of seabirds.117

6.2.2.3 Sharks
Another requirement for non-target species concerns sharks. According to the
IOTC, Kenya is required to minimise the waste in respect of sharks by requiring fishers
to fully utilise their entire catches of sharks.118 Fishing vessels are thus prohibited from
retaining on board, transhipping or landing any fins harvested in contravention to this
resolution.119 In addition, Kenya is under an obligation to impose requirements for the
release of live sharks, especially juveniles and pregnant sharks caught incidentally in
fisheries not directed at sharks.120 Another requirement is for Kenya to implement the
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FAO International Plan of Action for the Conservation of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks).121 The
IPOA-Sharks applies to States in the waters of which sharks are caught by their own or
foreign vessels and to States the vessels of which catch sharks on the high seas.122
Sharks bycatch has been observed in purse seine sets,123 and also in longlines.124
Shark populations are particularly vulnerable to fishing pressure due to their slow
growth rate, late maturity, and low fecundity.125 Based on these characteristics and the
increase in shark exploitation both as bycatch and targeted fisheries, the viability of
sharks has become a worldwide concern.126 Hence, the adoption of the IPOA-Sharks in
1999.127 The objective of the IPOA-Sharks is to ensure the conservation and
management of sharks and their long-term sustainable use.128 States should thus
implement the IPOA by adopting a National Plan of Action for conservation and
management of shark stocks.
At present, Kenya has no provisions concerning sharks. There is a need for
Kenya to adopt NPOA-Sharks in order to meet the requirements of the IOTC regarding
sharks. In meeting the objective of the IPOA-Sharks, Kenya should aim to ensure, inter
alia, the sustainability of catches; assess threats to critical habitats and establish
appropriate management actions; contribute to the protection of management of
biodiversity and ecosystem structure and function; improved data and monitoring of
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sharks; and capacity building.129 Kenya is also required to carry out an assessment on
the effort and yield (physical and economic); status of stocks; existing management
measures and their effectiveness as well as possible modifications. A report on the
findings of such an assessment will need to be written.130 The Shark-Plan for Kenya
should include; the status of the stocks, associated fisheries and management framework
and its enforcement; the objective of the plan; and strategies for achieving such an
objective. Kenya should report on the development, implementation and assessment of
its Shark-plan biennially.131
For Kenya to implement the NPOA-Sharks effectively there is a need to develop
an appropriate institutional, legal and policy framework. Hence, Kenya needs to develop
programmes for education, awareness and capacity building of all stakeholders and to
determine their mandates. Kenya will also need to establish regulatory provisions
concerning the conservation of sharks. Considering the transboundary nature of some
sharks, Kenya will need to cooperate with other States in the region through the IOTC
and other arrangements concerning issues such as conservation, data exchange, fund
raising and research.
The Fisheries Act requires the Director to include as a condition of the foreign
fishing license, the amount of bycatch that may be retained.132 Kenya could strengthen
these measures towards minimising the incidental catch of non-target species by
imposing additional conditions on licenses for fishing vessels requiring them to submit
reports on incidental catches of turtles, sharks, seabirds, and other non-target species.
Such data would support the assessment of the status of bycatch in its tuna fisheries. It
would also facilitate the development of protective measures under the framework of
the IPOAs, in order to ensure the conservation of vulnerable or threatened species and
to minimise the impacts of tuna fisheries on the wider ecosystem, thereby fostering the
integrity of Kenya’s marine ecosystems and enhancing their productivity. To conform
to good practice, the provisions established for these purposes would need to be species
specific, and clearly state Kenya’s ecosystem objectives.
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It would be beneficial for Kenya to formulate a national fisheries bycatch policy
which would provide the necessary framework to minimise the impact of fishing on
non-target species and reduce discards. Such a policy could provide the necessary
strategies for Kenya to address bycatch associated issues such as principles and
approaches to minimising bycacth; guidelines for developing management plans
(including bycatch action plans); designing education and awareness programmes; and
cooperation of various stakeholders. Australia for example, has developed a bycatch
policy which provides a national framework for coordinating efforts to reduce bycatch,
and a benchmark against which the efforts to reduce bycatch can be measured. 133
The ecosystem effects from the incidental mortality of non-target species in tuna
fisheries are a threat to many species. The effective management and reduction of
discards in capture fisheries are still a matter of global concern. FAO recognises that
managing bycatch is an integral component of implementing the ecosystem approach to
fisheries.134 For this reason, the United Nations General Assembly Sustainable Fisheries
Resolution has called for action on bycatch and discards.135 Further, the FAO has
initiated global studies on bycatches and discards on the global scale for tuna purse
seine, longline and small scale fisheries. The development of the International
Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of Discards by FAO is also
underway.136 Such guidelines will be instrumental in advising States on issues
pertaining to inter alia, bycatch management plans, and governance and institutional
frameworks.

6.3 Data Collection and Sharing
Another requirement for the conservation and management of tuna fisheries is
the collection and sharing of data. International fisheries instruments require flag and
coastal States to contribute and exchange scientific information, catch and fishing effort
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statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks.137 There is a further
need to ensure that such data is accurate, detailed and that it is collected and shared in a
timely manner.138 These data may include catch and effort data,139 data on target and
non-target species140 biological data,141 and vessel identification and gear related data.142
It is evident that various kinds of data are required at every stage of decision
making for tuna resources conservation and management. The need to collect and share
data on tuna stocks is clear. Data are needed to make rational decisions, evaluate
fisheries performance in relation to management objectives and fulfil regional
requirements.143 Because of their migratory nature, there are several States in the region
participating in the harvest of tuna stocks. Thus for effective conservation and
management of tuna stocks, there is a need to consider data from various tuna fisheries.
Not only are shared data essential to a transparent decision-making process, but an
educated public can also “serve to marshal the political will needed to resist historical
patterns of overexploitation”.144
The IOTC requires various kinds of data for target and non-target species, to be
submitted by Kenya according to specific timelines,145 and that such data is shared with
other coastal states and flag states fishing for the same stocks. An analysis of
management practices and regulations regarding data in Kenya’s tuna fisheries follows.
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6.3.1 Data on Target Species
According to the IOTC, the essential tuna data to be collected and submitted by
Kenya, fall into three main categories. The first category is the nominal catch data,
comprising the total catch by species and gear for all species under the IOTC
mandate.146 Secondly, catch and effort data for surface fisheries, longline fisheries and
coastal fisheries is to be collected.147 For surface fisheries, catch weight by species and
fishing effort are to be provided, and purse seine data stratified by mode.148 For longline
fisheries the number of hooks deployed should be provided in addition.149 Thirdly, size
data should be provided for all gears and for all species covered by the IOTC mandate,
according to the guidelines set out by the scientific committee.150 The IOTC provides a
logbook template for maintaining a data recording system for purse seine and long line
fishing vessels.151 The IOTC has adopted elaborate measures specifying the format and
timeframe for submission of tuna fisheries data and requires that a standardised logbook
with relevant data be submitted to the flag State and coastal State administration for
onward transmission to the IOTC Secretariat and the Scientific Committee by June 30th
of the following year on an aggregated basis for purse seine and longline fishing
vessels.152 Longline data is to be submitted to the IOTC on 30 December each year.153
In Kenya, one of the conditions that the Director may impose on a fishing
license is the provision of statistical information.154 This is true for both national and
foreign fishing vessels.155 Currently, all tuna data is based on vessels’ logbook
146
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records.156 Thus, every master of a licensed foreign fishing vessel operating in Kenya
fishery waters has to maintain on board the vessel at all times, a fishing log which
should include the following information relating to the activities of the vessels;
methods of fishing used; fishing effort of the vessel in terms of number of hauls of
trawls or seine nets and in the case of the set nets or long lines, the length of netting or
number of hooks set per day; area in which fishing was undertaken; specifics of fish
taken including the quantity and size of fish of each species measured by weight; and
species of fish returned from the vessel into the sea and the quantity.157 Other
requirements include reporting on a weekly basis, to the Director or to the person
designated on the license, the quantity, in kilogrammes, of each species of fish in the
hold; and each species of fish caught since the last port of inspection.158

6.3.2 Data on Non-Target Species
Aside from data directly related to target fish stocks, it is a requirement of
international fisheries instruments to collect and share data on non-target and associated
or dependent species.159 The IOTC obligates Kenya to submit data on numbers of
animals caught for turtles.160 Kenya is further required to report catch and effort data for
sharks and submit such data in accordance with the IOTC data reporting procedures.161
This also includes historical data. Kenya is also obligated to encourage CPCs operating
in its EEZ to collect and voluntarily provide the scientific committee of with data on
incidental catches of seabirds in fisheries under the purview of the IOTC.162
Currently, Kenya’s fisheries laws do not explicitly provide for the collection of
data on turtles, sharks, seabirds or any other non-target species. However, the Fisheries
Act authorises the Director to impose a requirement for the provision of statistical
information on a fishing license.163 Kenya could therefore require the collection and
submission of data for non-target species, particularly those specified by the IOTC.
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6.3.3 Data on Vessel Characteristics
Another data requirement relates to vessel characteristics. A list of vessels larger
than 24 meters in length and operating the IOTC area is to be submitted to the IOTC
with the following information; IOTC number; name and registration number; IMO
number if available; vessel type, length and gross tonnage; main target of species; and
period of authorisation.164 Kenya is under an obligation to ensure the vessels operating
in its EEZ are listed on the IOTC Record of Active Vessels.

6.3.4 Management Practices for Data Collection in Kenya
The collection and management of tuna data is central to the management of
Kenya’s tuna fisheries. Well managed tuna data aids the decision making process which
is fundamental to ensuring the long-term sustainability of tuna resources. The process of
data management involves managing, checking, correcting, securing and storing tuna
fisheries data after they are collected.165 A database system usually facilitates the
management of such data.166 Data management of a tuna fishery may include
registration of data (logsheets, port samplers or observers); manual checks of data
forms; entering data into a database; archiving; and packaging data for onward
transmission to relevant organisation.167 Well managed data ensures its quality, efficient
storage, completeness, and security.168 Thus, data collection systems need to be
supported with good data management.
As earlier discussed, Kenya’s tuna data is obtained from logbook recoveries.
These data are submitted to the Ministry of Fisheries Development where they are
processed and analysed. Kenya is also implementing a port sampling programme in
respect of purse seine vessels.169 Port sampling is a convenient and cost-effective
method for obtaining quantities of species and size composition data (lengths of
164
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individual fish) for stock assessment and also for the determination of annual catch
estimates.170 Port sampling data can also provide independent verification of fisheries
data supplied in logsheets.171 Kenya’s port sampling programme has however been
hampered by the low numbers of purse seine coming to port and lack of personnel.172
The logbook returns from foreign fishing fleets in Kenya are however very poor,
as these vessels hardly report their catches to national authorities.173 It has been
observed by some non-governmental organisations that the reluctance of foreign fishing
vessels to divulge their catches is compounding the challenges of fishery data collection
and recording.174 It is quite possible that logbook data are also unverified. According to
fisheries reports, inspection and verification of logsheets has only been carried out for
the Kenyan flagged longliner.175
As the foreign fleets land and process the majority of the tuna catches taken
from Kenya’s EEZ in foreign ports,176 the data for such catches is not reflected in the
logbooks. The catch landed in foreign ports is not likely to be reported to the IOTC as
having originated from Kenya. If Spain for example, lands the catch obtained from the
Kenyan EEZ in the EU, it shall not be reported to the IOTC as Kenyan catch. The
implication is that, the logbook data does not provide a true picture of the actual
amounts of tuna caught in Kenya’s EEZ. This is further compounded by the activities of
illegal fishing vessels.177 These uncertainties in tuna data are reflected by the nominal
catch reports submitted to the IOTC as seen in Figure 6.
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with deteriorating global level productivity, forcing majority of producers to incur
higher fishing costs while the global catch has remained stagnant.180 The average length
of high seas tuna vessels which mainly target yellowfin and skipjack tunas is 70-80
meters and these vessels carry about 1,000 to 1,500 tonnes of frozen tuna.181 It is
therefore not realistic for such a vessel to operate profitably with an annual catch of
only 80 tonnes. There may be two reasons for this kind of data reports. One is that the
DWFNs may be misreporting data. The second reason in that there are deficiencies in
Kenya’s statistical system. Both these issues have been previously pointed out as being
instrumental in the constraints for data collection in Kenya.
In order to improve data reporting from DWFNs, the government is
contemplating imposing a requirement for foreign vessels fishing in Kenya’s EEZ to
land their catches at Kenyan ports, and to pay royalties for such catches.182 Such a
requirement will have to be preceded by infrastructure enhancement, particularly in the
port area, to develop facilities for handling fishing vessels as will be discussed in
chapter 7. Many developing States in the Western Indian Ocean lack robust data
collection and data management systems.183 They also lack personnel with expertise and
financial resources to establish such systems, thereby jeopardising the quality of
fisheries data.184 The quality of such data is expected to allow for statistically
meaningful analysis in order to achieve conservation and management objectives of the
tuna fishery.185 It is therefore critical for Kenya to implement a reliable data
management system for tuna that can aid in decision making.
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6.3.5 Deficiencies in Kenya’s Tuna Fishery Data and Gaps in the Fisheries
Regulations
As previously discussed, the IOTC obligates Kenya to submit specific types of
tuna fishery data to the secretariat within a designated period and in the required format.
Kenya has a number of data deficiencies in relation to incompleteness, lateness in
provision to the IOTC, and poor quality.
According to the IOTC, the catch data submitted by Kenya was found to be of
poor quality. The data from Kenya does not meet the IOTC requirements in terms of
both quality and detail, as they lack essential fishery information. The data are also not
submitted in a timely manner as required by the IOTC. On many occasions, Kenya has
been late in submitting data reports. At other times these data have not been submitted
at all completely,186 thus creating gaps in the IOTC fisheries data and affecting the
quality of stock assessments. Late reports compromise the validation, verification and
utility of data, particularly when such data are submitted close to or during Working
Party meetings.187 Poor and late reporting of data by DWFNs probably contributes to
the delays and poor quality of data in Kenya. Even so, Kenya’s statistical system was
among those that were unable to produce reliable estimates of catches from 1950 to
date. A recommendation of the IOTC is for Kenya to implement new data collection
systems or strengthen the existing ones.188
These deficiencies need to be addressed if Kenya is to fulfil its reporting
requirements in accordance with the IOTC. There is a need for Kenya to develop an
efficient data system that would aid in improving the accuracy of tuna fisheries data, to
enable national and regional stock assessments. It will be necessary for Kenya to
develop and implement an effective logbook system and the means to validate catch
data. In order for Kenya to meet the data requirements of the IOTC, priority also needs
to be given to long-term capacity building needs for data collection. Capacity will be
needed in areas such as; data collection methods; international data requirements;
managing the database system; reporting; and data security.189
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There are various opportunities that arise as a result of Kenya’s cooperation
through the IOTC for the conservation and sustainable utilisation of tuna resources. By
cooperating through the IOTC, Kenya can access data on tuna fisheries resources in the
region, receive management advice and training, and participate in decision making on
issues concerning conservation and management of tuna resources. Such cooperation
improves Kenya’s capabilities to utilise its tuna resources more sustainably and enables
Kenya to be represented in the IOTC.
In respect to its obligations, Kenya has not fully given effect to the international
and regional requirements for data collecting and sharing in its fisheries laws and
regulations. There are a number of weaknesses that inhibit the effectiveness of the
measures it has adopted in this respect. One major weakness relates to the provision for
timely and accurate reporting of the catch. The Fisheries Act fails to provide for the
timely and accurate reporting of the catch as required by international fisheries
instruments and the IOTC. Accurate and timely reporting of catch are critical to
monitoring of the fish catch. Such a provision could be imposed as a condition of the
fishing vessels license. There is a need for the Fisheries Act to be more stringent in this
regard especially because, despite the conditions imposed on the fishing vessel license
by the Fisheries Act requiring submission of catch data, Kenya is among the State
Parties that fail to fully fulfil the data reporting obligations on timeliness imposed by the
IOTC. An additional gap in Kenya’s data regulations for non-target species is that, the
Fisheries Act does not specifically address data reporting requirements for seabirds and
sharks as required by the IOTC.
To comply with international and regional data reporting requirements, Kenya’s
fisheries regulations on data reporting need to be more explicit. The obligations relating
to timeliness, accuracy and quality of data will need to be more precise. The same data
requirement applies to specific species, and especially non-target species for which
Kenya is obligated under the IOTC to provide catch reporting measures. The fisheries
regulations for example, may require the reporting of catch data with respect to specific
species. It will also be necessary for the fisheries regulations to specify timeframes for
the provision of such data. These timeframes need to be synchronised with the IOTC
timeframe for submission of data in order to ensure that Kenya submits its tuna fisheries
data in a timely manner. Foreign fishing vessels could be required to report accurate
tuna fisheries data promptly, a few months before the due date for the IOTC data. The
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late provision of such catch returns could be prescribed as an infringement offense.
Kenya could impose legal sanctions or financial penalties to deter such delays.
Fisheries data underpins and sustains the management framework of Kenya’s
tuna fisheries. The maintenance of data quality, timeliness and completeness of data
reporting is therefore fundamental to the effective conservation and management of
Kenya’s tuna fisheries. Kenya should make it a priority to obtain the right data in order
to assess the tuna fisheries resources available as a first step towards the conservation
and management of its tuna resources. Without proper knowledge of its tuna stocks it is
extremely difficult for Kenya to determine quantities of fish to be harvested and hence
the numbers of fishing vessels to licence. For any country to sell fishing rights to a
DWFN they have to base their decisions on sufficient knowledge of fish stocks and
their sustainability.190

6.4 Compliance and Enforcement
The effectiveness of the conservation and management measures adopted by
Kenya in respect of its tuna resources depends on compliance by fishing vessels. The
enforcement of such measures is also vital for Kenya to meet its management
objectives. To ensure that flag States take responsibility of vessels flying their flags,
Kenya is required to establish a compliance and enforcement regime that would aid in
promoting the sustainability of its tuna resources.191 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement
provides for the reinforcement of flag State duties concerning control over fishing
vessels and also provides mechanisms for compliance control including enforcement by
flag States and port States.192

Thus, Kenya as a port State also has obligations

concerning vessels entering its ports with catches of tuna. Compliance and enforcementrelated measures relevant to tuna fisheries have been categorised broadly under flag
States duties, port State measures, and monitoring, control and surveillance.
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6.4.1 Flag State Duties
A flag State in relation to a fishing vessel, is the State under whose laws the
fishing vessel is registered or licensed.193

Under international law, States have a

responsibility over the activities of vessels flying their flag. As Kenya has two tuna
fishing vessels flagged to it, Kenya is under a duty to control the activities of such
vessels and to ensure compliance by these vessels with the tuna management measures
of the IOTC.194
One of the requirements of the IOTC concerning flag States is for members to
establish and maintain a record of vessels that are authorised to fish for tuna and tunalike species in the IOTC Area.195 These vessels are referred to as AFVs. Not only are
such records instrumental in monitoring the activities of fishing vessels but they also aid
in determining the fishing capacity. The record of AFVs should include information on
the history of the vessels regarding non-compliance.196 Fishing vessels must also be
required to carry on board documents issued and certified by the competent authority in
respect of authorisation to fish, vessel name, port in which registered and number of
registration, international call sign, names and addresses of owner, length and engine
power of vessel.197 The vessels and gear should also be appropriately marked,198and
carry a bound fishing logbook.199
The Fisheries Act does not require a record of authorised fishing vessels to be
created. Neither does the Act associate fishing vessel registration with the authorisation
to fish. The requirement in Kenya’s fisheries laws for ship masters to maintain a ship’s
log when operating in Kenyan waters200 is directed towards foreign fishing vessels only.
However, in practice logbook data has been recovered from the single operational
Kenyan fishing vessel since 2007.201 Therefore, the reason for the omission in Kenya’s
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fisheries laws regarding the log requirement for Kenyan-flagged vessels may lie with
the fact that Kenya has only recently acquired the fishing vessel. The laws have not
been amended to accommodate this fact.
Regardless of the vessel being a very recent acquisition, Kenya has a
commitment to implement the relevant requirements as a flag State. It is necessary for
Kenya to adopt laws and regulations that are consistent with the IOTC’s requirement to
establish and maintain a record of fishing vessels. Kenya has met its obligation to
provide the IOTC with the national record of fishing vessels. In this regard, two
longliners are registered as authorized fishing vessels with the IOTC,202 although only
one longliner is reported to be operational.203 Kenya has also met the requirement of the
IOTC to supply the following; registration number; international call sign; names and
addresses of owners; and engine power of vessel.
Although Kenya has rightfully registered its fishing vessels on the AFV list of
the IOTC, it will be necessary for Kenya to provide for the establishment of a record of
vessels that are authorised to fish for tuna and tuna-like species operating in its EEZ and
in the IOTC area. The Fisheries Act requires all licensed foreign fishing vessels while in
Kenya’s fishery waters to report to the Director the name, call sign and country of
registration of the vessel. Kenyan-flagged vessels are however not addressed and this
amendment will be necessary in order for Kenya to meet the IOTC requirements.204
Kenya’s legal rules will also need to state clearly that, fishing vessels not entered in the
record of fishing vessels are not authorised to fish for, retain on board, tranship or land
tuna and tuna-like species. The record of fishing vessels ought to contain the history of
the vessel’s fishing activities including IUU fishing activities. It is recommended that
the fishing vessels be required to be marked appropriately in conformity with
international standards such as the FAO Standard Specifications for the Marking and
Identification of Fishing Vessels.205 This is a standard system of identifying fishing
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vessels operating or likely to operate, in waters of States other than those of the flag
State.206 The specifications can be adopted by States on a voluntary basis.207

6.4.2 Port State Measures
“Port State measures are requirements established or interventions undertaken
by port States which a foreign fishing vessel must comply with or is subjected to as a
condition for use within the port State”.208 There is a growing reliance on port States to
combat non-sustainable fishing practices, especially due to the failure of flag States to
effectively control fishing operations carried out by vessels carrying their flags.209
Enhanced Port State control has increasingly become an important tool for combating
IUU fishing activities.210 IUU fishing leads to loss in economic benefits, creates
environmental damage through the use of unsustainable fishing practices, and has
consequences for food security.211
One of the compliance control mechanisms for the conservation and
management of tuna is strengthened enforcement by port States. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement provides the right and duty of a port State to take measures to promote the
effectiveness of [RFMO] conservation and management measures.212 Thus, Kenya has a
right to take measures to ensure compliance by tuna fishing vessels in relation to port
access by adopting measures in accordance with the IOTC. Kenya also has a duty to
take measures to promote the effectiveness of the IOTC conservation and management
measures, as it has discretion over fishing vessels calling into its ports.213
According to the IOTC, Kenya may inspect documents, fishing gear and tuna
catches on board fishing vessels, when such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its

206

FAO, The Standard Specifications for the Marking and identification of Fishing Vessels (FAO, 1989)

1.
207

Ibid.

208

Database on Port State Measures. http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en (accessed 20 February 2010).

209

Ibid.

210

Adriana Fabra, Virginin Gascon and Rodolfo Werner, ‘The Use of Port State Measures to Improve
Fisheries Compliance: Issues and Instruments, http://www.illegal-fishing.info/ (accessed 20 February
2010); Database on Port State Measures. http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en (accessed 20 February 2010).

211

Agnew et al, ‘Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing’ (2009) 4(2), PLoS ONE.

212

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 23(1).

213

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 23 (1).

236

offshore terminals.214 Landings or transhipments from such vessels should be prohibited
if it is established that they have violated the conservation and management measures
adopted by the IOTC.215 In the event of incidences of violation by foreign vessels as a
result of port inspections, the flag States and the IOTC are to be notified.216 The other
port State measures which Kenya must implement are specifically directed at
preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing.217 These measures relate to entry into
port; use of ports; inspections and follow up action; role of the flag State; and
requirements of developing States.

6.4.2.1 Entry into Port
Concerning entry into port, Kenya is required to implement measures in respect
of advance request for port entry, designation of ports, decision making on port entry
and issuing of authorisation or denial.218 The ports to which vessels may request for
entry must be publicized and a list of these provided to the IOTC. Such ports must have
sufficient capacity to conduct inspections.219 In respect to port entry, Kenya is to require
information concerning vessels to be submitted at least 24 hours prior to granting entry
of such vessels to its ports.220 This includes, inter alia, intended port of call, port State,
date and time of arrival, port and date of last port call, name of the vessel, flag State,
type of vessel, international call sign, vessels owners, IMO identity, vessels dimensions,
fishing authorisations, and transhipment authorizations.221
Based on this information port entry may be granted or denied after determining
its involvement in IUU fishing activities.222 Vessels are to be denied entry into port if it
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is found that they have engaged in IUU fishing activities.223 Exceptions may be made in
cases where there is a need to inspect the vessel in order to take appropriate action in
conformity with international law.224 Otherwise such vessels should be denied the use of
Kenya’s ports for landing, transhipping, packaging, and processing for fish and for other
port services such as refuelling, resupplying, maintenance and dry docking.225

6.4.2.2. Use of Ports
In respect of the use of ports, a vessel may be denied the use of Kenya’s ports
for the following reasons; if it does not have a valid authorization to fish as required by
its flag State;226 if it does not have authorisation to fish as required by Kenya in respect
of areas under national jurisdiction;227 if the fish on board was taken in contravention of
Kenya’s requirements in respect of areas under its jurisdiction;228 and if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was engaged in IUU related activities.229
Nevertheless, a vessel shall not be denied the use of port services essential to the
health or safety of the crew or safety of the vessel if these needs are duly proven,230 or
for scrapping of the vessel.231 The decisions made regarding the denial of the use of
ports or port entry should be communicated to the flag State.

6.4.2.3 Inspections and Follow-Up Actions
Following decisions on port entry and use of ports, Kenya is required to carry
out inspections of fishing vessels calling into its ports. Inspections should be carried out
for at least 5% of landings or transhipments in Kenya’s ports annually.232 Such
inspections shall involve the monitoring of the entire discharge or transhipment and
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ascertaining the quantities by species landed or transhipped.233 The functions to be
carried out by inspectors include; verification of vessel identification documentation and
information relating to the owner;234 vessel’s flag and markings (e.g. name and IMO
identification number);235 authorisations of fishing; review all documentation and
records held onboard the vessel including electronic and VMS data;236 examine fishing
gear;237 and fish.238
Inspections of vessels in port are to be carried out by qualified inspectors
authorized for that purpose.239 In this respect, the training programme for inspectors
may include the following elements; ethics; health safety and security issues; relevant
national laws and regulations, international law and conservation and management
measures of the IOTC; collection, evaluation and preservation of evidence; report
writing and interview techniques; analysis of information such as logbooks and
electronic documentation; vessel boarding and inspection; verification and validation of
information related to landing, transhipment and processing; and identification of fish
species, vessels and gears.240
The inspectors are to identify themselves to the master of the vessel prior to an
inspection,241 and inspect all relevant areas of the vessel relevant to verifying
compliance with relevant conservation and management measures.242 The master of the
vessels should be required to cooperate in submitting all relevant information to the
inspectors.243 The written report of the results of an inspection shall include details on,
inter alia, the inspecting authority; port of inspection; name of principal inspector;
commencement and completion of inspection; confirmation of advanced notification;
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vessel name; flag State; type of vessel; port of registry; and vessel owner.244 Such a
report shall be transmitted to the relevant parties within a period of three full working
days including the master of the vessel, the flag States and the IOTC secretariat.245
Where, following inspections a vessel is confirmed to have engaged in IUU
fishing activities, the flag State, the IOTC and other relevant organisations should be
notified.246 Such a vessel is to be denied the use of Kenya’s ports in a manner consistent
with the IOTC conservation and management measures.247 Kenya is required to
maintain information on recource and avail it to the relevant parties whenever
necessary.248

6.4.2.4 Role of Kenya as a Flag State
According to the IOTC, Kenyan-flagged vessels are required to cooperate with
port State inspections.249 In the event that such a vessel is believed to have been
engaged in IUU activities and is seeking entry to or is in the port of another State,
Kenya should request that State to carry out an inspection as appropriate and take other
measures consistent with the IOTC requirements.250 Kenyan-flagged vessels should be
encouraged to tranship, package, and process fish and use other port services in ports
that are in accordance with the IOTC requirements.251
Where following an Inspection, a report is submitted to Kenya indicating that a
Kenya-flagged vessel is believed to have engaged in IUU fishing activities, such a
matter shall be immediately and fully investigated and upon sufficient evidence,
enforcement action should be taken in accordance with Kenya’s laws and regulations.252
A report on the action taken in respect of a Kenyan-flagged vessel which has been
determined to have engaged in IUU activities should be made available to other relevant
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States, port States and the IOTC.253 Kenya has a duty of ensuring that the measures
applied to fishing vessels flying its flag are effective in preventing, deterring and
eliminating IUU fishing activities.254 Kenya is also required to cooperate with other
States through the IOTC to establish appropriate funding mechanisms to support
developing States in implementing the requirements of the IOTC.255 Such funding
mechanisms shall be directed towards enhancing capacity in areas such as MCS, port
managers, inspectors, and enforcement and legal personnel,256 and MCS and
compliance activities relevant to port States measures.257
The Fisheries Act of Kenya has very limited provisions relating to port State
measures. According to the Fisheries Act, a vessel wishing to enter a Kenyan port after
it has been given clearance to fish in the EEZ is required to notify the Director not less
than twenty-four hours before its intended entry.258 Such a vessel should also provide
the name, call sign, and flag State of the craft; the intended port of entry; and the
purpose of the intended entry.259 Every vessel that has been authorised to enter a
Kenyan port is required to proceed directly and immediately to an inspection port.260
The port entry requirement under the Fisheries Act, for fishing vessels to make
an advance request of port entry is consistent with Resolution 10/11 of the IOTC.261
However, contrary to the IOTC requirements, the Fisheries Act does not fully provide
the relevant vessel identification information to be given prior to entry into port. The
omissions include date and time of arrival, date of last port call, name of the vessel, type
of vessel, vessels owners, IMO identity, vessels dimensions, fishing authorisations, and
transhipment authorisations. Further, the terms and conditions for decision making in
respect of port entry and what would constitute denial of entry are not provided, nor
have conditions for the use of ports been provided as required by the IOTC.262 There are
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no regulations on the inspection of vessels in port and the procedures to be followed
during such inspections. Similarly the procedures for handling Kenyan-flagged vessels
when in port are not provided.
Consistent with this measure, Kenya may further provide the conditions that
could lead to denying port entry to both foreign and Kenyan-flagged fishing vessels. For
example, fishing vessels may be required to provide information detailing their fishing
trips in order to ascertain that their fishing activities are compliant with Kenya’s
national requirements. The IOTC resolution on Port State measures was adopted very
recently in March 2010 during the Fourteenth Session.263 It is therefore a very new
development and also quite detailed to most of the Indian Ocean States including
Kenya. The implementation of this measure by Kenya may therefore take a while.
In order to regulate the activities of vessels within its EEZ and the IOTC Area,
there is a need for adequate enforcement action against vessels that carry out fishing
activities that are not in accordance with the conservation and management measures
adopted by the IOTC, and by Kenya. For Kenya’s regulations as a port State to take
effect there is a need for enforcement mechanisms to be instituted and the appropriate
enforcement provisions established to empower authorised officers to execute their
duties. It would be beneficial for Kenya to adopt enforcement measures to ensure
compliance with its regulations for port State control. Such measures would include
requirements related to control of port entry and port services, control of fish landing,
processing and transhipment, the use of designated ports, documentation, and port
inspection. Kenya may impose penalties for breach of these regulations or deny port
access to fishing vessels that are non-compliant. In addition to the requirement for
foreign fishing vessels to comply with the relevant management measures, Kenya may
also require the owners of these vessels to cooperate in enforcement of conservation and
management measures for tuna. Finally, Kenya may sign the FAO Port State Measures
Agreement as indicative of international good practice.
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6.4.3 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Measures
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) is an integral component of tuna
fisheries management.264 Robust national MCS systems are essential elements for
improving compliance.265 Such systems are used to collect information on the fishery
and fishers concerning, inter alia, fishing vessels and gear, type and amount of catch,
where fish are caught, and what happens to them after they are caught.266 This
information can aid in the setting and monitoring of the rules of the fishery,267 as it is
utilised in combination with surveillance of fishing vessels, to deter fishers who violate
the rules of the fishery or to apprehend and punish them if they still do so.268 Effective
MCS programmes presume that States are willing, and capable, of exercising effective
control over their vessels, and that flag States participating in international fisheries will
take measures to ensure that their vessels comply with the relevant international
instruments and the management arrangements in a particular fishery.269
Among the international requirements related to compliance and enforcement
with respect to tuna resources in the EEZ, is the development of national legal systems
that govern fisheries control.270 In this regard Kenya is obliged to establish an
enforceable national regulatory framework that provides directions for MCS, to ensure
the effective control of the fishing activities in its EEZ, including compliance with its
laws and regulations. Such MCS measures include a vessel monitoring system
(VMS),271 an observer scheme,272 and a boarding and inspection scheme.273
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6.4.3.1 Vessel Monitoring Systems
A fishing vessel monitoring system is a programme of fisheries surveillance
which provides information on the vessels’ position and activity.274 The use of VMS is
being increasingly adopted by States worldwide as a tool that can be used in the
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of fishing vessels to enhance compliance.275 VMS
allows the transmission of catch and effort data from fishing vessels to a monitoring
agency in real time.276 Hence, catch data entered and transmitted at sea after a fishing
operation commits the vessel operator to a specific estimate of catch without the
knowledge of whether the vessels will be inspected at sea or at the point of landing.277
This is very instrumental for catch declarations. Other data that may be transmitted by
VMS may relate to notification for port entry, distress, or information concerning the
activities of other vessels.278 For a VMS to be useful, the vessel must be licensed and
fitted with the relevant equipment.279
The implementation of a VMS is an international requirement.280 The IOTC also
requires Kenya to install a satellite-based VMS for vessels greater than 15metres in
length,281 and to collect information regarding vessel identification, current
geographical position of the vessel and the date and time of the fixing of the position of
the vessel.282 This measure can also be applied to other vessels of different sizes if it is
deemed necessary.283 Further, the land-based national Fisheries Monitoring Centre
should be able to receive all relevant information through the VMS and also be
equipped for automatic data processing and electronic data transmission.284
On the basis of the Kenyan Fisheries (Foreign Fishing) Regulations, foreign
fishing vessels are required to install and maintain in working order, a transponder and
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navigation equipment installed for purposes of identification and location of the
vessel.285 There are however no provisions for Kenyan-flagged vessels in respect of
VMS. Nevertheless, Kenya is implementing a vessel monitoring system which
commenced in 2009.286 The objective of the VMS in Kenya is to gather fisheries data
and also to monitor the activities of foreign fishing vessels to ensure compliance and
deter illegal fishing activities by such vessels.287 For Kenya to achieve its purpose for
implementing a VMS, it would need to adopt measures that would provide a mechanism
to enforce its national regulations such as revoking or suspending a foreign fishing
vessel license at any time for failure to comply with the provisions of the Fisheries Act,
its regulations, or management measures, or conditions of the license.

6.4.3.2 Observer Programmes
The implementation of an observer programme is a requirement under
international fisheries instruments.288 The requirement for observers on board foreign
fishing vessels is very significant for accurate data collection from industrial tuna fleets.
An observer program is one of the least costly or restrictive of the operations of
industrial fishing fleets.289 Under the LOSC, one of the conditions that States can
establish in its laws and regulations which should be met by DWFNs participating in
tuna fisheries in its EEZ is the placing of observers on board such vessels.290 The IOTC
requires vessels fishing for tuna to be covered by the observer scheme, and that the
minimum level of coverage to be met.291 Such observers are to be facilitated in their
work in order to execute their duties competently and in a safe manner.292
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The requirement to take on board observers is a condition of the fishing license
according to the Kenyan Fisheries (Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations.293 This
requirement is consistent with the IOTC requirement for tuna fishing vessels to be
covered by an observer scheme. The Regulations state that the Director may assign an
observer to any foreign fishing craft.294 The master of the fishing vessel to which an
observer has been assigned is also required to avail the vessel at designated places and
times for purposes of embarking and disembarking the observer.295 The observer should
also be accommodated and fed according to the standards provided to the officers of the
fishing craft;296 have access to utilise communications equipment and personnel;297 and
be accorded reasonable assistance to enable him/her to carry out his/her duties while
aboard the fishing vessel.298 These requirements are consistent with the IOTC measures
provided by resolution 10/04.
Although the provisions for the implementation of a national observer
programme are in place for foreign fishing vessels, the Fisheries Act does not provide
for national observers. Further, Kenya is not implementing this programme yet.299 The
implementation of such a program is hampered by logistical problems stemming from
the duration of fishing vessels at sea which makes it difficult for observers to disembark
whenever they need to be replaced.300 Generally, it is expensive to deploy observers.301
Such an expense may be prohibitive for Kenya and it may be a reason for Kenya not to
implement an observer programme. Kenya is however considering the implementation
of a regional observer program being initiated by the Western Indian Ocean coastal
States which include Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Mozambique.302
An observer scheme if implemented would provide much needed data essential for the
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sustainable management of tuna fisheries and it would also aid in monitoring the
practice of foreign fishing vessels operating in Kenya’s EEZ, with a view to promote
compliance.
Observers require specialist training to enable them to collect and verify tuna
fisheries data on catches of both target and non-target species, fishing effort, catch
composition and report on compliance with Kenya’s fisheries regulations. The lack of
knowledge and technical expertise necessary to implement the observer scheme might
be a major reason why Kenya is yet to put it in practise. The calibre of the observers
placed on board fishing vessels is fundamental to the success of any observer
programme.303 Proper training and good standards of ethics are essential. It is thus
important to create a structure, training and monitoring system that encourages superior
performance and rewards observers since they mostly work in an unsupervised
capacity.304 In addition to the existing legal authority to place observers on board
foreign fishing vessels participating in its tuna fisheries, Kenya may develop a more
elaborate scheme in order to implement an effective observer programme. The
implementation of such a scheme requires Kenya to adopt specific and appropriate
measures on the role of the observer. It will also be necessary for the fisheries laws to
provide for national observes.
An effective observer scheme would state the specific activity to be carried out
by the observers including their level of authority (enforcement powers) and duties.
Such a scheme would also state the nature of information to be collected by the observer
and the terms of their appointment including the conditions under which observers may
operate. The conditions would include for example, the responsibility of the vessel
owner towards the observer-like feeding, insurance, safety, remuneration and travel
expenses. When functions of the observer are backed by legislation it becomes easier to
deal with any conflicts that may arise between the captain and the observer.305 It may
also be necessary to state the authority responsible for the appointment of observers.
Failure to do so may result in an inappropriate choice made just to fulfil a legal
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obligation.306 This may defeat the purpose of the observer programme in the event of a
wrong choice being made. Kenya may include these details in its fisheries regulations.
Kenya’s fisheries laws and regulations may also need to provide for the
implementation of a protocol concerning the engagement of observers. For example, the
authority responsible for the deployment of observers would need to give the vessel
operator a notice of intention before the observer is placed on the fishing vessel. The
Fisheries Act prohibits the obstruction of any authorized officer in the exercise of the
powers conferred on him.307 This may include the role played by observers. However
observers are not listed as “authorised officers”. As an additional measure Kenya’s
observer scheme may also impose conditions relating to the safety of observers while on
board fishing vessels and penalties for non-compliance to these terms.

6.4.3.3 Regulating Transhipment
International law provides the right for Kenya to adopt regulations that enable
the prohibition of transhipments where it has been established that the catch has been
taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of the IOTC conservation and
management measures on the high seas.308 Kenya may also verify data from
transhipment reports.309 The IOTC restricts transhipments in the IOTC Area and
establishes conditions for at-sea transhipments such as flag States authorisation310 and
regional observer programme.311 Except for large scale tuna vessels that participate in
the IOTC regional observer programme which can authorise transhipments at sea, the
IOTC also requires the transhipment activities of tuna and tuna-like species to take
place in port.312 Further, the IOTC prohibits the transhipment of fish if it is established
through inspection that the vessel has undermined IOTC conservation and management
measures.313
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In Kenya, the transhipment of fish at sea is prohibited. According to the
Fisheries Act, the transhipment of fish can only be carried out from a foreign fishing
vessel to another vessel at designated ports, and at a time authorised for the purpose by
the Director, and in accordance with such conditions as the Director may specify.314
Aside from the Director, an authorised officer may also provide directions for
transhipment.315 Transhipment of tuna in Kenya is carried out at the port of Mombasa,
mainly to supply the tuna processing plant. For Kenya’s national regulations in respect
of transhipment to be effective, it is necessary for violations to be detected, in order for
enforcement action against fishing vessels to be applied. However, Kenya’s fisheries
surveillance capability is limited,316making it difficult to detect violations that may
occur at sea. It is highly likely that transhipments at-sea go undetected. Kenya needs to
make it a priority to establish a national surveillance program if it is to effectively
monitor the activities of fishing vessels operating in its EEZ.
In as much as Kenya has enacted laws on transhipment as required by the IOTC,
the regulations do not provide any restrictive or punitive measures in the event of noncompliance to Kenya’s fisheries laws and regulations. Another gap in Kenya’s fisheries
regulations in respect of transhipment is concerned with the prohibition of transhipment
by tuna fishing vessels found to be in violation of its conservation and management
measures. There remains a need for Kenya’s fisheries regulations on transhipment to
include measures for deterrence and punitive purposes if they are to be effective.

6.4.4 Challenges of Enforcement
By establishing its EEZ under the LOSC, Kenya has not only been confronted
with challenges in realising its opportunities and the management responsibilities for the
tuna resources in such a vast fishing zone, but it is also challenged by the enforcement
of its jurisdiction in the EEZ. Kenya has made efforts to fulfil its conservation duties in
the EEZ by implementing fisheries conservation and management measures. However,
it has limited capacity and the capabilities to enforce the measures that have been
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implemented so far. Kenya is challenged by its limited MCS capabilities.317 This is
because Kenya lacks the financial, institutional and technical resources with which to
monitor its tuna resources. As a result, the Kenyan EEZ is highly unregulated,318 and
Kenya can neither control the activities of licensed foreign fishing vessels nor curtail the
illegal fishing activities in its EEZ. Thus, it becomes difficult to detect, intercept and
prosecute foreign fishing vessels operating in the EEZ, which might be in violation of
the Kenyan fisheries regulations.
The control of foreign fishing vessels operating in the Kenyan EEZ is dependent
on good faith and self-reporting.319 Since these vessels hardly ever report catches to
national authorities, there is little information on species composition, quantities of
catches taken by commercial operators, sources and the exact time of capture of those
catches.320 Further, the Department of Fisheries is only able to license those foreign
fishing vessels whose owners put forward their request for a fishing license.321 Hence, a
number of foreign fishing vessels operating in Kenya’s EEZ are unlicensed. There is a
need for Kenya to solicit the necessary support required to build its technical and
financial capacity and to enhance its capabilities in monitoring, control and surveillance
in order to meet its international and regional obligations in respect of compliance and
enforcement.
Regardless of its legislative and enforcement challenges, Kenya has an
obligation under the LOSC to avail to third States, the surplus tuna resources in its EEZ
which it had no capacity to harvest.322 Thus, Kenya could utilise the tuna resources in its
EEZ and increase the economic benefits derived from them by establishing a fisheries
development programme. Through such a programme strategies to develop its tuna
fisheries could be formulated.
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6.5 Issues Associated with Kenya’s Participation in the IOTC
As a member of the IOTC, Kenya participates in both the regular and technical
meetings and also makes its financial contributions.323 Except for the Twelfth Session of
the IOTC, Kenya has consistently attended the annual regular meetings of the IOTC
since the ninth Session in 2005.324 In particular, Kenya had a delegation of five senior
government officials attending the ninth Session of the IOTC. It is assumed that such a
gesture was intended to invite the Kenyan government to recognise the importance of
participating in the work of the IOTC in order to support the efforts of the Department
of Fisheries in the conservation and management of the tuna fishery. The other very
significant meetings that Kenya has attended quite consistently since 2007 to date are
the scientific meetings.325 Kenya only failed to attend the ninth Session of the Scientific
Committee in 2006.
Aside from the regular technical meetings, Kenya is also expected to play its
role as a member of any other special technical group which may come up occasionally,
such as the IOTC performance review panel to which Kenya was appointed in 2007.326
Although Kenya attended the subsequent meetings of the performance review panel, it
failed to attend the first meeting. It is very likely that Kenya did not attend this meeting
for financial reasons. Kenya has otherwise shown its keenness in supporting the efforts
of the technical meetings by hosting some of them.327
As discussed in chapter 3(3.4.3), the administrative budget expenses of the
IOTC are derived from Members’ contributions. Each Member of the IOTC undertakes
to contribute annually its share of the budget,328 which is determined in accordance with
a scheme which the IOTC adopts and amends as required by consensus.329 Each
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Member is assessed an equal basic fee and a variable fee based, inter alia, on total catch
and landings and per capita income of each Member.330 The IOTC sets out a scheme for
the calculation of contributions to the administrative budget of the IOTC as follows:
a) ten per cent of the total budget is divided equally among all
Members;
b) ten percent of the total budget is divided equally among Members
having a fishing operations in the IOTC Area;
c) forty per cent of the total budget is allocated among Members based
on per capita GNP for the calendar year three years before the year to
which the contributions relate, weighted according to the economic
status. Kenya is classified as a low income Member and is weighted
by the factor of 0;
d) forty percent of the budget is allocated among Members based on
their average catch in three calendar years beginning with the year
five years before the year to which the contributions relate, weighted
by a coefficient reflecting their development status. Kenya’s
coefficient is 1.331
The IOTC decides upon its annual budget at each annual meeting. Members’
assessed contributions are to be paid on the first day of the financial year and at least be
paid in full not later than 150 days after that date.332 Kenya’s contributions duly paid, to
the IOTC budgets are recorded in the table below:
Table 3. Kenya’s Contributions to the IOTC333

Year

Contribution (in USD)

2005

11,441.00

2006

13,165.00

2007

14,529.00

2008

13,733.00

2009

14,880.00

2010

15,974.00

Although Kenya has been reasonably consistent in attending the IOTC meetings
and submitting its contributions, it is also important for Kenya to fully implement the
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conservation and management measures adopted by the IOTC. As a Member of the
IOTC, Kenya has committed to implement such obligations. Kenya also has an
obligation to discharge its international obligations in this regard. As such, Kenya’s
commitments towards the conservation and management of tuna including the
collection and sharing of data, and compliance and enforcement need to be met.

6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the Kenyan legal and regulatory framework and management
practices relative to the management and conservation of the tuna resources under
Kenya’s jurisdiction have been analysed. Kenya’s national framework and tuna
management practices are assessed using the findings from chapters 2 and 4 of the
thesis in order to ascertain the consistency of this framework with the international and
regional legal requirements. It is shown that Kenya has not fully adopted measures
consistent with its international and regional obligations for the sustainable utilisation of
tuna, and that Kenya’s current legal and policy framework, and management practices
do not adequately address the long-term sustainability of its tuna resources.
A number of gaps were identified in the implementation of conservation
measures for tuna including fishing capacity and setting of catch limits. Kenya has not
developed a NPOA-Capacity. Neither has it set catch limits for any of the tuna species
as required by the IOTC. Concerning non-target species, Kenya’s fisheries laws have
not provided for the conservation and management of seabirds and sharks as specifically
required by the IOTC. The measures adopted for sea turtles are also incomplete. In
respect of data collection and sharing, there are no provisions requiring submission of
data on non-target species. The timeliness for providing such data is also not
emphasised. Kenyan fisheries laws and regulations fail to adequately provide punitive
measures for non-compliance. Thus, Kenya would need to address these gaps by
reviewing its current fisheries regulations and adopting the appropriate measures and
practices. The following chapter discusses the utilisation of tuna resources in Kenya
with a view to examining the alternative strategies that can be employed for the
development of Kenya’s tuna resources
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CHAPTER 7
OPTIONS FOR THE SUSTAINABLE UTILISATION OF TUNA RESOURCES
IN KENYA’S EEZ

7.1 Introduction
The conservation, management and utilisation duties by coastal States
concerning the fisheries resources in their EEZs are addressed in Articles 61 and 62 of
the LOSC. Article 61 of the LOSC sets out the conservation obligations of the coastal
State for managing the [tuna] resources in the EEZ, while Article 62 concerns the
utilisation of such resources. These articles underscore the obligation of the coastal
State to manage the [tuna] resources in its EEZ responsibly, so as to maximise the
contribution of EEZ resources and uses towards the development process of that State,
while conserving and protecting them.1 Coastal States are thus required to develop
policy frameworks aimed at meeting these obligations of the LOSC and also to
maximise the economic benefits from the tuna resources in their EEZs.
Kenya is under an obligation to promote the objective of optimum utilization of
the tuna resources in its EEZ,2 as a result of extending its fisheries jurisdiction when it
claimed an EEZ. Since the extension of jurisdiction limited access to fishing grounds
which had traditionally been fished by DWFNs, Kenya is required to make provision
for access to the surplus tuna resources in its EEZ by foreign fishing States.3 Kenya also
has the prerogative of determining the terms and conditions of access to the tuna
resources in its EEZ by such States. However, the levels of exploitation of such
resources should be set at conservative levels and be justified by conservation principles
established in the LOSC and within the IOTC framework.4
This chapter reviews the various approaches available for Kenya to sustainably
utilise tuna fisheries resources in its EEZ jurisdiction. The chapter proceeds as follows.
The first section reaffirms the obligation of coastal States to promote the objective of
optimum utilisation of fisheries resources in the EEZ, as required by the LOSC. This
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requirement creates the need for Kenya to establish appropriate arrangements for the
purpose of utilising the tuna stocks in its EEZ, while conserving and managing them
responsibly.5 The second section outlines Kenya’s utilisation efforts to date and
demonstrates that Kenya’s tuna fisheries are not very well developed. The third, fourth
and fifth sections examine various strategies that may be adopted by Kenya, for the
utilisation of tuna resources under its jurisdiction, as well as related issues and
challenges. In these sections, lessons are drawn from the diverse experiences of other
States as a guide for Kenya. The strategies examined include domestic tuna industry
development and fisheries access agreements, including the European Union Fisheries
Partnership Agreements (FPAs). The chapter emphasises the need for Kenya to develop
a rational management regime for the tuna resources in its EEZ in order to fulfil its
international obligations.

7.2 Optimum Utilisation of the EEZ Resources
The emergence of the EEZ concept did not only present significant opportunities
for States to benefit economically by exploiting the tuna resources within the area under
their national jurisdiction, but it also created a dilemma for developing coastal States as
to how best to realise the social and economic potential of such resources. These States
found themselves in a situation where they had to strike a balance between their
obligation to conserve the tuna stocks in the EEZ and their aspirations to maximise the
benefits from such stocks. As discussed in chapter 2(2.4.1), developing coastal States
aspired for economic development and increased control over the [tuna] resources
within their EEZ when they extended their fisheries jurisdiction. They also hoped that
the risk of overexploitation of their EEZ resources by DWFNs from developed States
would be reduced, and that the economic benefits from such resources would be
maximised.6
The LOSC calls upon coastal States to adopt conservation and management
measures to promote the optimum utilisation of [tuna] resources in their EEZ.7 For this
reason, Kenya has a commitment to meet this requirement by developing and managing
5
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its tuna resources for optimum utilisation. Kenya is thus obligated to determine its
capacity to harvest the [tuna] resources of the EEZ,8 and to allow other States access to
the surplus of the allowable catch for which it does not have the capacity to harvest,
through the conclusion of agreements or other arrangements.9 Kenya also has a
protective role under the LOSC and is required to regulate the activities of foreign
nationals fishing in its EEZ,10 to ensure that such activities are consistent with its
national laws.
Since the LOSC does not define the meaning of optimum utilisation and leaves
it to the discretion of the coastal State,11 the implementation of this objective raises a
major concern regarding the determination of an optimal level of fishing. Nevertheless,
the principle of optimum utilisation of tuna resources in the EEZ offers developing
coastal States such as Kenya the opportunity to meet their social, economic and food
security objectives.
Dahmani defines optimum utilisation in the literal sense as that utilisation which
is ‘best or most favourable’.12 This definition, however, still leaves open the question of
what is optimal and what the criteria used to determine such a level might be. Based on
this definition, it can be concluded that Kenya may achieve optimum utilisation of its
tuna resources if these resources are put to the best use. Hence, the responsibility of
determining the best use and optimum level of fishing still rests with Kenya. It is
believed that the optimum utilisation requirements of the LOSC are meant ‘to ensure
that available fishery resources are not hoarded by the coastal State’,13 with which the
wealth of the tuna resources of the EEZ rests.
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Although the optimum level of fishing in the EEZ rests with the coastal State,
the LOSC prescribes the limits within which the ‘optimum utilisation’ of [tuna]
resources should be undertaken. Such activity is to be undertaken without prejudice to
the conservation obligations of the coastal State.14 Hence, to attain the optimum
utilisation of its tuna resources, Kenya is required to take into consideration the
determination of the allowable catch,15 collecting and sharing of data,16 maintenance of
sustained quantities of harvested species and also to consider effects on associated or
dependent species.17 Kenya’s legal and policy responses to the implementation of these
conservation and management objectives have been analysed in chapter 6. The
following section outlines Kenya’s efforts to utilise the tuna resources in its EEZ.

7.3 National Tuna Fisheries Development Experience in Kenya
The tuna resources in Kenya’s EEZ are targeted primarily by fishing vessels
from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) with no involvement from Kenyan
nationals whatsoever.18 However, one longline vessel has been flagged to Kenya since
2007.19 Like most developing coastal States which were driven by their aspirations for
economic development to claim their rights and jurisdiction over fisheries in their EEZ,
Kenya’s domestic capacity to harvest the tuna resources in its EEZ is limited.20 As
demonstrated in the previous chapters, Kenya lacks the financial and institutional
capability, and the expertise to participate in the tuna fishery. Kenya is therefore
dependent upon foreign fishing access to derive financial benefits from the tuna
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Nancy Gitonga and Robin Achoki, ‘Fiscal Reforms for Kenya Fisheries’ in Stephen Cunningham and
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resources in its EEZ. Foreign access to Kenya’s tuna resources has been regulated
through direct licensing since 1996 to date.21
As earlier demonstrated in chapter 4, fisheries is a minor component of Kenya’s
economy and domestic tuna landings are minimal. However, the resource in Kenya’s
EEZ is potentially significant, with DWFNs catching upto an estimated 60,000 tonnes
annually as the seasonal migration passes through the Kenyan EEZ.22 Hence, the
domestic industry development in Kenya is very limited, with only a single tuna
processing plant in operation. The only catch landed in Kenya is wholly utilised in the
shore-based investment of the tuna processing industry. The rest of the catch from
DWFNs operating in Kenya’s EEZ is landed directly to foreign States.23 As the
domestic landings of tuna in Kenya are minimal, the tuna processing industry remains a
minor activity with its operation fully dependant on fish imports from DWFNs
operating in its EEZ.24
The tuna landed in Kenya is processed into loins (fillets) by the Wananchi
Marine Products Company based in Mombasa.25 The company also produces tuna
flakes for the domestic market.26 The quantity of tuna loins produced for export is about
10,000mt, while at least an additional 15,000mt of tuna are landed by foreign fleets and
transhipped from the same company annually.27 Tuna loins are relatively minor
compared to the other products of the tuna industry such as canned or fresh tuna. Tuna
processing by Wananchi Marine Products was initiated in 1996 with modest exports of
21
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500-1000 tonnes to Italy and increased to 9,000 tonnes in exports to the EU in general
by 2005.28 This amount represented 12% of the EU import market of pre-cooked tuna
loins, most of which were made up of yellowfin tuna and exported to Italy.29 The
company has an annual turnover of €30million.30
Tuna processing in Kenya is constrained by a range of factors, particularly, the
lack of infrastructure such as fish ports and cold storage facilities for fish preservation.31
Wananchi Marine Products have leased a government owned purse seine docking
facility where landings of tuna are received from DWFN vessels. However, the
company is constrained by its limited cold storage capacity. As a result, Wananchi
Marine Products has to contend with the seasonal nature of the tuna fishery. Hence, the
company faces high prices or shortages of tuna when the EU fleet is operating
distantly.32 This creates a variable supply of Kenya’s pre-cooked tuna loins to export
markets, which in turn causes a fluctuation in the income from such exports.
For example, in 2006 Kenya’s exports amounted to 6.963MT at an average
export price of US$ 4.562 per MT compared to 7.893 MT in 2007 at US$5.67 per MT.
This variation represented a 13% increase and placed Kenya in the fourth position as a
major supplier of pre-cooked tuna loins to the EU after Ecuador, El Salvador and
Thailand.33 Such fluctuations may have a detrimental effect on the company’s ability to
conduct its operations. The effective operations of Wananchi Marine Products require a
regular supply of tuna which is also fundamental to the development of Kenya’s tuna
industry.
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Although minimal, Kenya realises benefits to its national economy as a result of
the revenue accruing from licensing foreign fishing vessels harvesting tuna in its EEZ.
Kenya’s national economy also benefits from the foreign exchange accruing from the
export of tuna loins to the European Union (EU). The current participation of foreign
fishing vessels in Kenya’s tuna fishery and the focus of its fisheries development
policies in recent times is an indication of Kenya’s aspiration to develop its tuna
resources and to realise significant economic benefits from them.34 However, despite
the abundance of tuna resources in Kenya’s EEZ, their potential benefits are not being
fully realised.35 The challenge for Kenya is how to assert and exercise its sovereign
rights in the EEZ, to utilise the tuna resources optimally and sustainably, in order to
realise long-term benefits to the national economy. Hence, options for the sustainable
utilisation of tuna resources within Kenya’s jurisdiction are examined in the following
sections.
Most developing coastal States have pursued two main types of arrangements
directed towards the development of the tuna resources under their jurisdiction, namely
domestic tuna industry development and fisheries access agreements. As coastal States
have the responsibility to ensure that such fish stocks are utilised sustainably, they need
to take steps to ensure the enactment of appropriate legislation and to adopt adequate
policies in this regard. The following section examines the issues associated with
domestic development of the tuna industry and draws on the experiences of some
Pacific Island States to illustrate the key elements that may be of value to Kenya. The
States examined include Kiribati, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The experience of the
Pacific Island States provides an overview of their domestic tuna industry development
efforts and also underscores the lessons learned from such experiences. Some of the
aspects reflected in these experiences include the regional and national strategies
adopted by these States for the development of domestic tuna industries, fisheries policy
aims and objectives, investment approaches, and also the challenges encountered in
these processes.
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7.4 Domestic Tuna Industry Development
Coastal States aspire to develop domestic tuna industries so as to maximise the
benefits from the exploitation of their tuna stocks. The process of developing tuna
fisheries and processing industries is often referred to as ‘domestication’.36 For the
purposes of this thesis, the definition of domestication is derived from Parris and
Grafton. Thus, domestication is defined as the process of developing and/or then
integrating domestically located harvesting and processing sectors to serve export
markets.37 Other aspects of domestication include ownership, management and
employment in fisheries industries by nationals of a coastal State, turnover cycling
through the domestic economy, and re-investing of profits locally.38
It is believed that by building their capacities to harvest tuna stocks from their
own EEZs using domestic fleets, developing coastal and island States could realise
increased economic and socio-economic benefits from tuna fisheries.39 Generally, by
developing local tuna industries, it is envisaged that States do not only realise a larger
share of the value accruing from the tuna stocks but that they have greater control over
such resources. Coastal States have thus tended to promote domestic participation in
their tuna fisheries for various reasons, such as broadening of their economic base;
generating employment opportunities, foreign exchange, and government revenue; and
to facilitate the transfer of fishing and related technology to their nationals.40
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7.4.1 The Experiences of the Pacific Island States in Domestic Tuna Industry
Development
As a result of their aspirations to maximise the economic contributions from
their tuna resources, some of the Pacific Island States have pursued domestic industry
development of the tuna fisheries within their jurisdiction. In this regard, the Pacific
Island States have formulated and are implementing national strategies directed towards
the achievement of their domestication objectives. Further, through cooperative
initiatives, the Pacific Island States have adopted regional strategies committed to the
development of domestic tuna industries.41
These Pacific Island States adopted a strategy encouraging domestication in the
1990s. The inspiration for such a policy derived from various issues like anti-colonial
feelings, the need for local employment, and from a feeling of dissatisfaction in dealing
with DWFNs which were believed to have out-manoeuvred the Pacific Island States in
access fee negotiations.42 Thus the development of domestic tuna industries has been
and continues to be central to the fisheries development aspirations of the Pacific Island
States.43 For this reason, this thesis draws on the experience of the Pacific Island States
41
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to illustrate various elements of domestic tuna industry development in order to provide
lessons for Kenya. The domestication experiences of the Pacific Island States may not
necessarily be readily applicable to Kenya. However, they may offer potentially
valuable lessons for Kenya.
Under the domestication policy, the Pacific Island States have directed financial
investments towards several fishing activities including purchasing of fishing vessels,
port infrastructure, and transhipment bases.44 Another strategy that some Pacific Island
States have adopted is to make industry development a condition of the licensing
arrangements for DWFNs. Under such licensing arrangements, DWFNs are required to
utilise domestic infrastructure and/or nationals to crew boats.45 The components that are
central to the domestic development strategies of the Island States include; subsidies to
domestic industry, incentives for foreign investors, and bilateral and multilateral aid.46
The following discussion highlights the strategies that have been formulated by some of
the Pacific Island States for the domestication of their tuna industries.

7.4.1.1 The Case of Kiribati
Kiribati is one of the Pacific Island States with a vast EEZ comprising some of
the richest skipjack fishing areas in the region. The policy framework of Kiribati
demonstrates its commitment to develop a domestic tuna industry since achieving
independence in 1979.47 As such, the domestication aspirations of Kiribati are reflected
in its national development plans and also in its tuna development and management
plans. For example, an aim of its tuna development and management plan of 2003 is to:
“reduce and replace foreign fishing access with Kiribati owned and operated vessels”.48
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In order to achieve its domestic aspirations, Kiribati has made an effort to promote the
implementation of various strategies including the establishment of processing plants,
transhipment, and service industries. The Kiribati nationals have also been trained and
recruited to work on foreign fishing fleets.49
Domestic development of the tuna industry in Kiribati was initiated in 1979
through the government owned enterprise, Te Mautari Limited which operated a pole
and line fishing fleet.50 The achievements of Te Mautari Limited include the
establishment of cold storage facilities, a training centre and longline development. Its
growth was fostered by proximity to rich tuna fishing grounds, the experience and
tradition of local fishermen, and the commitment of government.51 However, the Te
Mautari Limited fishing fleet diminished in the early 2000s leading to the company’s
collapse.52
A number of factors contributed to the failure of Te Mautari Limited. First, its
operations were constrained by fluctuations in tuna catches.53 Secondly, the operational
costs and the maintenance of fishing vessels were very high and the management
poor.54 Thirdly, there was a shortage of skilled labour. Lastly, the market prices of tuna
products were very competitive.55 Despite external funding and technical assistance, the
operation of the government owned company Te Mautari Limited was not profitable
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and it finally collapsed.56 Subsequently, all government-owned fisheries in Kiribati
companies were consolidated to form the Central Pacific Producers.57
Based on the experience of Te Mautari Limited operations, the development
focus in Kiribati shifted slightly in the 1990s from the emphasis on national fishing
operations to restructuring of public enterprises and reforms to create an enabling
environment to stimulate growth and to promote private sector development. Thus,
foreign investment became a major focus together with the improvement of
infrastructure and the establishment of joint ventures with foreign companies,
particularly in the purse seine fishery.58 (Joint ventures are discussed in a subsequent
section of this chapter). Another strategy that has been adopted for the development of
domestic tuna industries in Kiribati is licensing of foreign vessels under access
agreements.59 Through such agreements, foreign vessels are required or encouraged to
utilise local ports for transhipment and other shore based facilities thus providing spinoff benefits.60 By employing locals on foreign vessels, skills have been developed for
establishing domestic fishing operations and income provided to local economies.61
The domestic development in Kiribati has been subject to various constraints.
First, the low level of economic development has been prohibitive to fisheries
development due to lack of institutions and infrastructure for business development.
Secondly, the geographic isolation and therefore the distance from major trade routes
make the airfreight very expensive.62 Third, shortages of land and the tenure systems
make it difficult and expensive to negotiate use rights for land.63 Fourth, there are
shortages of fresh water and electricity which are major requirements for fisheries
56
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development.64 Fifth, the lack of various trades,65 and technical skills required to
operate fishing vessels effectively, and inappropriate transfer of knowledge and
technology by DWFNs which also provided foreign aid.66 These challenges limit the
incentives to attract the private sector and foreign investment,67 and have rendered
shore-based developments very expensive making it difficult for Kiribati to achieve its
domestication aspirations.68

7.4.1.2 The Case of Fiji
A second example of domestication is drawn from the experience of Fiji. Fiji’s
EEZ is one of the least endowed in the region. Nonetheless, Fiji’s fisheries development
policy and strategies reflect its efforts of domestication and indigenization of its tuna
fisheries.69 The ultimate aim of such policies is for Fiji to create employment for its
nationals and earn foreign exchange from fish exports.70 As part of its domestication
efforts, the Fijian government has maintained a policy requiring foreign vessels to land
fish locally or to fish under charter, lease arrangements or joint ventures with domestic
companies.71
Thus, foreign fishing vessels have to be licensed and registered and flagged in
Fiji, while fishing companies operating in Fiji are to be at least 30% owned by Fijian
64
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citizens.72 Such an arrangement is considered strategic as it enables the government to
maintain control over foreign owned vessels. It also enables Fiji to establish a
significant catch history in its zone and the adjacent high sea and from the onshore
landings for processing, an aspect which is fundamental to the level of allocation of
Fiji’s total allowable catch in the region.73
One of Fiji’s earlier domestication initiatives was the establishment of a
government-owned cannery under the Pacific Fishing Company (PAFCO) which was
first initiated in 1964.74 The company has contributed immensely to Fiji’s economy in
terms of foreign exchange and also to the local economy.75 However, several difficulties
have been encountered in the course of its development. Although PAFCO was
strategically located near rich fishing grounds with preferential market access to the EU,
and had a good water supply and a skilled, trained workforce, it incurred high
operational costs, lacked capital and suffered shortages of fish.76 In an effort to maintain
the operations of PAFCO, its US based partner, Bumble Bee provided a financial input
of US$20 million in 2009.77
Another domestication initiative in Fiji is the fresh tuna longline fisheries. The
domestic development of Fiji’s fresh tuna longline industry has successfully been
facilitated by the private sector through joint ventures, contracts and agreements
between foreign operators and domestic interests.78 These developments have been
supported by Fiji’s infrastructure such as reliable airfreight and its capitalist economy.79
In addition, by providing tax and duty concessions, the Fijian government has
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encouraged private sector development and foreign investment through supporting
government policies.80

7.4.1.3 The Case of Papua New Guinea
A third example of domestication in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
(WCPO) region is taken from Papua New Guinea, which is the largest State, in size and
population. Papua New Guinea’s EEZ has some of the richest purse seine fishing
grounds with the highest annual catch in the WCPO region. Its longline fishery is also
potentially productive. Through a process of policy reform which was initiated in 1995,
Papua New Guinea has progressively improved its business environment and enhanced
private sector development. As a result, Papua New Guinea has experienced significant
growth in its domestic tuna industries and a domestic tuna longline industry has since
been developed.81
The growth of the longline industry in Papua New Guinea has been facilitated
by the introduction of a duty waiver on tuna exports and the development of a national
tuna management plan for the longline fishery. The tuna longline industry was reserved
for the citizens of PNG and local companies through a change in policy which permitted
a minority (49% maximum) foreign shareholding.82 The facilities owned by the longline
companies included sashimi packing, fresh tuna loining, and a cold storage facility at
Port Moresby airport which facilitated storage of fish ready for export.83
Papua New Guinea is also one of the States that have adopted a strategy where
foreign owned purse seine companies which have been encouraged to base their fleets
in locally, have established processing facilities in the State since the mid 1990s. As a
result, the Papua New Guinea based purse seine fleet which grew from two vessels
before 1994 to 40 vessels in 2006,84 accounts for most of the total increase in purse
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seines operating in the region from 147 in 1995 to 175 in 2006.85 Papua New Guinea’s
aspirations to develop domestic processing industries are very ambitious as it hopes to
replace Thailand as the worlds’ centre for tuna processing.86 It suffices to note that aside
from its strategic position, Thailand’s dominance in the world tuna industry lies with its
government policies which support industry objectives.87
Under the arrangement of basing foreign-owned vessels domestically, the
beneficial ownership may rest with the Pacific Island State but the legal ownership
remains foreign, in which case the flag State responsibility lies with the owner of the
fishing vessel.88 Although this arrangement is beneficial to Papua New Guinea, it places
enforcement and monitoring responsibility upon the State in respect of such vessels.
Even so, Papua New Guinea needs to ensure that the agreements entered into with
foreign owned vessels are explicit regarding flag State responsibility in order for the
owners of such vessels to be fully aware of their management responsibilities.89
The initial development of tuna industries in Papua New Guinea has been
supported by the government policies which have been formulated as a result of
improved governance. However, administrative improvements need to be made across
all sectors for governance to be effectively enhanced. As such, the development
aspirations of Papua New Guinea have been constrained by the incapacity of the
government to improve the business environment and also by the political interference
which has caused uncertainty in governance.90 In summary, despite the considerable
efforts of the PICS to develop domestic tuna fishing and processing, domestic tuna
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industries account for less than 30% of the value of tuna harvested in the region’s EEZ
and a much smaller proportion of high seas catches.91

7.4.2. The Viability of Domestic Tuna Industry Development in Kenya
The tuna industry domestication experiences of the Pacific Island States above
identified some elements pertinent to the effective development of a national tuna
industry. Based on the experience of these States, it is evident that Kenya is generally
faced with a number challenges which may constrain the development of a domestic
tuna industry. These challenges relate to fisheries legislation and policy, capital
constraints, expertise and an enabling business environment.

7.4.2.1 Fisheries Policy and Legislation
The effectiveness of any efforts to develop a national tuna industry requires
policy direction. This calls for an appropriate legal framework and a sectoral and
national policy framework governing fisheries management and development. Not only
should such a framework enable Kenya to generate wealth from its tuna resources but it
also needs to ensure the sustainability of Kenya’s tuna resources. As demonstrated in
chapter 5(5.3), the development of Kenya’s tuna industry requires policy support.
However, Kenya’s fisheries law has no provisions designed to establish specific
management strategies for the individual fisheries. The profile of fisheries, particularly
marine, is also low in Kenya’s economy.92 This creates difficulties for developing a
management and development plan specifically for tuna.
Kenya needs to establish a comprehensive framework for the management and
long-term development and sustainability of a tuna industry. A tuna management and
development plan would provide guidelines for the development and investment in the
tuna industry and would also give effect to the management objectives for tuna set in
the fisheries laws. The development of the tuna industry and management of tuna
fisheries in Fiji for example, has been articulated in its tuna management and
development plan. Fiji’s plan sets out the management objectives and addresses, inter
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alia, economic expectations (such as employment, export earnings and government
revenue) and sustainability (compliance with international agreements) issues.93

7.4.2.2 Limited Access to Investment Capital
The development of a domestic tuna industry requires large capital investments.
The start up costs for a fishing operation is substantial. Such an operation will require
equipment such as fishing vessels (purchasing or leasing) and related gears, personnel
and other operational costs. The financial inputs are prohibitive to private individuals
and the business risky. The government of Kenya is also not in a position to provide the
finances for investment in a domestic tuna industry. Furthermore, it has been pointed
out previously that State-owned enterprises have not been successful in the development
of the tuna industry, and that the private sector is considered instrumental in providing
the development needs of the tuna industry.
Hence, it becomes necessary for Kenya to facilitate the engagement of the
private sector in the development of the tuna industry. Besides being a reliable source of
financing through capital investment, the private sector plays a significant role in the
areas of trade, marketing and financial management.94 Kenya will also need to promote
foreign investment through appropriate policies. The Kenyan government has a major
role in creating an enabling business environment conducive to the participation of the
private sector and to attract foreign investment.

7.4.2.3 Enabling Business Environment
The development of the tuna industry involves the participation of various
government sectors including, inter alia, fisheries, transport, finance and economic
planning, and foreign affairs, involving several line ministries. There is a need for
effective government coordination across the relevant ministries to ensure
understanding of Kenya’s tuna development objectives. The various government
ministries provide the vital network necessary for supporting the development of the
tuna industry in areas such as taxation, transport, and immigration. Such support is
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fundamental to the creation of an enabling business environment. In Kenya, the
coordination between the Ministry of Fisheries Development and other agencies
concerned in the fisheries sub-sector is inadequate.95 This creates an institutional barrier
to proper planning for strategies directed towards the development of the tuna industry.
Government coordination is a key area of focus for the Kenyan Ministry of Fisheries
Development, in its efforts to revitalize the fisheries sub-sector.
Kenya has formulated the Strategic Fisheries Plan (2006-2011) and the Private
Sector Development Strategy (2006-2010) which promote private sector investment.
These strategies are aimed at meeting the medium term objectives outlined in the
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation policy.96 Although
the objectives of these strategies have not yet been met,97 they can provide significant
leverage for private sector development within Kenya’s fisheries sector, particularly for
tuna through enhanced cooperation across sectors.
The other enabling factors necessary for the development of the tuna industry
can be broadly described as supportive quality government services. Such services
include infrastructure such as efficient ports and transport, onshore facilities, freight
networks, water supply, and electricity, most of which are inadequate.98 Kenya also
lacks a skilled and experienced human resource base required for the development of
the tuna industry.99 Also lacking is good knowledge of the dynamics of the tuna
industry including at the global level. Kenya will need to address these issues if
domestic tuna industry development is to be considered as an option.

7.4.2.4 Lessons Learned From the Experience of the Pacific
The main lesson to be learned from the experience of the Pacific Island States is
that, domestic development of the tuna industry is particularly challenging for
developing coastal States, and that such development takes time. Overall, the domestic
95
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tuna industry development requires various enabling factors such as good governance,
adequate investment capital, raw materials, skilled labour, equipment, infrastructure,
and ready markets. Although the situation of the Pacific Island States may be deemed
unique because of their size and geographical challenges, the basic principles that apply
to the domestic development of the tuna industry may be applicable to other coastal
States.
A number of factors can be identified from the experience of the Pacific Island
States as being fundamental for the creation of a foundation for domestic tuna industry
development. First, it is shown that the domestic development aspirations of the Pacific
Island States have been accorded recognition in the relevant national policy documents.
Their domestication objectives are also clearly stated in national development plans
and/or national tuna management and development plans. The implementation
strategies directed towards such objectives are also stated and documented. This
underscores the importance of assigning a high priority to the development of
appropriate policies and strategies.
Second, domestic investments in the tuna industry need to be supported by
adequate infrastructure. These include port facilities (e.g. wharf, seaport, and slipway),
land, supply of water and electricity, transport (air, sea and land), fuel, and skilled
labour (skippers, engineers, seamen, and business and fisheries managers). There is also
a need for suitable fishing equipment including vessels, and development of onshore
infrastructure such as processing facilities for value addition and for general fish
handling. The processing facilities may include cold storage facilities, canneries, loining
plants and workshops.
The third lesson concerns government- owned tuna fishing companies. Contrary
to the assumptions of commentators in the WCPO region that domestication of the
region’s tuna industry would yield greater economic benefits than those received
through a policy of maximising access fees, several reports including those by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB),100 point out that most of the fisheries investments in the
domestic industry have failed financially, particularly those investments that have been
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supported and owned by the government and which are in the majority.101 Various
authors have highlighted the weaknesses of the government-owned tuna companies in
the WCPO, and pointed out that they are hardly ever successful.102 “The general
consensus in the region is that the government is very poor at running large and
complex fishing operations”.103
The learning process has been a long and expensive one for the Pacific Island
States. The government of the Federated States of Micronesia for example, had invested
over US$120 million by 1995 through State owned enterprises. These enterprises have
been unsuccessful.104 Other such enterprises that have been unsuccessful include joint
ventures between the Marshalls Islands and the United States; Solomon Islands and
Japan;105 and a state-owned fishing enterprise in Kiribati.106 Private investments have
been more promising in the tuna industry. Some of the successful ones have been
established in Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Tonga.107 Barclay contends that, domestication
should be wholly private-sector driven and independent of financial inputs from
government.108
The failures of the public investment companies in the Pacific are attributed to
various factors such as the economics of the global fishing industry,109 and large upfront
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costs and substantial technical requirements that reduce potential financial gains.110, 111
Additionally, the cost of patrolling the EEZs of the Island States has become more
prohibitive as a result of increased domestication. Generally, the cost associated with
fisheries management is quite substantial and in some States it may even exceed the
potential benefits from the fisheries.112
The fourth lesson concerns the participation of the private sector in the domestic
development of the tuna industry. This is necessitated by the need for significant capital
investments and efficiency. The active participation of the private sector requires a
stable and enabling investment environment that is able to create the appropriate
conditions. Based on the above discussions, it is evident that the private sector can be
very instrumental in facilitating tuna industry development. Barclay affirms that; “for
domestic tuna development to work, the economic and policy environment has to enable
private-sector development”.113 The World Bank also emphasises the importance of the
private sector in strengthening the foundation of economic growth.114 A key element in
creating the desired climate for private investment is good governance.115 The Asian
Development Bank identifies four key principles to good governance that are
fundamental to the socio-economic performance of the Pacific Island States, namely,
accountability,

participation,

predictability

and

transparency.116
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that are designed to be flexible and adaptable to the changes occurring in the local tuna
fishery and in the global arena as a whole.
It is argued that it would be far less risky for Pacific Island governments to focus
on maximising resource rents derived from fishery access fees from both DWFNs and
local fishing vessels and that some proportion of these funds could be deposited in a
trust fund and invested globally as has been done successfully in Kiribati.117

7.5 Fisheries Access Agreements
Aside from the development of domestic tuna industries to secure economic gain
from their EEZ resources, coastal States have also entered into access agreements as a
form of managing foreign fishing. The legal basis for fisheries access agreements lies in
the LOSC. The adoption of the LOSC in 1982 which enabled coastal States to exercise
their jurisdiction over the [tuna] resources in the EEZ created the need for DWFNs to
negotiate access to such resources which they had previously fished traditionally. As
such, the LOSC recognises the special circumstances of certain Sates in accessing the
surplus of the living resources of the EEZ.118 Nonetheless, the coastal State is ultimately
sovereign in deciding to whom it grants access.119 The practise of many developing
states to assign access rights to DWFNs has been driven by the need to generate
revenue, their inability to fish surplus stocks and the need to satisfy the obligation in the
LOSC to assign such surplus to other States for exploitation.120 Thus under the terms of
Article 62 of the LOSC which requires coastal States to avail the surplus [tuna]
resources in their EEZ to ‘other States’,121 a developing coastal State like Kenya is able
to derive economic benefits from the tuna resources in its EEZ in spite of its inability to
harvest them. Most developing coastal States which lack the capacity to harvest the tuna
resources in their EEZs have entered into fisheries access agreements with DWFNs as a
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means of trading the resources with developed States.122 Besides enabling developing
coastal States to derive revenue from their tuna resources, fisheries access agreements
can also foster the development of the tuna fishery.
Historically, fisheries access agreements were adopted in the late-seventies as a
means of regulating the activities of foreign fishing vessels when most coastal States
extended their jurisdiction over waters adjacent to their coasts.123 Although bilateral
agreements had been used earlier in situations of shared interest, most coastal States had
licensed foreign fishing vessels for regulatory purposes.124 However, most coastal States
preferred to manage foreign fishing through access agreements rather than direct
licensing because access agreements provided the means for coastal States to secure
recognition of their jurisdiction and rights, and also for purposes of compliance and
economic gain.125 Additionally, access agreements provided an opportunity for the
establishment of a framework which could incorporate requirements for foreign fishing
States to adopt measures which ensured that they would comply with coastal States
laws.126
The recognition of the sovereign rights of coastal States through access
agreements was most significant for highly migratory species like tuna, for facilitating
the application of the relevant provisions of the LOSC.127 Access agreements included
the relevant wording requiring flag States to recognise the sovereign rights of the
coastal State.128 Such clarity was significant for developing coastal States whose interest
was to derive benefits from the fish resources within their jurisdiction. These States
could therefore exercise their rights and authority over the resources of the EEZ in
accordance with the provisions of the LOSC. In fact, some coastal States made it a legal
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requirement for flag States to enter into a foreign fishing agreement before a fishing
license could be issued.129
Today, access agreements have become an increasingly important part of trade
and development relations between developed and developing States, and they form the
main supply for fishery species like tuna to DWFNS.130 In principle, such agreements
can be a positive way of managing the surplus fish stocks of developing coastal States
and can be a source of much needed foreign exchange which can be channelled towards
domestic management of fisheries and development of local fishing businesses.131 Thus,
it is necessary to review the fundamental components of fisheries access agreements in
order to gain an understanding of their role in facilitating tuna fisheries development.
Access agreements can be categorised according to their structure, either as
bilateral or multilateral. They can also take the form of joint ventures. The following
section provides a synopsis of the various types of bilateral access agreements and the
nature of multilateral access agreements. Although the various types of access
agreements are defined, this thesis focuses on bilateral fisheries access agreements
concluded between developing coastal States and developed States. These types of
agreements are particularly relevant to Kenya. The multilateral access agreements have
been described in order to understand and appreciate the role they have played in the
Pacific region tuna fisheries. These types of agreements will however not apply to
Kenya alone as a State.

7.5.1 Bilateral Fisheries Access Agreements
Bilateral fisheries agreements are the most common category of agreements
which establish the right of access to fishing zones of coastal States. Such agreements
can be concluded between two governments, or as private agreements between industry
association-to-government

and

company-to-government.132
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the exchange of non-pecuniary rights.133 Bilateral access agreements, most of which are
concluded between a coastal State and a foreign fishing State, have a defined form and
structure, and are implemented within a specific duration and by means of specific
institutional mechanisms.134
Aside from the level of access fees to be paid, other terms and conditions of
access that may be included in bilateral access agreements are; the number and size of
vessels that may fish in the prescribed area; areas of operation; gears to be used; catch
quotas; and mechanisms for reporting. The structure of the agreement may vary
depending on the parties that are undertaking it, and the provisions of the agreement
may include mechanisms for cooperation and technical assistance.135 The EU has
concluded fifteen bilateral fisheries agreements with developing third States (twelve of
them are tuna agreements),136 which involve financial compensation. Most of these
agreements have been concluded with African coastal States. (The EU agreements will
be discussed in a subsequent section of the thesis).
A bilateral fisheries agreement in which access is exchanged for non-pecuniary
rights is one that consists in the reciprocal right of access to fisheries.137 This type of
bilateral agreement provides mutual arrangements for neighbouring coastal States to
access each others’ fisheries resources, and is not contingent upon financial
compensation. The EU has concluded such agreements that do not involve financial
compensation with Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland.138 Seychelles and Mauritius
have also concluded a similar agreement.139
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The agreements between developed States differ significantly from those
between developed and developing States. The provisions of the latter agreements are
more likely to include technical assistance for fisheries development. Therefore, the
owners of foreign fishing vessels would pay license fees and in addition the flag State
would contribute towards the development of the fishing industry of the developing
coastal State.140 An example of a bilateral agreement between developed States is the
EU-Norway annual bilateral agreement. This agreement which is the most important of
all the fisheries agreements between the European Community and a third party, is
reciprocal by nature and provides mutually balanced fishing possibilities of several fish
stocks (herring, saithe, haddock and cod) for the States Parties.141 The EU-Norway
agreement provides for conservation, scientific research and rational management and
regulation of fisheries with no financial compensation.142 An example of a bilateral
fisheries agreement between developed States and a developing coastal State is the EUMozambique agreement, which has a requirement for the EU to promote economic,
scientific and technical cooperation in the fisheries sector.143 The EU makes an annual
financial contribution of €900000 to Mozambique.144

7.5.1.1 Government-to-Government Agreements
The terms and conditions of government-to-government agreements are
negotiated between governments of the DWFN and the coastal State. The DWFN
government pays a fee to the coastal State for access to its fisheries resources. In
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addition the DWFN pays a fee for the license and administrative costs as provided in the
agreement.145 Such agreements often include provisions on development assistance.146
Such bilateral agreements typically exist between the EU and the governments of
several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States.

7.5.1.2 Government-to-Industry Association Agreements
Access agreements can be concluded between industry associations and coastal
State governments. Most of the industry associations would have originated from
fishery cooperatives and will usually negotiate for fisheries access on behalf of their
members.147 The associations would also pay all fees or the fees would be paid by
industry association members.148 These types of agreements have been concluded
mainly with industry associations from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China.149 Such
agreements are typical between Japanese fleets and some Pacific Island States. Most of
these agreements are rolled over at the end of the agreed period following consultations
and checks on the status of tuna stocks.150 These associations may provide services to
their members such as negotiating for fisheries access, supplies of fuel, bait gear and
crew to vessel operators, license registration and administrative assistance.151 The
associations take one negotiating position as a strategy to strengthen their bargaining
power.152

7.5.1.3 Government-to-Company Agreements
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The governments of costal States can negotiate access agreements with
companies for direct licensing. These types of access agreements can either be between
individual fishing companies and governments of coastal States or between fishing
interests and coastal State governments requiring companies to make investments
onshore.153 In the former case where individual fishing companies engage with coastal
State governments, the companies can comprise owners or operators of a fleet of vessels
or a single vessel, while in the latter case part of the licensing agreement may require
the foreign fishing interest to create a business operation or base the company in a
coastal State.154 The aim of the coastal State would be to derive economic gain from the
business activities of such an operation, such as employment for its nationals.
These kinds of agreements have become popular in the Pacific Island States and
have taken the form of either domestically-based foreign fishing companies or
domestically-based foreign processing companies.155 In the former case the foreign
fishing firms register as a local company and can then purchase domestic licenses at a
reduced price, while in the latter case the firms invest onshore (such as processing
plants and net repairs) in exchange for foreign and/or domestic licenses.156 These
agreements which are common with Korean, Chinese or Taiwanese companies157 are
short term, usually one year and are renegotiated at the end of every term.158

7.5.2 Multilateral Fisheries Access Agreements
The only multilateral treaty on fisheries is being implemented between the
governments of the United States of America and sixteen Pacific Island Countries
(PICs) in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.159 This treaty represents a model of
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international and fishery cooperation. The US treaty which came into force in 1988 is
valid up to 2013, and grants fishing rights to at least 40 US purse seiners to the EEZs of
all the PICs.160 Under this agreement, the government of the United States cooperates
with the PICs by providing technical and economic support towards their objective to
maximise benefits from the development of Pacific Island fisheries resources.161
Among the benefits that the PICs obtain from this treaty are the fixed lump-sum
access fees which are paid annually by the US regardless of the catch.162 The access fees
which are distributed among the parties according to laid down procedures have
increased from US$14 million annually in 1988 to the current US$21million.163 Apart
from the access fees, the US tuna industry covers the costs for observer programmes,
vessel monitoring system deployment and a regional registration fee.164 The FFA
administers a project development fund amounting to US$ 18million annually which
can be equally accessed by any of the parties.165 In summary, 85% of the revenue from
the US agreement is paid to the PICs according to the volume of catch in their EEZs,
while 15% goes towards aid and technical assistance.166 Nationals of the Pacific Island
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parties are also employed on board US fishing vessels.167 The benefits gained by the US
for its participation in the treaty include canning, transhipment, slipping and repairs of
their fishing vessels in the Pacific Islands, as well as purchase of supplies such as
fuel.168
The US treaty provides the legal foundation for measures concerning flag State
responsibility and the enforcement procedures for instituting legal proceedings and
imposing penalties in the event of infringement by US fishing vessels,169 compliance
procedures applicable to US fishing vessels for breach of the treaty obligations,170 and
settlement of disputes.171 In respect of flag State responsibility, the government of the
US is obligated to ensure that both its nationals and fishing vessels operate in the
designated areas,172 and adhere to all the terms of the fishing license including using
appropriate gears,173 and observing the applicable national laws.174 Pacific Island
parties’ observers are to be facilitated to board US fishing vessels to perform their
duties like obtaining scientific information, compliance and monitoring.175
The Multilateral agreement provides a strong negotiating position for the PICs
and encourages better implementation of conservation measures for tuna. The
involvement of parties in the negotiations also enhances transparency. However, such
agreements are challenged by the ability of individual States to achieve their national
goals which vary from State to State.176 Individual States may therefore not be fulfilled
167

FFA, The Ttreaty between the US and PICS, Article 2(2.2)(c). http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27
December 2010).
168

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 2(2.2)(a) & (b). http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27
December 2010).
169

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 4. http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27 December
2010).

170

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 5. http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27 December
2010).

171

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 6. http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27 December
2010).

172

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS. Article 4(4.1) and Annex 1. http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed
27 December 2010). The treaty provides a list of closed areas.

173

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 4(4.5). http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed 27 December
2010).

174

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Article 4(4.6) and Annex 1. http://www.ffa.int/ (accessed
27 December 2010).

175

FFA, The Treaty between the US and PICS, Annex 1 Part 7. http://www.ffa.int/ (27 December 2010).

176

Barry Coates, Fishing for a future: The Advantages and Drawbacks of a Comprehensive Fisheries
Agreement between the Pacific and European Union, a briefing paper by Oxfam, New Zealand.
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/ (accessed 27 December 2010).

285

if a multilateral approach is applied.177 In addition, the lack of supportive institutional
arrangements and the implications of setting up such institutions with regards to their
distribution between the PICs impairs such cooperation.178 PICs need incentives in
order to pool resources,179 but they also need to agree on the division of rents and the
level of exploitation to succeed in joint exploitation through such cooperation.180
As discussed above, the US multilateral treaty is unique to the Pacific Island
States and is regional in nature. Such an arrangement will therefore not apply to Kenya
alone, if it were to be adopted. Kenya would require the cooperation and involvement of
other developing coastal States in the WIO region such as Tanzania, Seychelles,
Mozambique, Madagascar and Comoros. Most importantly, the Pacific Islands Fisheries
Forum Agency (FFA) administers and provides support for the implementation of the
US multilateral treaty.181 The support of the FFA is entirely significant in providing a
regional framework for the successful implementation of this treaty. Such a framework
would be necessary if Kenya, jointly with the coastal States in the WIO is to consider
adopting a multilateral approach to the development of their tuna resources.
In chapter 3(3.2.3), it was seen that a regional framework for the coastal States
of the Southwest Indian Ocean existed under the auspices of the now-defunct Western
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (WIOTO). The objectives of WIOTO were;
harmonization of fisheries policies; relations with DWFNs; fisheries surveillance and
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enforcement; fisheries development; and access to EEZs of members.182 A similar
organisation such as WIOTO could probably play a role like the FFA for the Indian
Ocean States. Without such a framework it is highly unlikely for Kenya to implement a
multilateral treaty.

7.5.3 Fisheries Joint Ventures
Fisheries access agreements can take the form of joint ventures. The LOSC
recognises joint ventures as a mechanism through which coastal States can cooperate
with nationals of other States wishing to fish in their EEZs. As such, the LOSC entitles
coastal States to establish requirements relating to joint ventures for such purposes.183
Broadly defined, a joint venture is a collaborative business undertaking between two or
more parties. This thesis adopts the definition provided by the FAO where ‘Joint
venture’ is defined as, “an association of two or more partners who share risks and
benefits of a joint commercial enterprise”.184 According to OECD, the combination of
capital from the partners (often from different countries) in such enterprises often
provides opportunities for trade in fisheries products and trade in fisheries services.185
Joint venture agreements facilitate cooperation between developed States which
may provide technology and other forms of support, and developing coastal States with
tuna fisheries resources.186 The interests of these partners in a fisheries joint venture
vary. For developing coastal States, joint ventures provide a contribution of capital
(hard currencies, infrastructure and equipment); transfer of technology and skills to the
coastal State; operational infrastructure; and access to foreign markets.187 Some
developing States also endeavour to have gradual national control of the joint
182
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venture.188 An example of a joint venture in which the national government of a
developing coastal State exhibits dependence upon foreign expertise, technology, and
capital from a transnational corporation is the Solomon-Taiyo Limited between the
Solomon Islands and Japan (1971-2000).189 The developed State on the other hand,
mainly aims to obtain a profit by accessing the tuna resources of the coastal State and in
addition, to sell their inputs and services to the venture; exploit local or neighbouring
markets; have a base for fishing operations; benefit from the local knowledge of the
partner and benefit from incentives of both the host government and/or the partner’s
government.190
Similarly, the partners in a fisheries joint venture have varied concerns. The
foreign partner may be concerned about restrictions on fisheries; difficulties in local
procurement and import of equipment; high turnover rates for local operations
(including the costs for hiring, training, and overstaffing requirements by host
government); high start up costs, and restrictions on export of profits in foreign
exchange.191 The developing coastal State on the other hand, would be concerned about
reluctance of foreign crews to train locals; provision of equipment not suitable for local
operation; exploitation of inexperienced host country partners; interference of joint
venture operation with local fishermen; high wages paid to crews and breaching of the
terms of the joint venture.192 In summary, the cooperation in joint ventures brings
together a combination of complementary competences which are likely to enhance the
performance of the joint venture if transferred effectively.193
Coastal States may subject joint ventures to national legislative control in order
to ensure real participation of local interests. For example, in an equity-based
international joint venture the terms of equity sharing are very important. Equity share
is measured by percentage. In Mauritania for example, when joint ventures were
188
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initiated in 1979, one of the objectives of the fisheries policy was to create joint
ventures that were Mauritanian-controlled. Such joint ventures thus implied a
government share of 43%, an 8% local private sector share and 49% foreign share.194
Similarly, the Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd. (IOT) joint venture between the Seychelles
government and Heinz has a shareholding of 60:40 respectively,195 while the Fiji Fish
company operating in the longline tuna fishery of Fiji in 2005 owned 30% of the 25
vessels in a joint venture with Taiwanese vessel owners, with half the crew on these
vessels made up of Fijians, while the rest were Indonesian, Chinese and Filipinos.196 In
Senegal majority shareholding is recommended for all fishing operations with an aim of
naturalization at the end,197 while Ghana’s Fisheries Act stipulates that at least 50% of
shares in all tuna vessels must be owned by Ghanaian citizens, the Ghanaian
government, a company or partnership registered by law in Ghana.198

7.5.3.1 Benefits for Developing Coastal States from Fisheries Joint Ventures
Developing coastal States have benefitted from joint venture agreements in
fisheries which have provided the opportunity for them to develop fishing capacity in
partnership with foreign investors, often using vessels that are already operational with
an experienced crew.199 For example, Namibia has created a fisheries sector with
substantial constructive foreign participation by developing a management regime that
enables local rightholders in its fisheries to charter foreign vessels through joint
ventures,200 while most tuna fishing vessels in Ghana are operated under joint venture
arrangements with foreign companies often from Korea.201

194

http://www.photius.com/countries/mauritania/economy/mauritania_economy_fishing.html (accessed 5
January 2011).
195

Philippe Michaud, Experience from the bilateral fisheries access agreement, impact on the economy
and implication for Seychelles of the outcome of the WTO mediation on the case of tuna between the EU
and Thailand and Philippines, Seminar on ACP-EU fisheries relations: towards a greater sustainability
ACP Secretariat, Brussels, Belgium 7-9 April 2003.
196

Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, Capturing Wealth from Tuna-Key Issues for Pacific Island Countries
(2006) 37.

197

R Hamlisch and G K F Moore, Joint Ventures in Fishery Development in the CECAF Area (1975).

198

Republic of Ghana, Fisheries Act 2000, Section 47.

199

Robin Mahon and Patrick McConney, Management of Large Pelagic Fisheries in CARICOM
Countries. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 464 (FAO, 2004) 91.

200

Sumaila et al, Namibia’s Fisheries: Ecological, Economic and Social Aspects (Eburon Academic
Publishers, 2004). After achieving independence in 1990, Namibia inherited fisheries that had been
heavily overfished by DWFNs from the apartheid system. Through a policy of Namibianisation, which

289

Joint venture agreements have also provided opportunities for the development
of infrastructure, availability of markets for fisheries products, development of technical
skills and enhanced fisheries management for developing coastal States that lack the
capability to develop their tuna fisheries. On the other hand, DWFNs have been able to
secure access to fisheries resources mostly in the EEZs of developing coastal States.
Such agreements may be government controlled or they can also be established
privately between foreign private firms and local firms in the coastal State with tuna
resources.202
For instance, Japanese fishing companies have maintained locally-based
presence in the western Pacific for a long time. Between late 1950s and 1980s these
companies established a significant number of tuna fishing joint ventures in the Western
Pacific which involved various onshore investments.203 As a result of such
arrangements, the Pacific Island States have realised substantial financial benefits from
shore based developments and value-added seafood processing activities.204 The
Japanese favoured such joint-ventures with the Pacific Island States for various reasons.
First, joint ventures secured supplies for Japanese markets,205 and gave Japan allies in
international fisheries debates.206 Second, Japan could export tuna products to the main
markets in Europe and US under the preferential trade arrangements between the ACP
coastal States and the EU through its association with the Pacific Island States. Third,
the Japanese could access live bait in the Pacific for skipjack fishing.207 Examples of
ensured a greater degree of Namibian participation, the State developed a management regime based on
limited access and allocation of rights. Through foreign investment, the goals for Namibianisation and
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some companies that were established between the Japanese fishing companies and the
Pacific Island governments discussed earlier include the Solomon Taiyo in Solomon
Islands and PAFCO in Fiji, both of which established canneries that are still
operational.208
Similarly, the African States have relied on joint ventures to develop their
fishing industry since the mid 70s.209 By the 1980s the majority of joint ventures were
to be found in Africa, with most partners originating from Asia and Europe.210 During
this period Africa hosted 32% of the joint ventures in which 51% of the foreign partners
originated from the Middle Eastern and Asian countries and 33% from Europe.211 Tuna
fisheries represented 22% of these joint ventures.212 Today, joint ventures still prove
beneficial to States such as South Africa,213 Mauritania,214 and Senegal.215
The successful implementation of a joint venture depends fundamentally on the
partners having a clear understanding and appreciation of each others objectives in the
venture.216 In this regard, coastal States and DWFNs, or companies compliment each
other as far as skills, costs and markets are concerned, and must therefore be willing to
cooperate towards the achievement of their objectives.217 Partners are motivated to enter
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into a joint venture arrangement to fulfil their need for additional resources,218
recognising that together they can develop ‘synergy to permit a greater probability of
success than the sum of their individual probabilities’.219

7.5.3.2 Legal and Policy Practices Relating to Fisheries Joint Ventures
Generally, joint ventures have played and continue to have an important role in
developing the tuna fishing industry in developing coastal States. Since most joint
ventures in tuna fisheries are established between developing coastal States and foreign
partners, some developing coastal States have made efforts to formulate policies that
would attract foreign investments as a mechanism for promoting the formation of joint
ventures. Such States endeavour to provide the appropriate incentives and an enabling
regulatory environment in order to facilitate the development of the tuna industry. Some
of these States have therefore liberalised their economies by providing fiscal and
monetary incentives, implementing appropriate policies and providing the relevant
institutional support.
The Seychelles’ fisheries policy for example, perpetuates the State’s vision to
‘create an efficient and productive environment for the promotion of investment,
production and trade in the fisheries sector’ by encouraging joint ventures between local
and foreign entrepreneurs with a view to developing its national tuna harvesting
capability for the social and economic benefit of its citizens.220 Hence, the Seychelles
Agriculture and Fisheries Incentive Act provides various concessions in form of trades
tax on equipment and commercial vehicles; goods and services tax (GST) on raw
materials; business tax on marine resources investments; social security; gainful
occupation permit concessions; fuel concessions; accelerated depreciation on capital
investment other than land and building; and marketing and promotion expenses.221
Aside from enabling policies, some coastal States have enacted legislation with
specific legal provisions governing fishing joint ventures. For example, the Fisheries
218
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Act of Malaysia authorises the Minister to make regulations to prescribe the rules and
procedures in respect of foreign capital investment and joint venture proposals in
fisheries, including the procedures for effective transfer of technology and training of
Malaysian Personnel.222 In Indonesia, government regulations provide for the
cooperation between nationals and foreigners in joint ventures in order to achieve
optimum utilisation of the fisheries resources of the Indonesian EEZ.223 To implement
this regulation, a Ministerial Decision regulating fishing vessels in the Indonesian EEZ
has been promulgated to ensure the responsible, optimal and sustainable utilisation of
fisheries resources in the Indonesian EEZ. Joint ventures have been suggested as one of
the mechanisms for utilising such resources.224 Joint venture companies are to be
established in accordance with Indonesian investment regulations.225 These companies
are obliged to construct a fish processing unit if they operate 20 or more vessels, at a
minimum value of 20% of the total value of operating vessels.226 Some Latin American
and African States make access to EEZ resources contingent upon the establishment of
joint ventures with coastal State companies.227

7.5.3.3 Fishing Joint Venture Experience in Kenya
The availability of pertinent information on foreign fishing in the Kenyan
exclusive economic zone is very limited. However, the limited documentation regarding
some of the historical fishing activities in the zone provides evidence of some domestic
activities in the Kenyan EEZ since the 70s. Historically, the Japanese have operated
tuna longline fishing vessels in Kenya since the 1970s under joint ventures.228 A joint
venture between the Kenya Maritime Company, Industrial Credit Development
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Corporation and ‘Ataka and Taiyo’ company of Japan was one of the operations in the
Kenyan EEZ during this time.229 The longline fishing operation which engaged
Japanese fishing vessels was under operation for a for three years. The Japanese fishing
vessels withdrew from the joint venture citing poor arrangements for transhipment.230
Upon the withdrawal of Japan from the joint venture, Industrial Credit Development
Corporation formed Kenya Fishing Industries in an attempt to establish a national tuna
longline industry.
The fishing vessels operating under Kenya Fishing Industries were foreign joint
venture vessels from Asia. Thus in 1980, Kenya Fishing Industries commissioned the
construction of two longliners in Korea, FV Alpha Funguo and FV Alpha Uchumi in its
efforts to secure its own fishing vessels. Both these vessels were operated by expatriate
Korean skippers and Kenyan crew members.231 The operations of Kenya Fishing
Industries were short-lived and it collapsed due to high operating costs, poor marketing
and low catches of tuna.232 A third company Southern Engineering Company Limited
acquired the vessels from Kenya Fishing Industries in 1993 and in addition Southern
Engineering Company Limited purchased another vessel, Alpha Alana. The operations
of Southern Engineering Company Limited were also short-lived and in 1995 it shut
down due to poor catches.233
The efforts to establish joint ventures in Kenya appear to have been hampered
by infrastructural problems and the prevailing governance structure from the initial
stages. This problem may also have been aggravated by the lack of knowledge and
understanding about the population dynamics of tuna, the state of the tuna stocks and
their migratory patterns. Beside natural processes and technological issues, these factors
might have contributed to the low levels of tuna catches from the fishing operations.
There is no doubt that the financial inputs may have also been prohibitive. Thus far, it
appears that the operation of joint ventures has not been successful in Kenya.
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7.5.3.4 Issues Associated with Fisheries Joint Ventures
There are certain drawbacks associated with fisheries joint ventures. The
challenges that joint ventures are likely to manifest which are significant for developing
States broadly include; financial risk and the financial manipulation by the DWFNs.234
DWFNs have financial, technical and market access advantages which developing
coastal States need for the development of their tuna fisheries and national economies.
By having control over managing and marketing of the venture, DWFNs often charge
excessive fees for these services to enhance their returns while denying profits to the
coastal State.235 Consequently, the venture may not have the anticipated national
economic impact.236 Joint ventures are also complex to evaluate, negotiate and
implement compared to other forms of foreign participation. This is because joint
ventures involve multiple internal inter-organisational and intercultural relationships.237
Joint ventures can therefore be expensive to negotiate and time consuming.238
In some situations joint ventures may compete for fishing grounds against local
fishers and also amongst each other, resulting in conflicts that may limit fishing
operations and also threaten the stocks.239 Conflicts such as these can make it difficult to
plan joint ventures between coastal fishing States with large numbers of artisanal fishers
and DWFNs especially when two or more nationalities or ethnic groups are involved.240
Some States have formulated polices to deal with such situations. For example, the
investment policy in Ghana designates areas set aside for the State, areas where foreign
234
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ownership is to be associated with local interests and areas where foreign ownership
alone is allowed.241 The employment of workers in a joint venture can also be a source
of conflict. This is because host countries usually limit the number of foreigners who
can be employed and the length of their stay in the country. Joint venture agreements
may also have a condition requiring the employment of nationals of coastal States.
However, most local people may not have the knowledge, skill and experience required
in fishing and processing practices.242 This list is not however exhaustive as joint
ventures vary in structure and will present unique challenges.
In many Japanese fishing joint ventures for example, it is believed that the
breakdown has resulted from lack of clarity in procedures for dealing with
dissatisfaction and disengagement.243 Generally other challenges of joint ventures which
ought not to stand in the way of cooperation result mainly from ‘lack of understanding
of partners objectives’, ‘lack of definition of responsibilities and contributions’, and
‘inaccurate prediction of relative costs and benefits’.244 In spite of these challenges joint
ventures are important to global tuna fisheries.
As the capital, services and other facilities in a fishing joint venture are to be
shared, it will be necessary for Kenya to establish a stable capital base and also to
identify suitable partners to participate in such a development if it is to implement joint
ventures. As discussed above (7.5.3.3), Kenya’s infrastructure, governance structure and
expertise ought to lend support to such an initiative. The role of the private sector is also
key to the implementation of joint ventures, particularly regarding capital, technology
and management. Kenya may impose a condition for employment and/or training of its
nationals under a joint venture agreement, thereby developing a variety of skills and
capabilities in the tuna industry.

241

R Hamlisch and G K F Moore, Joint Ventures in Fishery Development in the CECAF Area (1975).

242

Nik Mustapha bin Raja Abdulla, Richard S. Johnson and R. Bruce Rettig, ‘Joint Ventures in Fisheries’
in James Barney Marsh (ed.), Resources and Environment in Asia’s Marine Sector (Taylor and Francis,
1992) 124.
243

K Honda, ‘Fishery joint ventures in developing countries’, in J W C Tomlinson and P S Brown, ‘Joint
Ventures with Foreigners as a Method of Exploiting Canadian Fishery Resources under Extended
Fisheries Jurisdiction’ (1979) 5 Ocean Management 251-261.
244

J W C Tomlinson and P S Brown’s ‘Joint Ventures with Foreigners as a Method of Exploiting
Canadian Fishery Resources under Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction’ (1979) 5 Ocean Management 251261.

296

7.5.4 The Role of Fisheries Access Agreements for Developing Coastal States
Generally, access agreements provide a source of foreign exchange earnings or
access to developed States’ markets that developing coastal States may otherwise not be
able to obtain.245 The earnings from fisheries access agreements make a significant
contribution to government revenue for some developing coastal States. The coastal
States of the Sub-Saharan West Africa for example, are heavily dependent on revenues
accruing from licence fees paid under access agreements, and for most of these States
coastal fishery resources are the most significant natural asset.246
For example, 25% of the government budget of Mauritania comes from the €86
million earned from the Mauritania-EU agreement.247 Additionally, Mauritania and
Senegal receive up to 50% of their export revenue from fish products.248 Although some
Pacific Island States (Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Tonga and Samoa) have developed local
fishing industries, fisheries access agreements remain a major source of revenue for
Kiribati, Tokelau, Nauru and Tuvalu.249 In Kiribati and Federated States of Micronesia,
access fees amount to about 45% and 25% of government revenue respectively.250
Access agreements also have the potential to aid the integration of fishing or
fish-processing industries in developing States into the global economy, and can help
promote conservation and sustainable fisheries if well implemented.251 Such agreements
are still used as the main mechanism of foreign participation by flag States in the EEZs
of many coastal States. For this reason, the national legislation of some States
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recognises and gives effect to access agreements as a mechanism for foreign fishing.
Examples of the fisheries legislation of Seychelles and PNG are representative.
The Seychelles Fisheries Act 1987 authorises the Minister to enter into
agreements with other States, intergovernmental organisations and associations
representing foreign fishing vessel operators and to allocate fishing rights to their
vessels.252 It further states that the total fishing rights allocated by access agreements
should not exceed the total resources or amount of fishing allocation permitted to
foreign fishing vessels by the applicable fisheries management and development plan.253
In addition access agreements are required to make appropriate provision for Flag State
responsibility, or responsibility by organisations or associations.254 The Fisheries Act of
Ghana has similar provisions.255
Papua New Guinea also sets out various principles governing access agreements
in its Fisheries Management Act. It requires that foreign fishing vessels operate in the
fisheries waters of Papua New Guinea under an access agreement and in accordance
with a valid and applicable license issued under fisheries law.256 The legislation also
gives authority to the Government of Papua New Guinea to enter into access
agreements with States and regional economic integration organisations; fishing
associations or similar body; a publicly incorporated company; or an individual.257 It
adds that, the term of validity of an access agreement for foreign fishing vessels is not to
exceed one year.258 Further, the Fisheries Management Act sets out the criteria to be
used by Papua New Guinea in decision-making on access agreements and their
negotiation,259 and requires that each signatory of an access agreement (State or fishing
association) agrees to assume flag State responsibility and complies with and enforces
Papua New Guinea laws.260
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7.5.5 Issues Associated with Fisheries Access Agreements
As previously discussed, access agreements were attractive to coastal States as a
mechanism for managing foreign fishing as opposed to direct licensing because coastal
States could secure recognition of their jurisdiction and rights, as well as for purposes of
compliance and economic gain. For fishing States, access agreements provided an
opportunity to remind coastal States of their obligation to give access to surplus
fisheries resources that they had no capacity to harvest, and the need to minimise
economic dislocation with historical fishing in waters now under national
jurisdiction.261 Over time however, access agreements have become more inclined to
facilitating profitable fishing opportunities for DWFNs, securing fish supplies for their
processing industries, and serving goals associated with the deployment of their vessels
in foreign waters.262 As a result, a number of inconsistencies with international fisheries
instruments have resulted from the access agreements put in place by fishing States,
namely, overexploitation, non-compliance, and transparency. Such inconsistencies do
not ensure the sustainability of fisheries resources in the EEZ of coastal States.

7.5.5.1 Over-exploitation of Fisheries Resources
The terms of access agreements can lead to the over-exploitation of fisheries
resources in developing coastal States and subsequently, the long-term decline of such
resources. The LOSC requires coastal States to provide access to their surplus fisheries
resources through such agreements.263 However, due to the lack of data on most fish
stocks in developing coastal States, access agreements have often been negotiated
without sufficient knowledge of the state of the fish stocks involved.264 Thus, access
agreements are often concluded without the surplus of such fish stocks being
determined.265
Further, such agreements may not take into account the overall fishing effort on
the fish stocks concerned, hence, by introducing increased effort, such fish stocks are
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exposed to over-exploitation.266 The lack of management capacity in most developing
coastal States has also been recognised as a major cause of such over-exploitation by
contributing to overcapacities of fishing fleets.267 Such overcapacities, if not reduced,
aggravate the sustainability of fisheries resources like tuna.268 An additional concern
about access agreements is that, many of them do not clearly define the limits on effort
or catch. Under such circumstances, these agreements carry a risk of overfishing.269

7.5.5.2 Issues of Non-Compliance
The pressures exerted on fisheries resources of developing coastal States as a
result of competing interests have intensified IUU fishing activities.270 Fishing vessels
operating under access agreements have been known to engage in various activities
which disregard the conservation measures adopted internationally, regionally and by
coastal States. Contrary to the terms of the access agreement, such vessels may fail to
report or under-report catches,271 a problem which is further exacerbated by the
inadequate MCS capacity in many developing coastal States. Additional problems
include the use of proscribed fishing gear,272 fishing in closed/protected areas,273 and
unauthorised targeting, particularly of sharks by tuna longliners.274 Not only do these
266
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activities result in economic losses of benefits by developing coastal States,275 but IUU
fishing activities also have negative impacts on the sustainability of target species and
the wider ecosystem,276 and also have negative consequences for food supply.277 The
value of IUU fishing in Africa has been estimated at US$0.9 billion.278

7.5.5.3 Lack of Transparency
Another criticism against fisheries access agreements is their limited
transparency.279 The negotiation process of access agreements remains a confidential
affair.280 In the case of the EU, such negotiations do not involve the civil society or
other domestic fishing stakeholders,281 while the agreements entered into with Asian
governments or fishing associations remain private with no information whatsoever to
the public.282 This situation further weakens the bargaining power of developing coastal
States, making it difficult for them to obtain adequate reporting on fish stocks and to
determine the value of the fish stocks in question.283
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Orellana points out that the key challenge to transparency is attaching
consequences to practices devoid of transparency, and emphasises that coastal States
granting access to their EEZs need to establish effective monitoring schemes and to
avail accurate data on the biological status of target and associated stocks.284 The
secrecy that attends access agreements is also seen as an incentive for corrupt
practices.285
The problems associated with access agreements have received much attention
globally from the international community and world governments including by
organisations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). Their considerations underscore the need for sustainable access
agreements which are compatible with the current international fisheries instruments.
WWF, in particular has set out the key principles for such agreements and related
management plans, through the preparation of a handbook.286 These principles concern,
inter alia, the total catch permitted to a DWFN;287 DWFNs sharing environmental costs;
protection of the interests of small-scale artisanal fishers of the coastal State; flag State
compliance by its vessels with coastal State laws and regulations; cooperation of
DWFNS with the coastal State in carrying out research; and the need for the coastal
State to ensure its MCS capabilities are adequate.288
The above shortcomings of access agreements bring to light the issues that a
developing coastal State such as Kenya ought to be aware of and to consider if it is to
adopt access agreements as the appropriate instrument for the development of its tuna
fisheries. The issues that are central to sustainable access agreements are to ensure
responsible fishing and sustainable fisheries. The changes in the approach of the
European Community (EC) to access agreements represents current best practice in
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respect of responsible and sustainable fisheries.289 The EC has moved away from
fisheries access agreements and is implementing Fisheries Partnership Agreements
(FPAs) which aim to embrace the principles of sustainability.290 These agreements are
the subject of the following section.

7.6 The European Union Fisheries Partnership Agreements
The European Union (EU) Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) provide EU
vessels with access to fisheries resources in waters of third countries. Relative to other
fishing States, the EU fishing fleet is the most prevalent in the Western Indian Ocean
(WIO), with a significant allocation of financial investments.291 FPAs are thus a very
significant source of revenue for the coastal States with EU agreements. The FPAs are
particularly important for the development of tuna fisheries in the African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) coastal States. These agreements are thus invaluable and highly
relevant to the present thesis.
Most of the EU member States have long traditions as DWFNs.292 As a major
fishing power,293 the EU has negotiated and concluded bilateral fisheries agreements on
behalf of the Community fisheries sector with third countries since 1979.294 Such
agreements have been necessitated by the growing dependence of the EU on fish
imports to fulfil the demands of the market.295 Hence, the EU adopted the Common
289
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Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983 which is a comprehensive framework for the
management of the fisheries sector with a presiding ethos to achieve a balance between
the conservation of fish stocks and the maintenance of viable national fishing
industries.296 The EU policy on fishing in third States is aimed at protecting the interests
of the EU in the fishing sector. Therefore, traditionally, the aim of the EU fishing
agreements has been; to supply the European fish processing industry with raw
materials;297 to maintain fishing capacity outside EU waters; and to maintain EU
employment.298
The scope of the Common Fisheries Policy extends to conservation,
management and exploitation of living aquatic resources and aquaculture, as well as the
processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products, where such activities are
practiced on the territory of Member States or in Community waters or by Community
fishing vessels or nationals of Member States.299 Fisheries access agreements have been
a major component of the CFP since the adoption of the LOSC.300 Since its
establishment in 1983, the CFP has undergone reforms in 1992 and 2002, with an aim
of becoming more effective in achieving its main objective of preserving fish stocks.301
The main areas of reform are with respect to the conservation of resources; protection of
the environment from the impacts of fishing; fleet management; common organisation
of markets; relations with third States; and control and enforcement.302 The regulations
adopted during the last reform of the CFP in 2002 are particularly significant for the
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conservation and sustainability of tuna fisheries resources in developing coastal States.
This is because the EU Fisheries Partnership Agreements were created as a result of the
2002 CFP reform.303
The basis for FPAs was established when the Agriculture and Fisheries Council
adopted conclusions on an Integrated Framework for Fisheries Partnership Agreements
(FPAs) with third countries in July 2004.304 FPAs incorporate economic, environmental
and social objectives into access agreements.305 In contrast to the previous fisheries
access agreements that the EU entered into with third countries, FPAs are designed to
be negotiated and developed through a partnership approach,306 and they aim to
contribute more effectively to sustainable fisheries management in the coastal State.
FPAs are required to address the following issues; contribute towards rational and
sustainable exploitation of the surplus of coastal States’ marine resources; improve
scientific and technical knowledge of the fisheries in question; contribute towards
combating IUU fishing; contribute towards strategies for the sustainable management of
fisheries as defined by the coastal State; facilitate the integration of developing coastal
States into the global economy; and foster better global governance of fisheries.307
Of the EU’s nineteen FPAs in force with third States, fifteen of them are with
ACP States. Twelve of the agreements with ACP States are tuna agreements. The EU
fisheries partnership agreements are thus significant for the development of the tuna
industries of the African coastal developing States.
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7.6.1 ACP-EU Fisheries Partnership Agreements
The EU fishing operations with ACP States are conducted under bilateral
agreements. Such agreements which are contingent upon financial compensation
contribute immensely to government budgets in some of the States.308 The EU is also
the main trading partner for ACP fisheries products and it accounts for at least 75% of
ACP fishery exports by value.309 Table 4 lists the current ACP-EU Agreements.
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Table 4. ACP-EU Fisheries Partnership Agreements310

Country

Period

Type

Total EU finance per
Year)

Earmarked for
Fisheries policy
development
100%
60%
100%

Cape Verde
Comoros
Cote
d’Ivoire
Gabon
Guinea

2007-2010
2005-2011
2007-2013

Tuna
Tuna
Tuna

€385 000
€390 000
€595 000

2005-2011
2009-2012

Tuna
Tuna

GuineaBissau
Kiribati

2007-2011

Mixed

€860 000
60%
€1 050 000 first Year 100%
decreasing
Following years
€7 500 000
2 950 000

2006-2012

Tuna

€478 400

Madagascar
Mauritania

2007-2012
2008-2012

Tuna
Tuna

Micronesia
Morocco
Mozambique
Sao Tome
and
Principe
Seychelles

2007-2010
2007-2011
2007-2011
2006-2010

Tuna
Mixed
Tuna
Tuna

€1 197 000
€86 million first
decreasing
Following years
€559 000
€36.1 million
€900 000
€663 000

2005-2011

Tuna

€5 355 000

Solomon
Islands

2006-2009

Tuna

€400 000

30% to be
Increased to 40%
Second year
Later to 60%
80%
Year 11 million €/yr
Increasing in
Future
18%
13.5 million €
100%
50%
56% from
17.01.2008
30%

From table 4, it is seen that the EU has an important stake in the tuna fisheries of
the WIO region, as all the EU agreements with the States in the region (Comoros,
Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles) are tuna agreements. These agreements play
an important role for the processing sector (tuna canning) which is dependant upon the
supply from EU vessels for supply to the EU markets.311 Negotiations for access to the
310

Fisheries Agreements with Countries Outside EU http://ec.europa.eu/(accessed 1 January 2011).
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Agreement, tuna exports to the EU must be wholly obtained in order to qualify for duty-free access to EU
markets. The main criteria for originating products are registration and flag, ownership and crewing
arrangements on the fishing vessels and factory ships. For further reading on Rules of Origin see, Lindsey
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tuna resources of such States are conducted by the European Commission. The
negotiations are based on the expressions of interest to fish in specific coastal States’
waters which are communicated to national governments or to the Commission by
European fishing companies.312
The EU fisheries partnership agreements have a specific structure. The FPA
consists of an all-encompassing agreement which establishes principles, rules and
procedures governing economic, financial, technical and scientific cooperation with the
coastal State; conditions governing access by Community vessels to coastal State
waters; and arrangements for surveillance in coastal States waters. A protocol and
annexes appended to the agreement detail the fishing opportunities and financial
contribution of the EU. Fishing opportunities for tuna stocks are expressed in vessel
numbers.
The EU-Seychelles agreement is an example of a tuna FPA. This agreement
took effect from 18 January 2005 and has a duration of six years ending on 17 January
2011.313 The Seychelles fisheries industry is the State’s highest foreign exchange earner
and the tuna cannery the largest employer.314 Port Victoria in Seychelles is the principle
tuna transhipment port in the region.315 As the access rights for tuna are expressed in
vessel numbers, the agreement provides access to 52 EC vessels (40 seiners and 12
longliners) from Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. The financial compensation for a
total of 63,000 tonnes annually amounts to €4,095,000, and a specific amount of
€1,260,000 annually allocated to support the Seychelles sectoral fisheries policy for
promoting responsible fishing,316 mainly through control, monitoring and enforcement
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activities.317 The support for development of fisheries policy is considered very
significant for dealing with issues concerning under-reporting of catches which are
extremely crucial.318 The EU vessel owners are required to pay a fee of €35 per tonne of
tuna caught and to secure a license for seiners at €15,000 and longliners at €3000.319 A
3 year protocol has been negotiated between Seychelles and the EU following the
expiration of above FPA.320

7.6.2 Issues Associated with Fisheries Partnership Agreements
Although the EU has initiated reforms of its fisheries policy and adopted a new
approach to fisheries access agreements with ACP States, the EU bilateral agreements
continue to attract criticism.321 Critics of these agreements claim that the fishing
activities of EU fishing vessels in ACP States are not in conformity with its obligations
to promote the sustainable utilisation of fish resources as required by the CFP and
current international law. Instead, the excess fishing capacity of the EU fleets operating
in these States with weak monitoring and enforcement capabilities contributes to
overexploitation of fish stocks.322 Further, the financial compensation from EU fishing
agreements is not commensurate with the fishing opportunities provided.323 It is
believed that, despite the EU responding to such criticisms through the implementation
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of FPAs, the basis of the agreements have remained the same,324 and that, a number of
the provisions in the ACP-EU agreements do not ensure the long-term sustainability of
tuna fisheries. The issues of concern include the sustainable utilisation of fisheries
resources and environmental protection; monitoring, control and surveillance; and
economic and social benefits to ACP States.325 The following section discusses these
issues and the efforts of the FPAs to address them.

7.6.2.1 Impacts of EU Fishing Fleets on Fish Stocks in ACP States
It is difficult to estimate the actual impact of EU fishing fleets on ACP tuna
stocks in the ACP-EU agreements. The fishing effort has often been underestimated,
especially because the access agreement has not stipulated any catch limitation. Basing
the fishing possibilities for access to tuna stocks on the number of boats has also made it
difficult to obtain an accurate estimation of the fishing effort.326 Hence, it is difficult to
estimate the real amount of catch and impact of the EU fishing fleets on the marine
environment as a whole. ACP–EU agreements may therefore be based on such
imprecise measurements of capacity.327 Although the LOSC requires the coastal State to
provide access only to surplus fish stocks, it is likely that access agreements are being
signed for stocks that are already overexploited.
The FPA addresses this issue by providing an exclusivity clause requiring all EU
vessels fishing in the EEZ of ACP States to operate under the FPA which ensures that
Community vessels are all engaged in fishing under the same terms and conditions, thus
limiting EU effort.328 According to the CFP reforms, the EU undertakes to conduct
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sustainability impact assessment studies on FPAs to ensure that they are negotiated,
agreed and implemented appropriately. The EU will also carry out an evaluation of the
impact that the FPA is likely to have on the local economy.329 Impact assessment
studies are viewed as a useful tool in ACP-EU fisheries relations if undertaken through
mutual participation of both parties, with the assessment of the various impacts being
conducted by independent bodies.330 The results of such studies are to be shared with
the ACP States as a gesture of partnership and transparency. Additionally FPAs base the
revision of fishing opportunities upon the best available scientific advice, provided
through a joint committee which is required to meet annually.331
The EU-Seychelles FPA for example, provides the functions of the joint
committee which include; monitoring the performance, interpretation and application of
the Agreement and evaluating its implementation; providing liaison for matters of
mutual interest relating to fisheries; forum for dispute settlement; and re-assessing the
level of fishing opportunities.332 According to the Agreement, the fishing opportunities
are to be adjusted based on the recommendations and resolutions of the IOTC.333 The
Agreement adds that; the Joint Committee shall meet once a year.334 In an EUSeychelles Joint Committee meeting in 2009 the two parties amicably resolved a
dispute regarding an increase in license fees sought by Seychelles. During this meeting
the EU compensated for the excess tuna catches taken in 2006-2007.335
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7.6.2.2 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Most ACP States lack the national capacity to monitor and control the activities
of DWFN fishing vessels, including those of the EU. They cannot therefore verify
catches taken from their vast EEZs by such vessels. The ACP-EU tuna agreements
create an additional incentive for EU vessel operators to under-report catches since the
calculation of access fees is based on the quantities of tuna caught. By reporting less
catches, the EU operators pay less.336 Under such circumstances, EU vessel operators
often under-report tuna catches or make no reports at all including for by-catch.337 The
extent of under-reporting and lack of sufficient data does not only make it difficult for
such ACP States to evaluate their tuna stocks, but it also hinders them from designing
the appropriate management plans for the sustainable management of tuna resources.338
FPAs have responded to this problem by incorporating various provisions to
address issues concerned with catch reporting. As in the fisheries agreements, FPAs
provide for observer programmes. The EU-Mozambique agreement for example,
provides for IOTC-designated observers to be taken on board EU vessels operating in
its waters.339 There is also increased provision for Satellite monitoring of vessels
through VMS, and the Commission is committed to support the establishment of VMS
protocols where conditions are insufficient, including other MCS activities under
partnership actions.340 This will go a long way in assisting to locate fishing vessels and
monitoring their activities. FPAs also provide transhipments restrictions, requiring such
activities to be carried out only in ports. They also provide a forum for dialogue on
stock status through a joint science committee, thus improving scientific knowledge of
tuna stocks in ACP States. Most ACP States still require immense financial and
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technical support to implement MCS schemes. If well implemented, MCS schemes
would be instrumental in ensuring that the EU is held accountable for compliance in
respect of VMS and catch reporting.

7.6.2.3 Developing the National Tuna Industry
From past experience of ACP-EU bilateral fisheries (“cash-for-access”)
agreements, it has been shown that the bulk of the economic benefits accruing from
such agreements go to the EU through value-added activities. According to a report on
the evaluation of EU fisheries agreements, the benefits to the EU from value-added are
at least three times that of ACP States.341 Although some ACP States have provisions
for compulsory landings, under-reporting of tuna catches and the poor monitoring
capacity of such States make it difficult to prove how much has been caught in the EEZ
of the State and how much should be landed.342 The EU is however making attempts to
enhance the benefits to ACP States through FPAs.
FPAs provide for the employment of local (as did access agreements) or ACP
crew. The FPAs add a social clause stipulating minimum conditions for employment of
crews on vessels and which must comply with minimum International Labour
Organisation standards.343 In the EU-Mozambique FPA for example, EU vessel
operators undertake to employ at least 20% of seamen of ACP origin, 40% of who
should be nationals of Mozambique.344 The EU-Seychelles FPA requires each tuna
seiner to take on board at least 2 Seychelles seamen.345 Most FPAs also include a
provision for joint ventures. Under such arrangements ACP States are facilitated to
integrate into the global economy and they also benefit from transfer of technology and
know-how as well as capital.346 Hence, the ACP States can extract value and valueadded from its tuna fisheries by activities such as building of a national fleet,
341
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developing or expanding the domestic processing sector, and increasing trade and
exports in tuna products.347 Seychelles for example, has captured significant valueadded through local landings and processing.
In respect of finance, the EU has widened the scope of the financial contribution
for FPAs. The calculation of the financial contribution is most significant for tuna
fisheries since it is not only based on access by the Community to the coastal State’s
fishing zone, but also on the Community’s financial support for enhancing responsible
fishing and the sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources in this zone. A portion of
the fund is therefore directed towards the implementation of a sectoral fisheries
policy.348 FPAs have thus moved away from just being purely commercial agreements
to contribute more to sustainable fisheries management in ACP States.349
It is arguable that FPAs will resolve the issues of unstainable fisheries especially
since the lack of reliable data on stocks continues to exacerbate the problem of
overfishing and the EU deems its investments in FPAs as commercial.350 Nevertheless,
FPAs are still preferred for developing the tuna industry in developing coastal States as
compared to the private agreements offered by other nations for various reasons. FPAs
offer ACP States a fair price for tuna purse seine agreements at 13% of the catch value
(normally 10%) and contribute more to local processing industries and trade compared
to Asian Agreements.351
For example, under the Japanese private agreements, PNG negotiated a fee of
USD$45-USD$48 per tonne for seine vessels for period 2006-2007 access period and
achieved a 6% return on catch value.352 On the other hand, WCPO coastal States receive
€35 per tonne in licence fees from EU seine vessel owners and an additional €65 per
tonne from the Community which works out to about USD$145 per tonne compared to
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Japan.353 EU tuna seiners under this arrangement are more compliant with regard to
catch declarations and entry/exit notices compared to their Asian counterparts.354
FPAs emphasise the partnership and offer opportunities for investment and
transfer of knowledge; provide a reliable, constant source of income making it easier to
plan budgets; and are a potential for immediate revenue source with minimal investment
cost.355 Compared to other fishing agreements, FPAs are much more transparent as the
text to the agreements, including fishing possibilities and financial contribution are
available in public domain.356 In summary, FPAs are a better deal for development than
the agreements that are offered by other States such as China,357 and they remain a vital
part of improved governance of tuna fisheries in ACP States.358

7.6.3 The Option of a Fisheries Partnership Agreement for Kenya
The EU Fisheries Partnership Agreement has the potential to aid the
development of Kenya’s tuna industry and to contribute to the sustainability of its tuna
fisheries. The potential investments from FPAs could provide a foundation for growth
and development in Kenya’s tuna fisheries and also improve fisheries management and
trade. This potential lies with the fisheries relations that Kenya has with the EU as an
ACP State. An FPA would enable Kenya to establish a dialogue with the EU, thereby
providing an opportunity for Kenya to negotiate for financial and technical assistance
from the EU which could directly benefit its tuna industry. There are a number of ways
in which Kenya may benefit by signing an FPA. These benefits include financial
contribution, monitoring and surveillance, and improved fisheries management.
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7.6.3.1 Participation of the EU and Financial Contribution
The participation of the EU fishing fleet in Kenya’s tuna fisheries through an
FPA will provide Kenya with the means of extracting economic rents from its tuna
resources which are currently considered underutilised. The current level of investment
in Kenya’s tuna fisheries is considered very low. Similarly, the low funding levels and
slow disbursements to the Department of Fisheries contribute to the challenge of
fisheries management as a whole.359 The financial contribution of an FPA in exchange
for access to Kenya’s tuna resources would provide a consistent and reliable source of
revenue to the national economy and the fisheries sector, making it easier for Kenya to
plan its budgets. The funds will also provide the necessary capital base for Kenya to
develop and benefit from its tuna industry with minimal costs of investment. A key
target for Kenya would be the development of a proper fishing port, landing, storage
and processing facilities,360 to enable the operations of EU fishing vessels and attract
other activities related to tuna fisheries.

7.6.3.2 Value-addition and Employment
The major economic benefits to be gained from and FPA are through valueadded.361 It would be to Kenya’s advantage to capture such benefits from such an
arrangement. Under an FPA, Kenya could consider enhancing its current tuna
processing operations for value addition, and the use of port facilities by EU vessels as a
direct means of obtaining sustainable benefits. The port of Mombasa in Kenya is
strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Kenya could encourage the use of the port for
transhipment or local landings. Through local landings, the activities of EU vessel
operators in Kenya could contribute to revenue through taxes and other payments. The
expenditure of EU vessels in port for the use of local services such as repairs, and
supplies of fuel, water and food, would create employment for Kenyans.
In Seychelles for example, the port industry contributes an estimated at €57
million annually to the economy through vessel expenditure.362 In Mauritius, a total of
€140 million a year is generated in port revenue and a similar amount from tuna
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processing export earnings.363 Local landings could also supply national fish markets,
thereby creating additional economic benefits to the State. The Kenyan processing
sector would also be assured of a steady supply of raw materials for their operations
from EU vessels, making their products acceptable to the EU and other international
markets. Increased fish exports would provide a significant source of foreign exchange
for Kenya.
Another benefit to Kenya is the possibility for employment of local crew upon
EU vessels. Through negotiations with the EU, a number of Kenyan seamen can be
employed to work under internationally acceptable standards (ILO standards).

7.6.3.3 Improved Fisheries Management
Although Kenya licences foreign fishing vessels to operate in its EEZ, the status
of the tuna resources is not known. A starting point for a Kenya-EU FPA would be for
the EU to provide accurate tuna catch and effort data of all their operations in Kenya’s
EEZ.364 Most of the purse seiners operating in Kenya’s EEZ belong to EU Member
States, mainly from Spain. Not only would such information give a clear indication of
the feasibility of such an arrangement but it would also be a good gesture of the
partnership approach being taken by the EU in an FPA.365 As the current status of tuna
resources in Kenya is not known, such data would be instrumental in providing
guidance on the fishing opportunities that may be negotiated for the EU.
An FPA could provide Kenya with the possibility to enhance the sustainability
of its tuna resources. This is because FPAs provide some level of regulation and control
on fishing vessels and support sustainable fisheries. First, the impacts of EU fishing on
Kenya’s tuna resources can be limited by the exclusivity clause provided in an FPA,
which restricts total EU effort in the EEZ. Secondly, the levels of fishing are to be based
on scientific advice and the status of the tuna stocks is to be reviewed annually through
a scientific committee. Thirdly, a proportion of the financial contribution from the EU
will be put towards the development of fisheries policy. Such funding can support the
formulation of a sustainable tuna management strategy for Kenya. As the present
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management of tuna resources in Kenya is not based on proper evaluation of the tuna
stocks or catch controls, there will be a need for complementary support in addition to
an FPA if Kenya is to improve in its fisheries management. Kenya also needs expertise
and technical support for effective management of its tuna fisheries. At present, Kenya
has no mechanism for monitoring the activities of DWFNs in its EEZ. An FPA can
provide a framework for VMS, observers and restrictions on transhipments for
improving monitoring and compliance in Kenya’s EEZ.
Overall, an FPA has the potential to contribute to the development of the tuna
industry in Kenya. However, if Kenya opts for this strategy, the FPA alone will not
necessarily guarantee the development and sustainable management of its tuna fisheries.
Kenya will need additional investment in the tuna fisheries and to develop its capacities
in diverse areas. An FPA provides the opportunity for Kenya to leverage support for an
approach that can help in laying a foundation for the management and development of
its tuna industry. The outcome of a Kenya-EU partnership agreement depends primarily
on how effectively Kenya can negotiate for fair terms that would be responsive to its
needs, concerns and obligations in respect of tuna.
As tuna is a highly migratory species, it is subject to exploitation by a number of
States within the total distribution range of its migration. States within this distribution
range lose the potential economic benefits from these shared stocks when they fail to
optimally utilise them in their EEZs. These benefits are further reduced by other States
in the region utilising the tuna stocks. Currently, there are other States in the WIO
region such as Seychelles, Comoros, Mozambique and Madagascar harvesting the tuna
stocks under FPAs. Kenya loses an opportunity to benefit economically from these tuna
resources if it does not employ a mechanism to utilise them optimally.
It has been pointed out previously that, although Kenya has potential tuna
resources in its EEZ, its capacity to develop its tuna resources is inadequate. Similarly,
Kenya’s capacity to monitor or control the activities of foreign fishing vessels in its
EEZ is inadequate. The sustainability of its tuna resources cannot therefore be assured.
Currently, Kenya’s tuna resources are being exploited by DWFNs without
commensurate benefits. It is therefore logical for Kenya to seek improved ways to
collaborate with DWFNs in order to establish mechanisms that would enable it to obtain
the full benefits from the foreign exploitation of its tuna stocks.
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A key advantage for Kenya is its sovereign rights to the utilisation of the tuna
resources in its EEZ. These rights enable Kenya to adopt the appropriate development
mechanisms in order to derive economic benefits from its tuna resources. As the
utilisation of Kenya’s tuna resources is governed by the LOSC, such mechanisms need
to be consistent with the relevant international requirements of law. Hence, it is
necessary for Kenya to take into account the sustainability and viability of its tuna
stocks, if it is to meet its international and regional commitments in respect of tuna.

7.7 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed two main approaches to tuna industry development;
domestic tuna industry development and fisheries access agreements. Concerning
domestic development of the tuna industry, it is shown that a number of enabling factors
such as good governance, adequate investment capital, raw materials, skilled labour,
equipment, infrastructure, and ready markets are required. It is also necessary for Kenya
to accord recognition to the domestic development objectives in the relevant national
policy documents. In respect of fisheries access agreements, it is essential that Kenya
ensures responsible fishing and sustainable fisheries by entering into agreements that
are consistent with international fisheries instruments.
Notably, Kenya belongs to the group of ACP States and already enjoys a
relationship with the EU. Hence, if Kenya opts for the EU agreement, the EU Fisheries
Partnership Agreement framework could provide the technical support and necessary
funding to initiate development of Kenya’s tuna fisheries. Kenya could be assured of
stable and better prices for its tuna fisheries products through FPAs as opposed to direct
licensing arrangements. As with the other strategies of tuna development discussed in
this chapter, the EU fisheries Partnership Agreement will only facilitate the
development of Kenya’s tuna industry and is not to be seen as the answer to all the
sustainable issues of the fishery.
Overall, Kenya is at a risk of losing the potential economic benefits from its tuna
resources if it does not adopt enhanced strategies for developing its tuna industry, since
a number of States in the WIO region are harvesting the same tuna stock under the
European Union FPAs and with other partners.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The LOSC changed the relations between coastal States and DWFNs
significantly by establishing the EEZ. As the LOSC recognised the rights of the coastal
State over the fisheries resources in the EEZ, many developing coastal States seized the
opportunity to gain economically from the fisheries resources in their EEZs, while
DWFNs, on the other hand, had to pay for access to resources which they had freely
obtained in the past under the freedom of the high seas. By securing fishing
opportunities in the waters of developing coastal States, DWFNs have maintained the
tuna supplies for their industries. The growing demand for tuna has however led to an
increase in global catches, thereby posing a threat to the long-term sustainability of tuna
stocks and having adverse effects on the wider ecosystem.

International fisheries

instruments impose obligations upon States to ensure the sustainability of tuna stocks
and to cooperate in their conservation and management.
This thesis sought to examine the international legal requirements for managing
tuna in the context of Kenya, in order to ascertain the national implementation actions
of these requirements. The introductory chapter of this thesis highlighted the global
significance of tuna and the sustainability concerns in tuna fisheries. It also provided an
overview of the tuna fisheries of Kenya. This chapter was followed by discussions on
the legal framework for the management of tuna fisheries and the measures necessary
for ensuring their long-term sustainability in the international, regional and national
context.
In chapter 2, the biological characteristics of tunas and the relevant international
legal instruments governing the management of tuna were examined. The relevant legal
instruments included the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement which are binding,
and the FAO Code of Conduct which is voluntary. It was established that tunas migrate
long distances for the purposes of feeding and reproduction, and that such migratory
movements may occur between the EEZs of two or more States, or between the EEZ
and the high seas. For this reason, tunas have been categorised as highly migratory
species under the LOSC. Such migratory behaviour has implications for the
management of tunas. Thus, in addition to tuna being subject to coastal State authority
in the EEZ, the LOSC also requires States to conserve and manage tuna cooperatively
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across their migratory range.1 The LOSC has granted coastal States significant access
and authority to the fisheries resources of the EEZ, including tuna. The LOSC equally
imposes corresponding conservation and management responsibilities in respect of
[tuna], requiring States to determine the allowable catch;2 contribute and share data;3
and ensure compliance of the measures they have adopted by instituting enforcement
mechanisms.4 The coastal State is also obliged to optimally utilize the [tuna] resources
in its EEZ,5 by giving other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch for which
it has no capacity to harvest.6
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement supplements the LOSC with respect to the
conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks like tuna,
and also in respect of the duty to cooperate on the high seas. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement provides the mechanisms that give effect to the duty to cooperate as required
by the LOSC, and places RFMOs in a central position in terms of its implementation.7
Thus, States are required to cooperate through RFMOs to achieve improved
conservation and management of tuna resources.8 To ensure the conservation and
management of tuna stocks in their entirety, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires
states to adopt compatible conservation and management measures across jurisdictional
zones, in the framework of the cooperative mechanisms it has provided.9 The RFMO
that is dedicated to the sustainable management of tuna resources in the Indian Ocean is
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
Chapter 3 provided a background to the governance framework for tuna
resources of the Indian Ocean and also gave a historical account of the management of
the Indian Ocean tuna fisheries. It reviewed the process of establishing the IOTC under
the FAO constitution,10 and discussed the relevant provisions of the Agreement for the
1

LOSC, Art. 63 and 64.

2

LOSC, Art. 61 (1).

3

LOSC, Art. 61 (5).

4

LOSC, Art. 73 (1); UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 21 and 22.

5

LOSC, Art. 62 (1).

6

LOSC, Art. 62 (2).

7

The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement, http://www.fao.org/ (accessed 28 February 2011).

8

UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 8(2).

9

UN fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 7(2)

10
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FAO Fisheries circular No. 913 (FAO, 1996).
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Establishment of IOTC. The chapter identified the relevant aspects of international
fisheries law that have not been addressed by the IOTC Agreement, and which hinder
the effectiveness and efficiency of the IOTC, namely, the precautionary and ecosystembased approaches. Another concern is the limitation on participation of entities in the
IOTC, which excludes Taiwan, a major distant water fishing entity operating in the
Indian Ocean. By limiting the participation of Taiwan in its work, the IOTC prevents
Taiwan from discharging its obligation to cooperate as required by the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. An additional issue of concern is the IOTC affiliation to FAO, particularly
in respect to the IOTC budget. This relationship is believed to be impacting negatively
on the efficiency of the work of the IOTC.11
Chapter 4 examined the conservation and management measures adopted by the
IOTC in respect of the tuna stocks under its purview, and assessed the consistency of
such measures with the provisions of the LOSC, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the
FAO Code of Conduct regarding the determination of allowable catch, data contribution
and sharing, and compliance and enforcement. The inadequacies identified in the IOTC
measures relate to catch quotas and TACs; decision-making, conservation of non-target
species and species associated with or dependent upon tuna; and MCS. The chapter also
established that the efficiency and effectiveness of the IOTC is affected negatively by
poor compliance by Members and lack of cooperation by non-Members regarding data
contribution.
Chapter 5 provided a discussion of Kenya’s legal, policy and institutional
framework for managing fisheries. It also discussed the national development policies
and fisheries sector plans of Kenya, and examined the legislative practices of States in
respect of tuna. The key findings in this chapter are that, the Fisheries Act has no
provisions designed to establish specific management strategies for the management of
Kenya’s tuna resources, and that fisheries management issues have not been
satisfactorily addressed in the framework of Kenya’s national development plans.
Hence, the interests of the fisheries sector in Kenya have not been given priority. The
chapter proposed ways in which the fisheries legislation could incorporate
implementation of management approaches that respond to the unique biological
characteristics of tuna, such as management and development plans for designated
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fisheries. It also proposed ways in which policy-makers can be made to recognise the
value of tuna fisheries in order to enhance management performance.
Chapter 6 analysed Kenya’s legal and policy framework relative to the
conservation and management of the tuna resources in its jurisdiction, in order to assess
its consistency with international and regional obligations. The chapter demonstrated
that there are gaps in Kenya’s regulatory framework with respect to fishing capacity,
catch limits, conservation of non-target species, data collection, and various compliance
and enforcement measures. There is a need for legislative reform to modernise the legal
arrangements for fisheries in Kenya in order to meet the requirements of international
instruments concerning these aspects. The chapter has proposed ways in which the
current fisheries regulations could be enhanced so that they remain consistent with
Kenya’s obligations under international law for managing tuna.
Finally, chapter 7 reviewed Kenya’s efforts to utilise its tuna resources to date
and demonstrated that the tuna industry in Kenya is not well developed. The chapter
further examined strategies that could be adopted by Kenya, for the sustainable
utilisation of tuna resources under its jurisdiction, as well as related issues and
challenges. Lessons were drawn from the diverse experiences of other States,
particularly the Pacific Island States, in order to provide guidance for Kenya. The
approaches discussed in this chapter included domestic tuna industry development and
fisheries access agreements, including the European Union Fisheries Partnership
Agreements (FPAs).
Overall, this thesis set out to assess Kenya’s national response to international
obligations for managing tuna fisheries. It was argued that Kenya’s legal and policy
framework would only be considered adequate if it fully incorporated the appropriate
provisions of the relevant international instruments relating to the management of tuna
stocks. Thus, Kenya would need to satisfy three sets of criteria provided by the LOSC,
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct. The first criterion relates
to the determination of the TAC. The second type of criterion concerns the contribution
and sharing of tuna fisheries data. The third set of criteria comprises the implementation
of compliance and enforcement mechanisms including flag State duties, port State and
other MCS measures such as VMS, boarding and inspection, and observer programmes.
The analysis of Kenya’s regulatory regime as well as the fisheries conservation
and management practices demonstrated that Kenya has not fully met its international
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obligations in relation to the management of tuna, since it has not met most of these
criteria. The measures adopted by Kenya for managing its tuna resources are not fully
consistent with the measures adopted under international fisheries instruments and the
IOTC. The thesis identified particular areas where Kenya’s practice is not consistent
with international law. First, Kenya’s fisheries laws neither provide for the total
allowable catch nor fishing capacity. Second, the regulation of fisheries data remains
incomplete both for tuna and non-target species. Third, the compliance and enforcement
regime is inadequate.
At present, the management regime in Kenya does not adequately regulate
fishing capacity in the EEZ, which exposes the tuna resources to the possibilities of
overexploitation. In connection with this Kenya has not implemented the IPOA-Fishing
Capacity. The regulatory provisions on specific conditions upon which foreign fishing
licenses may be issued are largely absent, making it more difficult for fishing capacity
to be monitored. The problem is further compounded by the lack of provisions on catch
limits. This omission in Kenya’s legislation fails to ensure the sustainability of its tuna
resources.
Concerning non-target species, Kenya’s fisheries laws do not provide for
seabirds and sharks. Kenya has not implemented both the IPOA-Seabirds and the IPOASharks. The protection of marine turtles also remains incomplete and the penalty for
violations on the capture of marine turtles does not provide an effective deterrent. In this
respect, Kenya has not implemented measures in accordance with the FAO guidelines to
Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in Fishing Operations in respect of tuna fisheries. Such
provisions are necessary in order to reduce the ecosystem effects from incidental
mortality of non-target species in tuna fisheries, and for Kenya to fulfil its international
obligations in this regard.
The current data management system for tuna fisheries in Kenya does not ensure
the accuracy and quality of data. The data-related measures that Kenya has adopted do
not clearly establish the need for quality, accuracy and timeliness as required by
international law. This hinders the monitoring of the tuna catches from Kenya’s EEZ.
Further, there are no data reporting requirements for seabirds and sharks as required by
the IOTC. These omissions in Kenya’s legislation influence the reliability of data
essential for stock assessments and decision making for management purposes in tuna
fisheries.
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In respect of compliance and enforcement mechanisms for vessels operating in
the EEZ, Kenya’s fisheries regulations have been directed mainly at foreign fishing
vessels. Although Kenya has established the relevant regulations for foreign fishing
vessels, it has failed to adopt and implement measures concerning the maintenance of a
ships log against vessels flying its flag. Similarly there are no requirements for Kenyanflagged vessels to provide a call sign and country of registration of the vessel as
required by the IOTC. In addition, Kenya has failed to prohibit the operation of fishing
vessels not entered in the IOTC record of fishing vessels. These are significant gaps in
Kenya’s implementation of conservation and management requirements for tuna
fisheries. Similar gaps are also apparent in Kenya’s provisions relating to port States,
requiring vessel identification information prior to entry into port; terms and conditions
for decision making in respect of port entry and what would constitute denial of entry;
and conditions for the use of ports. There are no regulations on the inspection of vessels
in port and the procedures to be followed during such inspections. Similarly, the
procedures for handling Kenyan-flagged vessels when in port are not provided.
The Kenyan fisheries regulations have failed to provide for VMS requirements
for Kenyan-flagged vessels and national observer requirements. Additionally, Kenya
does not prohibit transhipment by tuna fishing vessels found to be in violation of its
conservation and management measures or those vessels that have undermined the
IOTC conservation and management measures. These gaps in Kenya’s legislation
jeopardise its ability to monitor the activities of fishing vessels in respect of tuna
catches, and to enhance compliance by such vessels to the conservation and
management measures adopted by both Kenya and the IOTC.
As noted in chapter 5, the fisheries sector in Kenya, and particularly the marine
fisheries have not been prioritised by the State for development since Kenya gained
independence in 1963. Aside from Kenya’s technical, financial and institutional
incapacities, it is likely that the low priority given to the fisheries sector has contributed
to Kenya’s failure to fully implement international fishery laws. It is notable, however,
that though most of the requirements of international law are not nationally legislated,
some of Kenya’s management practices respond to international fishery instruments. In
recent years, Kenya’s policy and institutional framework for fisheries has evolved and
recognises that the management of tuna fisheries is subject to international legal rules,
and emphasises the need to lobby for the implementation and translation of the relevant
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provisions of the LOSC into national policy and legislation in order for tuna fisheries to
be utilised sustainably. The establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries Development in
2008 presents an opportunity for the sector to assert itself. Kenya also recognises the
need for international cooperation to manage its tuna resources, hence its participation
in the IOTC.
Consistent with the objectives of this thesis, a number of recommendations have
been made resulting from the analysis of Kenya’s fisheries management practices and
its national legal and policy framework for managing tuna fisheries. These
recommendations could be incorporated under the Fisheries Act 1989 as amendments,
or as measures adopted under a legislated Kenyan National Tuna Fisheries Management
Plan.
A number of factors limit the effective utilisation of tuna resources in Kenya,
making it difficult for Kenya to meet its international requirements for optimum
utilisation of its tuna stocks. Among such factors is Kenya’s inadequate capacity to
develop its tuna resources, and to monitor or control the activities of foreign fishing
vessels in its EEZ. The current exploitation of Kenya’s tuna resources by DWFNs
without commensurate benefits and without effective enforcement does not ensure the
sustainability of such resources. For these reasons, chapter 7 emphasised the need for
Kenya to take advantage of its sovereign rights to utilise the tuna resources in its EEZ
by employing any of the strategies proposed. Kenya could therefore develop a domestic
tuna industry, or enter into access agreements in order to promote the development of its
tuna industry, while contributing to the sustainability of its tuna fisheries.
As a Party to the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Kenya has accepted
the opportunities as well as the responsibilities and obligations of establishing an EEZ.
Kenya can determine who will exploit the tuna resources in its EEZ and also limit such
exploitation to sustainable levels, with the hope of obtaining long-term economic
benefits from its tuna resources. Kenya also has a responsibility under international law
to ensure the sustainability of its tuna resources. It is entirely necessary for Kenya to
respond to its international obligations in this respect. Kenya stands to gain by
conserving and managing its tuna resources.
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APPENDIX 1
Republic of Kenya’s National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, 2008

Due to copyright the policy has been removed, however, it can be
found through the following web address:
http://uploads.agro-info.net/uploads/38/13/
e21bc85c062197b8f7ca7eab8ce2daeb/OCEANSANDFISHER.pdf
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